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     Tyres are still burning. Tyres can burn for a very long time.  
     The smell of burning rubber fills the air. 
     But this time it is not mingled with the sickly stench of roasting human flesh. 
     Just pure wholesome rubber. 
 
                                  Zakes Mda, Ways of Dying, 199. 
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 1 
Introduction 
The spectre of necklacing 
 
It is ironic though isn‟t it? History has swallowed the necklace. In ten years time it 
will be a faint memory; in twenty it will be the subject of an MA dissertation at 
the University of the Western Cape (Luke Alfred, 1996).
 1
    
 
Necklacing - the practice of placing a petrol soaked tyre around the neck of an individual 
before setting it alight - was most pronounced during the mid 1980s in South Africa. 
During 1985-1989, South Africa experienced intense resistance to apartheid, largely led 
by the exiled African National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). 
The practice of necklacing was a form in which political violence was manifest and 
emerged predominantly in townships. Initially, those targeted were allegedly persons 
suspected of collaboration, either as spies or as functionaries of the apartheid state. Later 
however, the lines became blurred between those suspected of collaboration and the use 
of the practice in deflecting the motives of murders not politically motivated.
2
 While the 
Eastern Cape was the epicentre of necklacing, the practice spread to other regions of 
South Africa. It is estimated that somewhere between 400 and 700 were killed in this way 
between 1985 and 1989.
3
 Yet despite the significance of the practice of necklacing in the 
                                                 
1
 L. Alfred, „A Story of Burning Flesh‟ in New Contrast, Vol.25, No. 2 (June 1997), 24. My emphasis. 
Alfred had written this memoir of sorts in early 1996 with specific emphasis on a necklace killing that he 
had witnessed in May 1986 through his binoculars. Whilst Alfred‟s “story” also concerns a dictionary that 
he was commissioned to compile of South African language in the mid 1980‟s and the decision by the 
publishers to omit the word „necklace‟, his statement is “ironic” in relation to my project. It opens a myriad 
of possible interesting discussions that relate to why UWC was mentioned as the institutional site for 
research into necklacing. 
2
 Amongst others, a case in point would be of the much publicised, “first white man that killed a black 
policeman by the „necklace method‟”, George Henry Burt case. Burt had reportedly first shot Sgt Johannes 
Buti Ndimande numerous times thereby killing him (6
th
 June 1986). Thereafter he went to a friend, Mr. 
Roger North, for assistance in covering up the murder by necklacing the body so as to make it appear as if 
the murder was a necklacing in the political violence sense. See for example, „White man faces “necklace” 
charge‟ in The Argus (17 July 1986) as well as, „White guilty of necklace murder in Cape Times (5 May 
1987). Burt was found guilty and sentenced to death but was granted clemency by former State President 
F.W. de Klerk in 1989. See, „Necklace case white won‟t hang‟ in Sowetan (29 May 1989). 
3
 The statistics on the practice of necklacing are not accurate due to the difficulty in distinguishing between 
a burning and a necklacing as well as constraints on access to information as a result of media restrictions 
imposed by the apartheid state as will be discussed in Chapter One. In P. W Botha‟s 23 April 1986 
parliamentary speech, he argued that 508 individuals had been necklaced since late 1984. See, „PW speaks 
on Black on Black violence‟ in The Sowetan (24 April 1986). By 1988 it was reported that 392 individuals 
had been necklaced between 1984 and 1987. See, „392 died by necklace‟ in Business Day (16 June 1988). 
By January 1987 the Centre for Investigation into Revolutionary Activities, based at Rand Afrikaans 
University, reported that, “from January 1984 to August 1986, 348 were killed by the „necklace‟ method 
while 20 were severely injured after escaping „necklace‟ deaths. A total of 275 were killed through other 
 
 
 
 
 2 
iconography of township revolt, it is relegated ambivalently as a spectre in historical 
accounts of the period.
4
   
 
This thesis falls within the category of historical studies that is concerned with “a difficult 
legacy” of South Africa‟s liberation struggle, namely the practice of necklacing that 
„accompanied‟ it.5 My interest in the practice is limited to its emergence and politicising 
as it relates to the ANC, the UDF and the apartheid state. The ANC and the UDF 
overwhelmingly understood the practice as resistance, yet ambivalently so. The question 
guiding this thesis therefore asks: how is necklacing written into the narrative of struggle 
history? Here I refer to its (re)representation, its (re)characterisation, its (re)articulation in 
a wider discursive war of propaganda strategies that was waged through the interplay of 
an apartheid state discourse and what I consider to be an „official‟ non-state discourse, 
that of the ANC and the UDF.
6
 
                                                                                                                                                 
burning methods, while 108 sustained serious injuries.” See A. Baleta, „348 “necklace” deaths in two years 
– review‟ in The Star (14 January 1987). In Parliament on 21 August 1987 General Johan Coetzee, former 
Commissioner of the SA Police, stated that 286 individuals had been killed by the necklace method in 
1986. See B. Stuart, „286 necklace deaths during 1986 terror escalation‟ in The Citizen (22 August 1987). 
By the 16 June 1988, it was reported that more 1100 individuals had been charged for necklace murders 
between 1984 and 1987. See, „1100 charged for necklacing‟ in Cape Times (16 June 1988). According to 
the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), 336 individuals were necklaced between 1984 and 
1987. By 1990 it was reported that between 1984 and 1990, 428 individuals had been necklaced and 
between October 1989 and February 1990, 29 individuals had been necklaced. See, „Less necklacing, but 
other ways of death by burning‟ in E.P Herald (2 July 1990). In the Eastern Cape alone it was reported that 
between 1985-6 133 individuals were necklaced. See I. R Lang, „“Necklace Murders”: A Review of a 
Series of Cases Examined in a Port Elizabeth Mortuary‟ in Medicine and Law, Vol. 13 (1994), 507. See 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report (Cape Town, Jutas, 1998), Vol. 2, 388-89. These 
figures, based on the SAIRR statistics, are for the time frame 1984-1989. What is evident is that, based on 
the morgue report cited here, despite the discrepancies, the majority of necklace killings occurred in the 
Eastern Cape and that the majority of those necklaced were male.  
4
 Whilst not a historical account in a conventional sense, I cannot help but think of the title of Mamphela 
Ramphele‟s book, Laying Ghosts to Rest. She argues that township revolts of the 1980‟s were “negative 
opposition” to apartheid rule. She cites Amilcar Cabral, Guinea-Bissau‟s liberation leader, who warned that 
the tolerance of liberation violence would spread into the post-colonial period, what he called “infections of 
violence”. In something like a postapartheid present, the practice of necklacing , for Ramphele, is 
remembered only insofar as to argue that, “we are seeing some of the chickens of that wanton brutality 
coming home to roost in the growing use of extreme violence to settle disputes at many levels in our 
communities.” Presumably, the spectre of necklacing is one ghost that cannot be laid to rest. See M. 
Ramphele, Laying Ghosts to Rest: Dilemmas of the Transformation in South Africa (Cape Town: NB 
Publishers, 2008), 132-133. 
5
 Indeed, “a difficult legacy” is precisely the terms in which historian William Beinart has characterised the 
practice of necklacing, a point to which I return in chapter four of this thesis. See W. Beinart, Twentieth 
Century South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 261.  
6
 It is widely held that the ANC and the UDF had symbolic and active dominance during the 1980s. The 
ANC in particular emerged as the dominant liberation organisation based on its institutional capacity, its 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Following Michel Foucault on the co-incidence of power/knowledge in the production of 
discourse,
7
 the thesis is concerned with discourses of and in relation to necklacing. An 
analysis of discourse, as Lata Mani suggests, can focus on that which appears stable and 
persistent in the ordering of social reality; a focus on discourse can point to assumptions 
shared by those who claim to be opposed to each other or are conceptualised in this 
manner.
8
 The concept of discourse, also “embodies the possibility of several 
simultaneous discourses” that engage with each other “in relations of dialogue and 
struggle.”9  
 
The discourses surrounding necklacing are constitutive of what I suggest be considered a 
„politics of ownership‟. The ANC and the UDF, in their separate submissions to the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), argue that whilst their condemnation of practices 
such as necklacing was never publicised due to media restrictions and the government‟s 
aim of vilifying them, they did indeed condemn the practice. However, in condemning 
the practice, the ANC and UDF maintained that those who undertook such actions were 
not responsible for their actions; rather the structural violence of the apartheid system 
itself was to assume responsibility. In other words, the apartheid state was not just 
complicit but accomplice to the practice of neckacing insofar as a resistance discourse 
legitimated necklacing as a rational response to oppression/repression. The former 
apartheid government and its institutions (the South African Police and the South African 
Defence Force), in their separate submissions to the TRC, claim that, based on statements 
made specifically by prominent ANC leaders and officials in the mid 1980‟s, the practice 
was propagated, condoned and hence „owned‟ by those major organs of the larger 
liberation movement. 
                                                                                                                                                 
alliances and its international credibility and legitimacy. Jeremy Seekings posits that, “While the ANC 
needed an integrative vehicle like the UDF to develop the capacity of the Charterist movement to sustain 
the revolt, the UDF needed the endorsement of the ANC to play this role…the UDF was transformed more 
clearly into a component of the ANC„s strategy. Its role was to maintain political pressure on the 
government inside the country, discrediting it, chipping away at the margins of its support, and building 
support for the kind of transformation envisaged by the ANC.” See J. Seekings, The UDF: A History of the 
United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), 292-294. 
7
 See M. Foucault, Discpline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan (London: 
Penguin Books, 1991), 27-28. 
8
 L. Mani, „The Production of an Official Discourse on Sati in early nineteenth-century Bengal‟ in Francis 
Barker et al. (eds.), Europe and its Others Vol. 1 (Colchester: University of Essex Press, 1985), 108.  
9
 L. Mani, „The Production of an Official Discourse‟, 109. 
 
 
 
 
 4 
I wish to argue that there is a difficulty in writing necklacing into the narrative of struggle 
history. This difficulty arises in relation to the ways in which the apartheid state assigned 
the emergence of the practice to the ANC and UDF and the way in which the liberation 
movement attempted to return it to its “authors”.10 
 
Writing about genealogical histories, Foucault posits that, “[e]mergence designates a 
place of confrontation but not as a closed field offering the spectacle of a struggle among 
equals.”11 Emergence therefore, according to Foucault, cannot be claimed by anyone 
because it always occurs in the “interstice”: “In a sense, only a single drama is ever 
staged in this „non-place‟, the endlessly repeated play of dominations.”12 He suggests 
further that, “[t]he isolation of different points of emergence does not conform to the 
successive configurations of an identical meaning; rather, they result from substitutions, 
displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals.” 13 Genealogy, as Wendy 
Brown reads Foucault, promises “dirty histories, histories of power and subjection, 
histories of bids for hegemony waged, won, or vanquished”, it is the “endlessly repeated 
play of dominations.” 14 
 
In justifying its recourse to violence, the ANC argued that the apartheid state was 
responsible for violent resistance as did the UDF in its call for “defensive violence”. I 
show that the ANC and UDF produced an unclear position as to „condemnation‟ of what 
can loosely be termed popular political violence. By popular political violence I mean the 
killing by methods such as necklacing (though not limited to this practice, as is shown 
with the lynching of Moegsien Abrahams in 1986 at a UDF rally) of individuals targeted 
as „collaborators‟ – „traitors‟. Whilst the ANC attempted to clearly define those regarded 
as legitimate targets for its armed wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), it stammered to make 
clear its position regarding the killing by necklace of individuals by its mass support 
base. In this sense, I ask how this ambivalence was produced.  
                                                 
10
 See Chapter Four of this thesis. 
11
 M. Foucault, „Nietzsche, Genealogy, History‟ in D.F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 150. 
12
 M. Foucault, „Nietzsche, Genealogy, History‟, 150. 
13
 M. Foucault, „Nietzsche, Genealogy, History‟, 151. 
14
 W. Brown, Politics out of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 104. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
The ANC had to politically justify its recourse to violence while at the same time secure 
its position as the holder of a moral high ground within a discursive war of propaganda 
strategies between the apartheid state and itself. Importantly, the practice was positioned 
by the ANC and UDF in a binary of resistance and oppression/repression. For the 
apartheid state, the practice of necklacing was not political violence. It was not acts of 
resistance and could never be rationalised. The practice represented, for the state, „black-
on-black‟ violence, a criminal activity, a form of barbarism and savagery. The state 
accused and believed that the ANC, in particular, supported, condoned and rationalised 
necklacing. These accusations were in relation to mixed responses to the rise of the 
practice as is evident by statements made by prominent ANC and UDF leaders about or 
in relation to the practice that is examined in Chapter Two. The official state discourse on 
necklacing saw the state mainly setting a discursive terrain fuelling ambivalence towards 
the practice on the part of the ANC and the UDF. As this thesis aims to underscore, traces 
of that ambivalence towards the legacy of necklacing are still visible in postapartheid 
(re)articulations of the liberation struggle. Before proceeding however, some ground 
clearing is necessary. 
  
Ground clearing I 
The practice of placing a petrol soaked tyre around the neck of an individual is not unique 
to South Africa. Despite the terms necklace and necklacing having gained such notoriety 
that the Oxford English Dictionary has an entry describing the gruesome practice as the 
label given in South Africa,
15
 in other parts of the world the practice goes by names such 
as „Pere Lebrun‟ in Haiti,16 as „the article 320‟ in Mali 17 and as „Weet-ee‟ (soaking with 
                                                 
15
 See C. Soanes and S. Hawker (eds.) Compact Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 679. 
16
 Here the practice was named after a Mr. Lebrun who was a motor car trader where tyres were bought. 
Similar to Winnie Mandela‟s infamous speech of inciting revolutionaries to use the necklace to achieve 
liberation (as discussed later), there are reports that posit Aristide as inciting „Pere Lebrun‟ as an effective 
method of dealing with political opponents. See A. Dupuy, The Prophet and Power (New York: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 2006). See also N. Nesbitt, „Turning the Tide: The Problem of Popular 
Insurgency in Haitian Revolutionary Historiography‟ in small axe, No. 27 (October 2008) for an overview 
of the debate surrounding Aristide and the practice of „Pere Lebrun‟. The South African, mainly Afrikaans 
press, also picked up on this. See for example F. Swart, „Die donker kant van Aristide…sy teenstanders is 
glo volgens halssnoer-metodes tereggestel‟ in Die Beeld (22 October 1993) and „Die demokrasie van die 
halsnoer‟ in Die Afrikaaner (29 September 1994). Both newspaper reports linked Aristide to Winnie 
Mandela and her infamous statement on the practice of necklacing as a means to liberation in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 6 
petrol) in Nigeria.
18
 There have been reports of the practice occurring in Mozambique 
where the practice is used as “punishment” for theft and what Zoe Wicomb has called 
“yet another transmutation of our export culture.”19 In writing about violence in Sri 
Lanka, E. Valentine Daniel makes reference to the killing of a boy who, after being 
beaten and stabbed, was thrown onto a tyre and set alight.
20
 
   
In South Africa, according to journalists Greg Marinovich and Joao Silva, “necklacing”, 
as a “warped symbol of liberation”, was also known as “shisanyama or burnt meat, three 
cents, which was then the price of a box of matches, and finally, savagely, Nando‟s after 
a popular flame-grilled chicken franchise.”21 The terms necklace and necklacing, as 
shown in the following chapter, entered the South African lexicon through media reports 
from September 1985 onwards. 
 
It is not clear where the terms necklacing and necklace originated in the sense of who was 
the first to use the terms.
22
 According to Julie Frederikse, writing in 1987, “[t]he 
government, the police and the military [had] launched an hysterical media campaign to 
discredit anything to do with those denigrated as „the comrades‟ or - another new word 
suddenly discovered by Pretoria – the „necklace‟”, a few lines later, she refers to, “the 
„necklace‟ – a township term…” 23 It appears that the naming of the practice, for 
Frederikse, is attributed to both the apartheid government and the township, telling of an 
                                                                                                                                                 
17
 I thank Paolo Israel for this reference and the translation. See J.J Mandel, „Les retrecisseurs de sexe 
Chronique d‟une rumeur sorciere‟ in Cahiers D‟etudes Africanes, 189-190 (2008), 194. 
18
 See J. Harnischfeger, „The Bakassai Boys: Fighting Crime in Nigeria‟in Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 41, 1 (2003), 23-49 and M.A Perouse de Montclos, „Does Africa need the police?‟ trans. by 
Barbara Wilson in Le Monde diplomatique (September 1997).  
http://mondediplo.com/1997/09/afpol  
19
 Z. Wicomb, „Culture Beyond Color? A South African Dilemma‟ in Transition, No. 60 (1993), 31-32. See 
also „Mozambique: Lynchings symptom of state failure‟, IRIN Africa – humanitarian news and analysis (9 
April 2007). 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=71234  
20
 E. Valentine Daniel, Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 209. 
21
 G. Marinovich and J. Silva, The Bang Bang Club: Snapshots from a Hidden War (New York: Basic 
Books, 2000), 39. 
22
 In a newspaper report recalling the killing of Benjamin Kinikini (discussed below), it was claimed that 
journalist Jon Qwelane had, “the dubious distinction of having introduced the term „necklace‟ in its 
gruesome context to the language.” See „Two years of the necklace‟ in Pretoria News (2 April 1987).  
23
 J. Frederikse, „South Africa‟s Media: The Commercial Press and the Seedlings of the Future‟ in Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1987), 646.  
 
 
 
 
 7 
interplay of discourses on necklacing. 
 
It is not my intention to engage such a search for the origins of either the practice of 
necklacing or the naming of the practice as such. Rather, my intention in this thesis, 
following Foucault‟s notion of a genealogical history, is to analyse the emergence of 
necklacing as a political signifier of the liberation struggle.  
 
On the 19 March 2005, the Weekend Post, in the run up to Human Rights Day in South 
Africa (celebrated on the 21 March each year), ran the following story, „Revisiting 
turbulent history of the 1980‟s‟. The caption read: “It was 20 years ago that the most 
feared and extreme form of mob justice known as „necklacing‟ emerged in the Eastern 
Cape.”24 Written by journalist Francois Rank, the report goes on to detail the brutal 
killing of Benjamin Kinikini on the 23 March 1985:  
Although the very first „necklace‟ victim was already dead when burning tyres 
were placed around his neck in Uitenhage, it was in fact the first time this kind of 
“punishment” was seen on South Africa‟s strife torn streets at the height of 
political unrest in the mid-1980‟s…It was all sparked by the Langa massacre in 
Uitenhage when a total of 20 people died after police opened fire on funeral-goers 
in Maduna Road on March 21, 1985…it was on the outskirts of industrial 
Uitenhage where the awful act was first branded into the nation‟s collective 
consciousness to become an often controversial and gut-wrenching symbol of the 
struggle. Winnie Madikizela Mandela would shock the world a year after the 
Langa massacre by publicly declaring that blacks would be liberated by means of 
matches and tyres – an infamous reference to necklacing which would haunt her 
for years. It is generally accepted that the first documented necklacing occurred 
three months after Langa in Duduza, near Johannesburg, when Maki Skosana was 
killed by a mob who thought she was an informer. Skosana was still alive when 
burning tyres were placed around her neck. What made the necklacing of 
Uitenhage businessman [and community councilor] Tamsanqa Benjamin Kinikini 
on March 23, 1985 – two days after the Langa slaughter – different was that he 
was already dead when the burning tyres were placed on his body. 
 
That Rank makes a distinction between the killing of Maki Skosana and Benjamin 
Kinikini is important insofar as it alludes to the difficulty in distinguishing between a 
burning and a necklace killing. Whilst there is a distinction between a necklace killing 
and other forms of burning in the physical sense, this distinction, according to Joanna 
                                                 
24
 F. Rank, „Revisiting turbulent history of the 1980‟s‟ in Weekend Post (19 March 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Ball, becomes blurred in the cultural arena. For Ball, “[t]he term necklace is applied more 
broadly than the word implies, for example the media will describe a burning where the 
tyres are placed on top of the victim‟s body as a „necklacing‟.”25 Necklacing as ritual in 
the wider context of burning as analysed by Ball, suggests that the two symbols of the 
necklace and the fire combine to form a very powerful performance because the 
“necklace symbol is highly potent in its verbal usage, whereas in the actual enactment of 
the burning, the fire takes over as the dominant symbol.” Ball suggests therefore that 
“presumably the broader use of this term is related to its symbolic potency and the 
graphic horror of burning that it captures.”26 It is possibly in this sense that both 
Benjamin Kinikini and Maki Skosana are regarded as the „first‟ to have been necklaced.27 
 
Rank highlights three of what can be considered constitutive moments in relation to a 
broader history of liberation struggle and the place of necklacing therein. The killing of 
Councillor Benjamin Kinikini and three of his family members on the 23 March 1985 has 
been claimed as the „first‟ necklacing as shown above. Their deaths in the iconography of 
township revolts, as shown in Rank‟s rendering, are positioned as causal to the police 
shootings two days prior in what has been called the Langa massacre where the South 
African Police (SAP) shot dead approximately twenty individuals.
28
 Mono Badela, a 
journalist who claims to have witnessed the killing recalled later that: “The 
necklace…Where it comes from? Nobody knows. Whose instructions? Nobody knows. 
                                                 
25
 J. Ball, „The Ritual of the Necklace‟, Research report written for the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (March 1994), 2. Indeed, as recently as 29 March 2009, a Cape Town daily newspaper, the 
Cape Argus, ran the following report, “Teens necklaced by vigilante group.” Upon reading the text of the 
article however, it becomes apparent that tyres and clothing were thrown onto the bodies of the teenagers to 
“fuel the flames” after they had been set alight. See „Teens necklaced by vigilante group‟ in Cape Argus 
(29 March 2009). 
26
  J. Ball, „The Ritual of the Necklace‟, 2. 
27
 For a substantive collection of media clippings relating to both the Kinikini and Skosana cases, including 
the subsequent trials, see the Barry Streek South African Press Clippings Collection - Box: Security- 
Necklacing (Incidents/Trials) 1986-1989, housed at Mayibuye Archive. In my reading of newspaper 
clippings, TRC submissions, the appeal case of the Skosana trial and accounts of the period, it became 
apparent that there is some discrepancy as to whether the killings of both Kinikini and Skosana were 
necklace killings in the sense of having tyres either around their necks, on their bodies or even of tyres 
being used in the killings. Whilst in relation to Ball‟s understanding, this possibly is a moot point but worth 
noting.   
28
 Indeed, it is suggested that this was a crucial factor in the anger of the people of KwaNobuhle that led to 
the killing of Kinikini and his family members. In relation to the Langa massacre, see R. Thornton, „The 
Shooting at Uitenhage. South Africa, 1985: The Context and Interpretation of Violence‟ in American 
Ethnologist, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1990), 217-236. 
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All we know is that people were tired of being killed. People were angry. People had 
enough!”29 Steven Mufson, who had interviewed Badela, describes the killing as:   
[f]ar more personal than lobbing a petrol bomb at a house or pulling a trigger 
from several paces away. The mob had chased its prey, ignored their pleas, 
stabbed them, beat them, held them, crushed them and torn them limb from limb. 
The attack was so savage that months later a court could not establish the precise 
cause of death of one of Kinikini‟s sons, Silumko. The medical examiner opined 
that the arms were amputated before the body was burned, that the head (95 
percent of which was missing) suffered a massive assault, and that the burning 
explained the protrusion of the intestines through the abdomen and the missing 
genitals. The body was almost completely charred and the right thigh partially 
amputated. There were also multiple fractures of all the ribs. 
30
 
  
A second moment that Rank alludes to is what has also been claimed as the much 
publicised „first‟ necklacing, that of Maki Skosana (20 July 1985). Without taking away 
from the brutal murder of Maki Skosana, it is what her death has come to signify that 
makes that moment important. As will be discussed in the following chapter, a video 
recording showing images of Maki Skosana being beaten and set alight by a large group 
at a funeral for eight anti-apartheid activists (that had been killed as part of a state 
sanctioned covert operation, Operation Zero-Zero),
31
 was aired both on South African 
national television and internationally by the apartheid government.
32
 This was to justify 
and legitimate its declaring of a partial state of emergency on the 22 July 1985. Maki 
Skosana‟s name has come to be overwhelmingly associated with the practice of 
necklacing. 
  
 
                                                 
29
 M. Badela cited in S. Mufson, Fighting Years: Black Resistance and the Struggle for a New South Africa 
(Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1990), 92. See also M. Badela, „The Weeks of Rage That Led to That First 
Necklace Death‟ in Weekly Mail (4 September 1987);  K. Vernon, „Charred bodies found, police evacuated 
from townships – East Cape riot toll up to 24‟ in Weekend Argus (23 March 1985) and J. Qwelane, 
„Revenge of the Mob‟ in The Sunday Star (31 March 1985). 
30
 S. Mufson, Fighting Years, 92. In some reports, cannibalism was reported. It was alleged that some 
individuals in the crowd began eating the burnt bodies. See A. Soule, „Uitenhage – The killing goes on‟ in 
Sunday Times (24 March 1985). I have not established the veracity of this or if it related to state 
disinformation. See Chapter One. 
31
 See TRC Report, Vol. 3 (Cape Town: Juta, 1998), 667- 668. 
32
 The Kinikini killings had also been filmed and those images were used as admissible evidence in the trial 
that followed the killings. See J. Saunders, „Court shown video of mob attacking bodies‟ in Eastern 
Province Herald (20 February 1986) and M. Tyala, „Kinikini video “may aid defence” – judge‟ in Eastern 
Province Herald (12 March 1986). It is possible that because of the negative and harsh condemnation of 
the police and the state in relation to the Langa massacre, those images were not widely circulated. 
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A case in point can be discerned with images of burning people splashed across the front 
pages of print media in relation to the South African xenophobic attacks of May 2008. 
Here scholars have turned to the iconic case of Maki Skosana as a precedent to 
contemporary images of burning black people in the media: 
The case of Maki Skosana happened to be captured by the media, and it became 
known as the „first necklacing case‟. One of the photographers who captured 
these events, the late Kevin Carter, spoke of how this was just one incident that 
was preceded by others. What made this the „first‟ was its coming to view to the 
South Africa that does not, and dares not go into a township. The apartheid South 
African government controlled media made maximum use of the moment. A 
young, helpless black woman being set ablaze by a carnival of black people 
reinforced what the colonial mentality had long warned of: the barbarism of the 
native.
33
  
 
Later, on the 16th of December 2008, South Africa‟s Day of Reconciliation, a memorial 
service for Maki Skosana was held in Duduza (just outside Johannesburg and where she 
had been killed) to, “reconcile the community, bury the hatred and move forward as a 
community.” 34 The memorial service, attended by members of the community, church 
leaders, political parties as well as Skosana‟s family, formed part of larger Reconciliation 
Day events taking place around South Africa organised by the ANC led government.
35
 
This, I suggest, is evidence of an attempt at coming to terms with “a difficult legacy” of a 
liberation struggle history fraught with ambivalence in it‟s (re)articulation of necklacing.   
 
A third moment that Rank highlights relates to that infamous speech given by Winnie 
Mandela on the 13 April 1986 in which she stated, “[w]ith our boxes of matches and 
necklaces, we will liberate this country.”36 These stirring words were cause for 
embarrassment to the ANC and UDF, who struggled to articulate a public position on 
necklacing. For the apartheid state, that statement served to legitimate its claims that the 
                                                 
33
 See S. Pillay, „Dangerous Ordinary Discourse: Preliminary reflections on xenophobia, violence and the 
public sphere in South Africa‟, draft paper presented at CODESRIA 12th General Assembly (Yaoundé, 
Cameroon, 07-11/12/2008), 4. Note: Permission granted to cite this paper by author via email 
correspondence on 09 March 2009.  
34
 See B. Masango, „True reconciliation as Duduza asks forgiveness‟ in The Star (17 December 2008); S. 
Hlangwane, „Whats the price of reconciliation? in City Press (14 December 2008) and B. Ngqiyaza, „An 
innocent and terrible death‟ in The Star (17 December 2008). 
35
 See „Motlanthe to speak‟ in The Mercury (16 December 2008). 
36
 See, „The language of anarchy‟ in The Star (16 April 1986) and G. van Staden, „Winnie slams 
“hysterical” media reaction‟ in The Star (18 April 1986). 
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ANC propagated and condoned practices such as necklacing.  
 
A fourth moment, I want to suggest, is Chris Hani‟s (then army commissar of MK) 
“comment on the necklace” given in December 1986. At the TRC, according to the 
former apartheid government and its functionaries, Hani and therefore the ANC, 
condoned and propagated the practice of necklacing. However, a close reading of Hani‟s 
“comment on the necklace” reveals no outright condoning and propagating of the 
practice, despite a tone of understanding and suggests rather a prose of ambivalence, as 
will be shown in Chapter Two. Official public condemnation of the practice of 
necklacing by the ANC, was issued by then president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo first in 
September 1986 and then again in September 1987. 
 
However, as shown later, it is the second condemnation that is considered as „official‟. 
Thus, a fifth moment is the September 1987 public „official‟ condemnation of the 
practice of necklacing by Oliver Tambo. A sixth moment that I suggest is constitutive in 
relation to a broader history of liberation struggle and the place of necklacing, is a 
contestation over the „ownership‟ of the practice during the TRC process as alluded to 
earlier and as examined more fully in Chapter Four. 
 
Ground clearing II 
Histories of South Africa‟s liberation struggle have come to be dominated by the history 
of the ANC. In part this is due to the extensive archival record of the ANC but also as 
Hillary Sapire argues, because of the inclination of historians of liberation movements to 
write from the perspective of „victors‟.37 It can also be added that this dominance of the 
ANC in the national liberation struggle archive has the unintended consequence of 
institutional top-down histories being (re)constructed. Indeed, Allen Feldman argues that, 
“[t]o simply study power at the „centre‟, that is, from the perspective of formal political 
rationalities, is to collaborate in the essential myth of formal rationalization: that power 
distributes itself from some place external to its effects, external to its violence, which is 
                                                 
37
 H. Sapire, „Liberation Movements, Exile, and International Solidarity: An Introduction‟ in Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 2009), 275. 
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reduced to a transparent instrument.”38 Whilst taking the point offered by Feldman, the 
question of how ambivalence in relation to necklacing has been produced is prompted by 
an overarching political violence discourse and attending notions of resistance and 
causality evident in contemporaneous and subsequent scholarly works on the practice of 
necklacing. That literature, in attempting to make sense of the practice, has resorted to the 
realms of historical causality and „cultural (dis)continuities‟ that has large political 
overtones in relation to the liberation movements, dominated by the ANC and the UDF. 
 
If, as Ball argues, a “necklacing archive” is difficult to constitute because we are unable 
to place the practice in a neatly labelled box with a clear sense of time, place and 
reason,
39
 then I might add that literature on the practice of necklacing is equally 
dispersed, diffused and at times ambivalent. Although a small but significant body of 
work on the practice has surfaced in South African studies, the discipline of history has 
been especially silent.
40 
Most works derive from the disciplines of anthropology, 
psychology, sociology, political science and literary theory. Here the practice of 
necklacing has been understood in relation to crowd/collective psychology and witchcraft 
beliefs/ritual killings akin to making sense of perpetrator consciousnesses. What is 
common to these frameworks is an overarching discourse where the practice of 
necklacing is named as resistance constituted by notions of political violence and a turn 
to causality in explanation that are beset with both ambiguity and ambivalence.
41
  
 
 
                                                 
38
 A. Feldman, Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 2. 
39
 J. Ball, „The Ritual of the Necklace‟, 4. 
40
 Scholarly work dealing specifically with the practice of necklacing is sparse. The most detailed works 
come from J. Ball, „The Ritual of the Necklace‟; N. Nomoyi and W. Schurink, „Ukunxityiswa kwempimpi 
itayari njengotshaba lomzabakaza: An exploratory study of insider accounts of necklacing in three Port 
Elizabeth townships‟ in E. Bornman, Y. Muthien, R. Van Eeden and Marie Wentzel (eds.), Violence in 
South Africa: A Variety of Perspectives (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 1998); P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of 
Violence: An In-Depth Analysis Of Two Case Studies Based On Interviews With Perpetrators Of A 
“Necklace” Murder And With Eugene de Kock„, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town 
(1999) and L. Praeg, The Geometry of Violence (Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2007). Elsewhere the practice of 
necklacing is not the main focus of enquiry but forms part of the larger research undertaken and therefore 
warrants the attention of scholars. See for example B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of 
Apartheid (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004).  
41
 Ambiguity and ambivalence are, at times, used interchangeably. Ambiguity is taken to mean having more 
than one meaning and ambivalence to mean having mixed feelings about something or someone. 
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An archive of necklacing can productively be thought of in relation to Ranajit Guha‟s 
levels of historical discourse.
42
 Guha distinguishes between three levels, a primary 
discourse, a secondary discourse and a tertiary discourse. They differ from one another in 
that within the primary discourses, accounts of insurgency are produced by officials and 
these accounts are then transformed into secondary discourses by official reports and 
biographies or memoirs long after the original accounts were produced. These 
transformations are then redistributed through tertiary discourses by historians (scholars) 
who have no direct link with the event, in time and association, being reconstructed. In so 
doing a “code of counter-insurgence” is present in the primary discourse that is 
transformed in the secondary discourse and redistributed in the tertiary discourse. This 
code lends itself to a paradigm in which the insurgents‟ subjectivity and agency is not 
acknowledged. The appropriation of the insurgent is thus constituted by a “code of 
pacification”, produced and transformed, that shapes the tertiary discourse when scholars 
fail to read the presence of the insurgent or as Guha posits, “the refusal to acknowledge 
the insurgent as the subject of his [her] own history.” 43  
 
If the primary discourse is meant to represent the official discourse of the state (the Raj 
for Guha), then I would like to suggest thinking of both the „official‟ non-state (ANC and 
UDF) discourse and the apartheid state discourse on necklacing, as representing that 
primary level. Whereas for Guha, the official colonial discourse on peasant insurgencies 
in India elides, or rather silences peasant insurgents by a “code of pacification” where, 
“insurgency is regarded as external to the peasant‟s consciousness and Cause is made to 
stand in as a phantom surrogate for Reason, the logic of that consciousness”,44 the 
„official‟ non-state discourse on necklacing is not so much silent as it is constituted by 
what I suggest is a prose of ambivalence. This prose of ambivalence comes to the fore in 
relation to both the interplay between the dominant discourses on the practice of 
necklacing, that of the apartheid state and that of the „official‟ non-state and of the 
assignation of the practice to more than one category as shown in Chapter Two.  
                                                 
42
 R. Guha, „The Prose of Counter - Insurgency‟ in Subaltern Studies Volume 11 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983). 
43
 R. Guha, „The Prose of Counter Insurgency‟, 82. 
44
 R. Guha, „The Prose of Counter Insurgency‟, 46-47. 
 
 
 
 
 14 
One needs to keep in mind that it is approximately twenty-five years since the practice of 
necklacing became prominent and received widespread attention. The implication of this 
is that the primary, secondary and tertiary discourses of necklacing are blurred. It is 
blurred because of the immediacy of the dominant necklacing discourses to its 
constituting members, official and affiliated. Guha posits that one of the distinctive 
features of the primary discourse is its immediacy in that, “statements of this class were 
written either concurrently with or soon after the event and…this was done by the 
participants concerned, a „participant‟ being defined for this purpose in the broad sense of 
a contemporary involved in the event either in action or indirectly as an onlooker.”45 I 
would add that the category „participant‟ for the purpose of this thesis also be thought of 
as including commentators that were onlookers in a broad sense. In other words, 
individuals that may not have been physically present at necklace killings but with a 
vested interest in the anti-apartheid struggle.
46
  
 
Social history or „history from below‟ has attempted to recover histories of previously 
dominated groups, the „ordinary people‟, and in so doing has tried to acknowledge and 
recover subaltern subjectivity and agency.
47
 Nicky Rousseau, in an elaboration of social 
                                                 
45
 Guha continues by stating that this loose defining of „participant‟ excludes, “that genre of retrospective 
writing in which, as in some memoirs, an event and its recall are separated by a considerable hiatus, but 
still leave a massive documentation – „primary sources‟ as it is known in the trade -  to speak to the 
historian witah a sort of ancestral voice and make him [her] feel close to his [her] subject.” See R. Guha, 
„Prose of Counter-Insurgency‟, 48. 
46
 In this regard, I find Mark Sanders argument intriguing. He argues that, “after apartheid, the question of 
complicity is unavoidable…The history of the intellectual and apartheid – whether of support, 
accommodation, or resistance – can…be deciphered not by fixing on apartness alone, but by tracking 
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responsibility-in-complicity. What makes apartheid exemplary for a study of the intellectual and complicity 
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through striving to minimize acting-in-complicity with the agents of apartheid and its policies, tended to 
acknowledge, affirm, and generalize responsibility-in-complicity.” Whilst this is not the argument I am 
making, it does partially resonate with the re-articulation of the dominant „official‟ non-state discourse on 
necklacing that, as I argue in Chapter Three, is evident in scholarly works on the practice of necklacing. 
See M. Sanders, Complicities: The Intellectual and Apartheid (London: Duke University Press, 2002), 11-
12. 
47
 I am grateful to Leslie Witz who has pointed out to me that South African social historians would not use 
the term „subaltern‟ to explain the work they do. I, however, do find the term useful in thinking through the 
work of social history in South Africa. By invoking the term „subaltern‟, I follow Premesh Lalu who argues 
that the combining of the notions „subaltern‟ with “subjection of agency”, “allows for a distance between 
those forms of narration which seek to recover subaltern agency at the expense of attending to how the 
reinscription of the subject into the discourse of history produces repetition, not difference.” See P. Lalu, 
The Deaths of Hintsa: Postapartheid South Africa and the Shape of Recurring Pasts (Cape Town: HSRC 
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history‟s relation to interdisciplinarity in South Africa in the 1980‟s and early 1990‟s, 
argues that it has an, “uncomfortable relationship to theory…not…only contemporary 
social and critical literary theories but psychoanalysis, critical geography, language 
studies – indeed, virtually any discipline where it is not possible „to strip-mine‟ or „gut‟ 
for useful empirical facts or context.”48 I want to suggest conversely that scholarly works, 
in making sense of the practice of necklacing have engaged, wittingly or unwittingly and 
despite their disciplinary reasoning, the social history paradigm of recovery.
49
  
 
In large measure, this has been enabled by a turn to what can be thought of as perpetrator 
consciousness in which the agency of the subject (perpetrator) is at the centre.This 
however, sees the subject of necklacing (re)constituted in a language of „perpetrators‟, 
and in understanding, has the un-intended consequence of silencing the „victim‟s‟ of 
necklace killings and arguably therefore, eliding the very violence of necklacing. 
Acknowledging subaltern subjectivity and agency therefore does not necessarily amount 
to a recovery of subaltern autonomy because subalternity by definition signifies the 
impossibility of autonomy.
50
 Thus in relation to Guha‟s levels of historical discourses, 
ambivalence, I suggest, is articulated and re-articulated because these scholarly works run 
up against a limit of a dominant resistance paradigm at making sense of the practice of 
necklacing. 
 
Arguably, the turn to perpetrator consciousness has been a part of a coming to terms with 
a larger national liberation struggle history. Sapire posits that former revolutionaries, now 
presiding over governments (the South African government) are, “legitimising their past 
actions and contemporary policies” and that this provides “political saliency” to the 
“recovery” of liberation struggle histories.51 The phrasing of Sapire suggests a causal link 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 2008), 23.   
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 See N. Rousseau, „Popular History in South Africa in the 1980‟s: the Politics of Production‟, 
Unpublished MA thesis, University of the Western Cape (April 1994), 112-113. 
49
 For an interesting critique leveled against the social sciences broadly regarding „the politics of historical 
interpretation‟, see H. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 73-75. 
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 See G. Prakash, „Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism‟ in The American Historical Review, Vol. 
99, No. 5 (December, 1994), 1480. 
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between legitimising past actions with legitimising contemporary policies, a point that 
Ciraj Rassool and Terence Ranger have highlighted.  
 
Rassool has explored the question of nationalism through what he has called the 
„biographic order‟ in South Africa. The „biographic order‟ can be understood as the 
production of biographies with the aim of furthering nationalist, or rather nation-building, 
histories as evident in South Africa post-1994.
52
 The notions of nation building histories 
that rely on biographic modes to (re)construct and strengthen meta-narratives of 
resistance and eventual liberation may have the unintended consequence of producing 
patriotic histories that instead of affirming nationalist narratives run contrary to those 
narratives. Those meta-narratives themselves are embedded in discourse with the nation 
state and modernity and the tension between colonial and postcolonial (in South Africa, 
apartheid and postapartheid as well). Terence Ranger draws a distinction between 
„patriotic history‟ and „nationalist history‟ and explores this problematic in relation to the 
current crisis in Zimbabwe. He argues: “[T]here has arisen a new variety of 
historiography …„patriotic history‟. It is different from and narrower than the old 
nationalist historiography, which celebrated aspiration and modernization as well as 
resistance.”53 
 
However, I want to suggest that it is not merely a causal link in the sense of history‟s 
complicity in nationalist projects. The relationship between contemporary policies and 
past actions that Sapire alludes to, suggests rather an oscillatory relationship, somewhat 
                                                 
52
 Indeed, Rassool argues that, “the heart of the very constitution of the post-apartheid nation and its 
citizenry has been a biographic mode, constituting what we can think of as a „biographic order‟, a 
discursive complex of framing and understanding society, memory and the constitution of persons.” See C. 
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similar to Ian Baucom‟s “repetition through oscillation” theory.54 Baucom posits that, “as 
time passes the past does not wane but intensifies; as history repeats itself it repeats in 
neither attenuated nor farcical form but by „redeeming‟ the what-has-been, „awakening‟ it 
into a fuller more intense, form.”55 Reading Walter Benjamin‟s „Philosophy of History‟, 
Baucom cites Benjamin: “It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or 
what is present its light on what is past; rather…what has been comes together with the 
now to form a constellation.”56 It is in this sense I wish to argue that the spectre of 
necklacing constitutes something like a history of the present. 
 
Histories of violence, such as that of the practice of necklacing in apartheid South Africa, 
have to contend with the question of how to make such histories narratable. Here, I am 
intrigued by the work of the Indian historian Gyanendra Pandey who highlights ways in 
which disciplinary history has dealt with violence.
57
 Pandey argues for histories of 
struggle that usually accompany histories of violence (for him, the Partition in India and 
for me, South Africa„s liberation struggle) not to be separated. By not separating the two, 
“a history of contending politics and contending subject positions” becomes possible that 
allows for something like a history of the present.
58
  In relation to Pandey‟s questioning 
that is engaged with in Chapter Four of the present thesis, I am concerned with asking 
how necklacing as a manifestation of the violence that „accompanied‟ the liberation 
struggle in South Africa fit into the contours of disciplinary history. In other words, can 
disciplinary history account for necklacing without running up against an impasse of 
making that history (non)narratable?  
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In problematising the relationships between history, violence and nation, I treat the event 
of violence (the necklacing) as a serious object of study rather than turning away.
59
 The 
implications of this may allow for a possibility of reconceptualising ways in which 
history in relation to statehood, nation and indeed, violence, are (re)articulated, 
(re)appropriated and (re)constructed for the purposes of historical, political, moral and 
ethical legitimacy. 
 
I argue that history has not “swallowed the necklace”. This research, whilst a few years 
short of Alfred‟s prediction that prefaces this Introduction, engages necklacing via the 
discourses through which it has been filtered. Those discourses constitute the liberation 
movements, specifically the ANC and the UDF; the apartheid state and its institutions 
(media); as well as disciplinary knowledge (history/archive, anthropology, psychology, 
literary theory and political science) including the TRC. This thesis then is neither a 
history of the ANC nor a history of the UDF, nor one about the apartheid state, neither is 
it a history of the practice of necklacing itself in a conventional sense. Rather, this thesis 
is an examination of the refusal of necklacing to be forgotten. 
 
Brief chapter outline  
In the following chapter, „On apartheid state discourse in relation to the practice of 
necklacing‟, I suggest that the apartheid state responded to the rise of the practice through 
its broader discourse on violence associated with resistance. I examine the ways in which 
the apartheid state responded to the practice of necklacing within a discursive war, via 
propaganda strategies, constituted through competing claims of legitimacy over the use of 
violence. The apartheid state characterised the practice of necklacing as „black-on-black‟ 
violence, with attending and racialised notions of barbarity, savagery. Through assigning 
„ownership‟ of the practice to the ANC and UDF, I show that the state attempted to argue 
that its repressive measures were legitimate and therefore justifiable. In so doing I 
suggest that the state mainly set the discursive terrain on necklacing in the mid 1980‟s in 
                                                 
59
 By event, I follow Foucault‟s formulation that an event, “is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, 
but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary 
turned against those who once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a 
masked „other‟.” See M. Foucault, „Nietzsche, Genealogy, History‟, 154. 
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the absence of a clear response from the liberation movements, specifically, the ANC and 
UDF to the question of necklacing. 
 
That there was not a clear response from the ANC and UDF did not mean there was no 
response. In Chapter Two, „On „official‟ non-state discourse in relation to the practice of 
necklacing‟, I show that a number of key statements were made by leading figures in the 
ANC and the UDF regarding attacks on suspected collaborators including the practice of 
necklacing. In examining what was said about the killing of suspected collaborators 
and/or the practice of necklacing, I argue that those public positions produced a prose of 
ambivalence. 
 
I suggest that the ANC and UDF were caught in a double bind. They could not explicitly 
condemn the practice and risk losing their mass support base, or explicitly condone the 
practice and risk losing the support of important internal and international constituencies 
thereby giving the apartheid state the upper hand in a discursive war on the moral and 
political legitimacy over using violence. Yet importantly, that ambivalence was not 
merely a tactical one. For underlying the „official‟ non-state discourse on the practice of 
necklacing was/is an inherent formulation of the binary of resistance and 
oppression/repression. The practice understood within this framework could only be 
rendered as state violence or resistance. In rendering it as the latter, though 
uncomfortably so, the ANC and UDF proposed that it be understood within a causal 
framework, as the result of oppression/repression. Ambivalence about the practice of 
necklacing thus, I argue, was produced in the interstice of the resistance – 
oppression/repression binary. Leading from this, I argue more broadly that the 
problematic of violence within the ANC has a far longer history.  
 
In asking how sense of the practice of necklacing has been made in scholarly works, 
Chapter Three, „Making sense of the practice of necklacing‟, points to the inextricable 
bounded-ness of necklacing to both the apartheid state‟s larger discourse on violent 
resistance and attempts by the „official‟ non-state to counter that discourse. As pointed 
out earlier in this Introduction, there is a small but significant body of work on the 
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practice of necklacing, though the discipline of history has been especially silent. 
Through examining the most substantial works produced on the practice, I show that the 
engagement is inter-disciplinary, though specifically within frameworks of collective 
violence, witchcraft and ritual although these frameworks overlap to some extent. Those 
analyses, however, operate within an overarching resistance paradigm characterised as 
political violence. I argue that a resistance paradigm points to limits of what is said about 
violence that is politically motivated and more so in the case of necklacing that has 
ambivalence as a symptom of its rationalisation. Ambivalence, I suggest, is articulated 
and re-articulated precisely because these scholarly works run up against the limit of a 
dominant resistance paradigm at making sense of the practice of necklacing.  
 
Indeed, the dominant discourses on necklacing, relational as they are, converge and 
diverge at the nexus over competing claims of the „ownership‟, akin to a „politics of 
ownership‟, of both the practice of necklacing and its discourses. Chapter Four therefore, 
„“A difficult legacy”?: Writing necklacing into a history of liberation struggle in South 
Africa‟, points to the persistence of the interplay of the dominant discourses that is still 
visible in „official‟ histories of the liberation struggle in South Africa. By „official‟ 
histories, I refer specifically to the way in which the liberation movement (read the ANC) 
constructs a history of the struggle and more importantly, their (non)articulation of 
necklacing through testimonies and submissions at the TRC as well as subsequent 
histories. In particular, I examine Every Step of the Way: The Journey to Freedom in 
South Africa (2004), a text produced under the auspices of the current ANC government 
and ask how necklacing is rendered (non)narratable in relation to struggle histories 
constructed under the rubric of the nation. Stated differently, I ask how necklacing is 
rendered intelligible as part of a national history of struggle. 
 
In so doing I pose the question of the extent to which nationalist histories elide violence 
in favour of larger political projects, namely nation building and nationhood. Guided by 
some of the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective, I examine and question the ways in 
which disciplinary history works in constructing narratives of struggle that marginalise 
moments of violence in favour of grand narratives of nation and progress. A further 
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question prompted by this examination asks what it might mean to write necklacing into a 
history of liberation struggle in South Africa that is not bound to the dominant discourses 
on necklacing and indeed, whether this is possible.  
 
The final chapter, „By way of a conclusion‟, examines a „Letter from the President‟, 
written in 2007 by former ANC and South African president, Thabo Mbeki. In so doing, I 
re-state some of the more salient issues that this thesis raises. I suggest that necklacing 
refuses to be forgotten precisely because of its ambivalence. Indeed, it may be that the 
inescapable ambivalence of necklacing is the condition for the possibility that it will 
always also be remembered. 
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Chapter One 
On the apartheid state discourse in relation to the practice of necklacing 
 
We know what happened “in Duduza in the 1980s”. We know who the people 
were who are described as “a mob”, and what the apartheid regime did to them. 
We know that it was the late Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, who 
intervened and stopped the “necklacing” originally started by agents of the 
apartheid regime (ANC Today, 21 January 2005). 
1
 
 
 
Part of the difficulty of writing necklacing into the narrative of struggle history arises in 
relation to the apartheid state‟s attempt at assigning the emergence of the practice to the 
ANC and UDF. For the state, this was aimed at de-legitimising them and thus the anti-
apartheid struggle more broadly. The aim of this chapter therefore is to examine the 
emergence of the apartheid state‟s discourse in relation to the practice of necklacing. I 
suggest that the apartheid state responded to the practice within a discursive war – 
strategies of propaganda - constituted through competing claims of legitimacy over the 
use of violence. 
 
I begin by providing a broad overview of the apartheid state‟s strategies of responding to 
increasing, local and global, anti-apartheid sentiment as well as the intensification of 
violent resistance in the 1980‟s. These strategies aimed to serve both the state‟s reformist 
projects as well as attempt to curtail the rising levels of political violence in South Africa. 
The state‟s „counter-revolutionary warfare‟ strategy, as will be discussed, was formulated 
as a shift in belief that „unrest‟ had to be dealt with first and via security measures as 
opposed to its earlier strategy in which it‟s reform project was seen as central. In 
particular, I draw attention to the constitutive elements of a propaganda strategy and 
show that in characterising the practice of necklacing as an excess of „black-on-black‟ 
violence, with its attending notions of barbarity and racial perceptions, the apartheid state 
attempted to argue that its repressive measures were legitimate and therefore justifiable. 
                                                 
1
 „Who shall set the national agenda?‟ in ANC Today, Vol. 5, No. 3 (21 January 2005). This statement was 
in reference to Archbishop Tutu and icons in the legacy of struggle history. It formed part of a wider debate 
about who should set the ANC‟s national agenda. 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/at03.htm  
Duduza was one of the key areas in which Operation Zero Zero unfolded and was where Maki Skosana was 
killed. I discuss this in more detail later in this chapter.  
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In so doing however, the state inadvertently unmasked the limits of its power: 
representations that relied on barbarism reinforced a specific kind of racial perception 
that ran counter to the state‟s reform project of winning over black moderates. 
 
Apartheid state discourse on violence 
Most scholarly works dealing with the inner workings of the apartheid state during the 
1980‟s, predominantly focus on what has been termed the militarisation of the South 
African state.
2
 South Africa was arguably a “state of exception” for the latter part of the 
1980‟s, with numerous emergency powers inaugurated since 21 July 1985 and the 
increasing presence of the defence force in townships during the latter part of the 1980‟s.3 
 
Since the Soweto Uprising of 1976, the apartheid state saw it as necessary to implement 
policies that could respond to increasing opposition to its governance that often took a 
violent form. Whilst violence was frequently in response to the state‟s violent measures 
in quelling such opposition, for the state, it was a „total onslaught‟ being directed by the 
ANC. It is in this sense, that South Africa of the 1980‟s has been characterised as a 
period of reform, repression and resistance.
4
 In particular and of relevance to an apartheid 
state discourse on the practice of necklacing, was the shift of what the state called a „total 
                                                 
2
 Most of the scholarly works on the apartheid state were in fact written during the 1980‟s and very little 
scholarly work has been written since then. See for example K. W. Grundy, The Militarization of South 
African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); P. Frankel, N. Pines and M. Swilling (eds.), 
State, Resistance and Change in South Africa (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 1988); J. 
Cock and l. Nathan (eds.), War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 
1989). See especially G. Moss and I. Obery (eds.), South African Review (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1987 
and 1988), Volumes 4 and 5. For a more recent and journalistic account of the strategies of the apartheid 
state and the “behind- the- scenes machinations of South Africa‟s security apparatus in the apartheid era”, 
see D.W. Potgieter, Total Onslaught: Apartheid‟s Dirty Tricks Exposed (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007).     
3
 Though outside the scope of the larger question this thesis seeks to examine, it would be interesting if the 
apartheid state of the 1980‟s was examined closely in relation to Giorgio Agamben‟s notion of “the state of 
exception.” Agamben posits that, “[t]he essential task of a theory of the state of exception is not simply to 
clarify whether it has a juridical nature or not, but to define the meaning, place, and modes of its relation to 
the law.” See G. Agamben, State of Exception, trans. by K. Attell (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 51. In this regard, Richard Abel‟s examination of some of the major political trials of anti-
apartheid activists during 1980-1994, engages the question of how/if law can constrain political power. 
Thus his work provides a possible point of departure for an examination of the apartheid state in relation to 
Agamben‟s notion of “the state of exception”. See R.L. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle 
Against Apartheid, 1980-1994 (London: Routledge, 1995). 
4
 M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „State Power in the 1980‟s: from “total strategy” to “counter-revolutionary 
warfare”‟ in J. Cock and L. Nathan (eds.), War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1989), 135. See also J.Dugard, N. Haysom and G.Marcus (eds.), The Last Years of 
Apartheid: Civil Liberties in South Africa (Ford Foundation – Foreign Policy Association, 1992). 
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strategy‟ to a strategy termed „counter-revolutionary warfare‟ that was largely 
spearheaded by South Africa‟s security establishment. Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips 
argue that the state‟s reform strategy: 
[p]artially restructured the citizenry‟s access to political society. It promoted new 
forms of partial inclusion of the unenfranchised into the formal, officially 
sanctioned institutions of political society. This reformist impulse was formulated 
primarily by the security establishment. It failed when the consequences of 
apartheid policies triggered new social movements in civil society in the early 
1980‟s. Articulating their interests chiefly through a national front in political 
society – the United Democratic Front (UDF) - these social movements rapidly 
mounted a challenge to state power. In response, the government declared a 
partial state of emergency in mid-1985. Elements within the state attempted to 
extend the reform programme beyond its original parameters to dowse the flames 
of resistance with „more concessions‟. When these measures failed to achieve 
their objective, a national state of emergency was declared and the security 
establishment implemented a new and more penetrating, repressive-reform 
strategy. This „counter-revolutionary warfare‟ strategy aimed at reconstituting the 
fundamental bases of civil society prior to altering the rules of political society. 
The new strategy, [started] from the assumption that „total strategy‟ failed because 
it left civil society intact. Learning from experiences in Latin America and south-
east Asia, the security establishment [attempted] to unite the state and political 
society around a long term programme whose goal [was] to restructure social 
hierarchies „from below‟.5  
 
Swilling and Phillips posit that the security establishment were largely influenced by the 
work of a US army official, Colonel John J. McCuen, in particular his book, The Art of 
Counter-Revolutionary War.
6
 In that book, according to Swilling and Phillips, McCuen 
identified four stages of revolutionary warfare; the organisational, terrorist, guerilla and 
mobile warfare stages. The authors posit that according to McCuen, the task of the state 
is to, “determine which phase the revolutionaries are in and then use the direction of that 
phase and turn it back on itself.”7 Stephen Ellis argues that by September 1986, former 
South African president P.W Botha had ordered that a largely summarised version of 
McCuen, penned by former army chief, Lieutenant-General Alan „Pop‟ Fraser, be 
translated into Afrikaans and circulated amongst senior officials of the State Security 
                                                 
5
 M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „State Power in the 1980‟s‟, 134-135.   
6
 M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „State Power in the 1980‟s‟, 144.  
7
 Cited in M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „State Power in the 1980‟s‟, 144. 
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Council (SSC).
8
 This text was similarly predicated on the idea that the style of 
revolutionary warfare could be countered by using the same technique, but in reverse.  
 
The mid 1980‟s thus saw the apartheid state engaged in an elaboration of counter-
guerilla, counter-terror and counter-organisational tactics. Swilling and Phillips proceed 
to cite a, “high-ranking State Security Council official” as saying: “We have studied 
counter-revolutionary tactics in Malaysia, Chile, El Salvador. We‟re using the same 
hearts-and-minds techniques here. First we neutralize the enemy, then we win over the 
people [read „moderate-blacks‟] so they will reject the ANC.”9 This „win hearts and 
minds‟ strategy, according to Swilling and Phillips, was integral to the „counter-
revolutionary warfare‟ strategy that the apartheid state adopted from late 1985.10 
 
With the adoption of „total strategy‟, the apartheid state formed the National Management 
System (NMS). The NMS comprised the National Security Management System (NSMS) 
and the National Welfare Management System (NWMS). Responsibility for the NSMS 
rested with the SSC, which was established in June 1972 but only activated in the late 
1970‟s. The central aim of the NMS was to ensure that all branches of the state responded 
in a coordinated manner to what was regarded as a revolutionary threat from the ANC. 
These structures, headed by the security establishment, can be regarded as the seat of 
power for the apartheid state during the 1980‟s.11 Methods used to counter the 
„revolutionary threat‟ included cross-border operations, strategic communication 
operations (STRATCOM), extra-judicial killings inside South Africa and other covert 
operations.
12
  
                                                 
8
 The name of General Fraser‟s book is „Revolutionary Warfare: Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency‟. 
The book had restricted circulation. See S. Ellis, „The Historical Significance of South Africa‟s Third 
Force‟ in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1998), footnotes 24 and 57, 275. 
9
 M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „State Power in the 1980‟s‟, 145. 
10
 M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „State Power in the 1980‟s‟, 143. 
11
 See M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „The Emergency State: Its Structure, Power and Limits‟ in G. Moss and 
I. Obery (eds.), South African Review 5 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989), 77-82. 
12
 M. Swilling and M. Phillips, „The Emergency State‟, 84.  Those covert operations can be understood as 
including the strategy of „counter-actions‟, „counter-mobilisation‟ or „contra-mobilisation‟ that was “used 
to organise and support „moderate blacks‟ to oppose the revolutionary movements. Of necessity, it was a 
covert strategy – concealing the hand of the state as provider of logistical, political and financial support – 
and making use of „surrogate‟ forces. Hence, the state would not be seen to be involved in the conflict and 
violence between groupings and the resistance organisations.” See TRC Report Vol. 2 (Cape Town: Juta, 
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While „total strategy‟ and „counter-revolutionary warfare‟ provided broad strategic 
direction, the concern here is to focus on the apartheid state‟s discursive war – what it 
called strategic communications (STRATCOM) or communications operations 
(COMOPS). Indeed, a component of the SSC, the Strategic Communications Branch, 
was responsible for formulating policies regarding this discursive war.
13
 What discursive 
methods did the apartheid state employ to counter violent resistance? In particular, how 
did it respond discursively to the rise of burnings and necklace killings?  
 
Seemingly the strategies of the apartheid state, particularly the aspects of „counter-
revolutionary warfare‟ discussed above, related to resistance strategies of the ANC. The 
ANC‟s resistance against the apartheid state, specifically its call for a „Peoples‟ War‟ in 
1985 that legitimated attacks on „collaborators‟ (police officers, local town councillors 
and suspected informers, amongst others), was complemented by its own propaganda 
campaign.
14
 The objectives of this campaign included the isolation of South Africa 
through the imposition of sanctions as well as the positioning of the ANC as holding the 
moral high ground in relation to the apartheid state‟s all encompassing oppressive and 
repressive governance.
15
  
 
The discursive war waged by the apartheid state was not a strategy that operated in 
isolation from other strategies of „counter-revolutionary warfare‟. It is with this in mind 
that I proceed to ask what the constitutive elements of that discursive war were and how 
they operated in relation to the emergence of the practice of necklacing. As will be 
argued in the following chapter, the initial hesitancy on the part of the liberation 
movement, notably the ANC and UDF, to the question of necklacing enabled the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1998), 297-312. It is suggestive that this strategy can be linked to what was known as the „third-force‟ 
theory that received widespread attention, particularly in the early 1990‟s when political violence 
threatened the negotiation process leading to South Africa‟s first democratic elections. See for example S. 
Ellis, „The Historical Significance of South Africa‟s Third Force‟, 261-299. 
13
 See for example TRC Report, Vol. 2, 316. 
14
 See amongst others, T. Lodge and B. Nasson, All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 
1980‟s (Cape Town: Ford Foundation – David Philip, 1991). 
15
 Whilst this view is generally known, see for example how it was spelled out clearly in an October 1985 
interview with ANC president Oliver Tambo in London with Cape Times editor, Anthony Heard. See 
„Interview to Anthony Heard, Editor of Cape Times, October 1985‟  
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/or85-12.html  
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apartheid state to set the discursive terrain on necklacing and thus (in part) the 
ambivalence that was to characterise the ANC and UDF‟s discourse on the practice of 
necklacing.  
 
Constitutive elements of a discursive war 
The discursive war waged by the apartheid state was one in which support was sought, 
from both its white constituency and so called „moderate blacks‟, through constructing 
certain perceptions of violent resistance that would lend sustenance to the state‟s larger 
reform policies as mentioned above. For example, a secret memo that was circulated to 
all members of the SSC by the former deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. D J Louis 
Nel on the 12th November 1984 (two months after the outbreak of the Vaal uprisings
16
) 
outlined key aspects of this strategy.
17
  
 
The memo began by listing certain objectives/aims that all members of the SSC were to 
carry out, “[w]ithin the total framework of existing strategies, and with the specific need 
for coordinated counter-actions in the area of psychological action.” These objectives 
included for example withholding credit and publicity from the organisers [such as the 
UDF] of “unrest”, particularly any positive social and political recognition. Channeling 
                                                 
16
 On the 3 September 1984 violence broke out in the Vaal townships, close to Johannesburg. According to 
Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson, two major grievances laid behind the violence that propelled more sustained 
violent resistance throughout the country; apartheid state educational policies and charges against 
municipal councillors. It is the second grievance that is of more relevance to this thesis. Rent increases by 
local black authorities (part of the states reform project) saw community councillors responsible for 
enforcing and collecting rentals from township residents. Though as in the case of Benjamin Kinikini, some 
councillors profited financially and often had the protection of state sanctioned vigilantes to protect them. 
In this sense, community councillors were regarded as collaborators with the apartheid „system‟ as 
discussed in the following chapter. See T. Lodge and B. Nasson, All, Here, And Now, 65-78. See also 
amongst others, R. M. Price, The Apartheid State in Crises: Political Transformation in South Africa 1975-
1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 192-200. 
17
 D. J Louis Nel (Adjunk-Minister van Buitelandse Sake), „Aan alle lede van die Staatsveiligheidsraad: 
Onlussituasies: Voorgestelde Terminologiese Riglyne Vir Amptelike Segsmanne‟, [To all members of the 
State Security Council: Unrest Situation: Proposed Terminological Guidelines for Official Authorities], (12 
November 1984). Translation of memo my own. 
http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_displaydc&recordID=mem19841112.040.024.084 
Julie Frederikse discusses a similar memo in relation to the states „psychological warfare‟ of the mid-
1980s. See J. Frederikse, „South Africa‟s Media: The Commercial Press and the Seedlings of the Future‟ in 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1987), 639-640. For a sense of the state‟s propaganda 
strategies in the 1970‟s, see G. Hull, „South Africa‟s Propaganda War: A Biblographic Essay‟ in African 
Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Dec., 1979), 79-98. 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
the rage of the “innocent masses” against “criminal activity”, [as opposed to the political 
aspirations of organisations like the UDF and ANC] was another objective. 
 
Similarly, another objective was to feed both domestic and international public opinion 
on “the criminal nature of so called activities and the uselessness of violence.” This was 
to be complimented by referring to violence as “black-on-black” violence although, “not 
necessarily emphasising it.” The final objective was to support the initiatives in creating 
an atmosphere that would promote peaceful change [read here the reform strategies]. A 
special remark was made in the memo that stated, “[t]hese guidelines must be seen as 
complimentary to the SSC – STRATCOM – investigation into „atmosphere creation.‟” 
The memo continued by stating: 
It is proposed that both government and the SABC [South African Broadcasting 
Corporation], in their dealings with suburban unrest (in other words; 
interpretations, comments etc), follow a specific/decided thinking 
pattern/mentality. The setting of such a thinking pattern happens according to 
certain psychological principles that lead the listener/reader to view suburban 
unrests within a fixed given frame.  
 
This, according to the memo, was “thought manipulation”. A section in the memo titled 
“Important” read as follows: 
It must be emphasized that the proposed terminologies must only be viewed as 
conceptual guideline. Upon implementation there must still be depended on the 
discretion and resourcefulness of the authorities. One general warning to the 
latter: The audience of an official authority is never limited to his own 
listeners/constituency.   
 
Following this, emphasis, according to the memo, should fall mainly on specific 
common-law crimes and should mostly avoid references to crimes with a political 
connotation. In other words, the terminology to be used should include terms such as 
“arsonists”, “looters”, “murderers” and “muggers”. The memo stated that when it was 
practically impossible to refer to specific common law crimes, descriptions such as: 
“rioters”, “boycotters”, “protestors”, must be avoided and where applicable, replaced 
with descriptions such as “hooligans”, “vandals” and “thugs”. In relation to this, the 
memo stated: 
The status of the instigator escalates when he is associated with widespread 
unrests/actions. It is proposed as a guideline that the militant organizations (ANC, 
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UDF etc.) rather be linked to individual atrocities (eg. car bombs) rather than with 
mass action. 
 
It was suggested in the memo that emphasis be further detracted away from mass action 
and concentration should rather be focused on individual acts of violence. The emphasis 
on the “human factor”, it was suggested, should also be given importance in that publicity 
to the „victims‟ of violent actions would propagate sympathy and disapproval. This 
should be done in such a way that, “unity be established amongst the victims. This unity 
will set the foundation for counter-actions [read a strategy of counter-mobilisation] in 
leadership.”18  
 
The memo proceeded to give examples, in relation to the terminologies to be used; the 
emphasis on innocent victims of criminal offences; and what the memo called “the 
Machismo factor” - “the perception of the street thug of his manhood/masculinity is 
connected to his „heroism‟ and „bravado‟ when he confronts danger. Emphasising the 
cowardly nature of most acts of violence will undermine his own perception and that of 
the public.” These examples included: 
  
“…drunken vandals ransacked the beerhall (Note: alcohol abuse is rejected by 
responsible black people)” 
 
“…the hooligans ran away when a police car arrived (Note: „ran away‟ in place of 
„dispersed‟)” 
 
“…the sixty-year old grandfather was the victim of a cowardly attack by a gang of 
thugs wielding iron bars, chains…” 
 
The memo concluded with the following recommendations:  
-The systematic application on a coordinated basis of the mentioned terminology 
as a high priority.  
-The consideration of this within the framework of STRATCOM strategies in 
connection with the atmosphere for orderly, peaceful governance. 
-Priority attention and publicity to political initiatives related to the key questions 
on the domestic political front such as consultations with black political 
leaderships.
19
  
                                                 
18
 The notion of “counter-actions” can be thought of as „counter-mobilisation‟ or „contra-mobilisation‟ 
strategies. See footnote 12 of this chapter.  
19
 D. J Louis Nel, „Aan alle lede van die Staatsveiligheidsraad: Onlussituasies: Voorgestelde 
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The detail with which the memo advocates a strategy of “thought manipulation”, such as 
providing examples of the ways in which the type of terminology it advocated was to be 
used, is indeed striking. So too was the concerted effort at removing any trace of political 
dissent from political violence, thereby rendering the perception of such violence as non-
political and criminal in nature. What this secret memo allows one to discern therefore is 
the „manipulation‟ of language - terminologies - in the construction of perceptions that 
the apartheid state wanted the public, both local and international, to have of the 
escalating violence and in so doing, justifying the state‟s response to it. Notions such as 
„black-on-black‟ violence (the implications of this terminology are discussed later in the 
chapter), “unrest”, “innocent masses” and “counter-actions” were used daily in both 
televised and print media. I want to proceed by showing how the objectives outlined in 
the memo were employed in the apartheid state discourse in relation to the practice of 
necklacing.    
 
During the mid 1980‟s, the state suggested that violence in the townships of South Africa 
was not to be seen as acts of political resistance. Rather it was more the criminal elements 
taking advantage of the “unrest” situation. Indeed, all forms of political dissent and 
violence were characterised as “unrest”. In a 1985 interview with the Minister of Law 
and Order, Louis Le Grange, a journalist asked the following question: “The unrest now 
seems part of our daily lives. It has spread throughout the country. Can the chain of 
violence be broken?” Le Grange responded by saying: “The type of unrest situation we 
have can‟t be coped with according to a calendar. One must have the patience and accept 
that it is the aim of any revolutionary to keep a revolutionary climate alive as long as 
possible… a revolutionary climate being created by revolutionaries.” In response to the 
question: “To what extent is the unrest purely criminal as opposed to politically 
motivated?” Le Grange replied: “There is a strong criminal element present, which is 
normally one of the results of an unrest situation. It is a pity that these criminal elements 
are operating against their own people and that the loss of life, injuries and damage to 
property as a result of riots are being directed by blacks against blacks.”20 
                                                                                                                                                 
Terminologiese Riglyne Vir Amptelike Segsmanne‟ (12 November 1984). My emphasis. 
20
 L. Le Grange, „All is under control‟ in Financial Mail (7 June 1985). My emphasis. 
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One can read in the above statements an explicit attempt to remove the political from 
violence so that it appeared criminal and irrational. There was also a concerted attempt at 
claiming the victims of the „unrest‟ as belonging to the state, very much in line with the 
state‟s larger reform project. Another example of this would be an interview with Adriaan 
Vlok in 1985, then Deputy Minister of Law and Order and Deputy Minster of Defense 
when he stated: “We, the security forces, are the friends of the black people. We are not 
the enemy and we want to show this to the blacks, by way, for instance, of a personal 
presence in the townships….”21 That “personal presence in the townships”, as mentioned 
earlier, included the use of the SADF together with the SAP in controlling township 
activities.  
 
With increasing anti-apartheid sentiment, from 1985 onwards, most information 
regarding violence in townships filtered through the apartheid state‟s Bureau of 
Information and most daily newspapers would have “unrest reports”, also called “unrest 
maps” – “the daily map of South Africa giving a geographical, 24-hour breakdown of 
unrest nationwide.”22 The SAP and the SADF supplied that filtered information.  
However, there was rising criticism against the SAP and the SADF after the Vaal 
uprisings of 1984.
23
 In particular, a damning report written by the Catholic Church, 
released on the 6 December 1984 after a Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference 
(SACBC), drew attention to “irregular police activity.” This activity it was argued, 
resulted in, “indiscriminate use of firearms, birdshot, rubber bullets and teargas, assaults 
and beatings, damage to property, callous or insensitive conduct, and particularly 
provocative conduct at funerals of people killed by police who, it says, harboured the 
belief they were „at war‟ with township residents.”24 Thus with the Uitenhage shooting, 
or the so named Langa massacre, on the 20 March 1985, (see Introduction) the SAP was 
under close public and international scrutiny. 
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 A. Vlok, „Authority and defiance‟ in Financial Mail (19 April 1985). 
22
 T. Weaver, „Maps reveal violent wave‟ in Cape Times ( 14 May 1986)  See also Mayibuye Archives, 
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The police responded by arguing that the report was published with “ulterior motives” 
since there were many “untruths” contained in the report in relation to “details, 
chronology and events.” The SAP continued by stating that it was, “regrettable that [the] 
publication [did] not condemn or, for that matter, even mention, the extent of damage 
(which runs into millions of rands), the victimization, intimidation and brutal murder of 
innocent people by callous and lawless rioters.”25  
 
With this in mind and the objectives aimed at in the secret memo, consider the following 
two newspaper reports that contained the earliest mention of the term necklace in public 
media.
 26
 The first appeared on the 29 September 1985:  
To every story there is another side. And to the story of police brutality in South 
Africa there is another side – „The Necklace‟. The necklace symbolises another 
form of brutality, that of the mob. Buried in daily police reports which have 
become routine in a South Africa hardened to violence is the occasional account 
of bodies found with burning tyres around their necks. This is „The Necklace‟ – 
the latest and perhaps most horrifying form of violence yet devised by the mobs. 
The Necklace spreads such terror that the police are not prepared to comment on 
it even though it would help to illustrate the kind of violence they are up against. 
For by simply describing the extent and the nature of the necklace, the police 
would be playing into the hands of those who use the necklace to spread terror 
among all those involved with „the system‟. An official request to the police for 
information on this form of mob torture received the reply that “it would not be in 
the public interest, nor that of law and order, to furnish the information that you 
require.” However other sources involved in security say that origins of the 
necklace can be found in the Eastern Cape where burning of victims was practised 
by the Xhosas during the Frontier Wars. During the past year of unrest, a number 
of victims of mob violence have been burnt. Sometimes their bodies are found 
under piles of rubble or old tyres. This practice has been mostly associated with 
the Eastern Cape although it has occurred to some extent in other areas. The 
Necklace, according to security forces, is a variation of this practice in which a 
tyre is doused with petrol, placed around the victims neck and set alight. Once 
rubber is ignited, it is difficult to extinguish, and the victim suffers a lingering 
death. He may have his hands tied or be beaten into helplessness first. But, 
surrounded by the mob, he is powerless to remove the necklace.
27
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The second appeared on the 4 October 1985: 
Police are highly disturbed over the lack of emphasis local and international news 
media are giving to the “shocking violence” being perpetrated against Blacks in 
the townships by mobs… “There is only one purpose behind this wanton violence 
of Black against Black – that is to intimidate the ordinary, decent , law-abiding 
people into joining the mobs bent on destroying order in the townships” said a 
senior police spokesman. South Africa was recently shocked by video recording 
of a woman in a East Rand Township being systematically burnt to death by a 
mob which suspected her of being an „informer‟ [referring to Maki Skosana]. The 
police have video material of burnings which make that footage seem mild by 
comparison. “One of the features of this Black on Black violence is that almost 
invariably these burnings are done in public. The intimidator effect, as you can 
imagine, is awesome” said the spokesman. One of the most common methods 
now being used is the so-called „necklace‟ treatment. The victim‟s hands are 
bound behind his back, and an old motor car tyre – which is set alight – is draped 
around his neck. The victim dies a slow and agonising death, while the 
perpetrators usually carry out a type of ritual dance around his screaming form.
28
 
 
In the first newspaper article quoted, the image of police brutality was juxtaposed with 
that of „the mob‟. The practice of necklacing was therefore used to counter the debate 
around police brutality. In relation to why the label, „necklace‟, had not been included in 
the daily unrest reports, the argument presented was that if the police were to include the 
descriptions of what the practice entailed, it would exacerbate efforts of the police in 
attempting to instil a sense of law and order in South African townships.  
 
However, a contradiction in terms is evident in reading the second article quoted, 
publicised one week later. There, the police took a different stance and argued that more 
reporting on the practice of necklacing ought to be reported by news media, presumably 
to illustrate the demanding situation in which police were meant to perform their duties. 
Despite the first article suggesting that the “intimidator effect”, as described in the second 
article, would only make matters worse in the townships by creating an atmosphere of 
fear, both articles went on to describe the practice in chilling detail. In doing so, the 
positioning of the practice of necklacing was in the realm of barbarism and irrationality. 
In relation to the aims of the secret memo, by describing the practice in that chilling 
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detail, emphasis on the “human factor” was to propagate sympathy and disapproval of the 
practice. 
 
The “ordinary decent law abiding people”, those whom the SAP had to protect from the 
destructive uncivilised „mobs‟ highlighted the demarcation of not all „black‟ people being 
included in the category of „black-on-black‟ violence. Of significance was the claiming 
of the origins of the practice, that of beginning during the Frontier Wars of the eighteenth 
century which suggested a sense of primordialism. For this conjured up an image of both 
„tribalism‟ and „tradition‟. Similarly, the second quote concluded with the description of 
the perpetrators performing some form of “ritual dance” around the “screaming form” 
further connoting a sense of primitivism. Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter Three, 
there is strong contention amongst scholars in linking the practice of necklacing with 
older „traditional‟ forms of burning in making sense of the practice. However, I will 
argue that there is a certain re-articulation of this framing in relation to the „official‟ non-
state discourse on the practice of necklacing that will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
 
Before proceeding, I wish to draw attention to the newspapers in which these reports 
were published. The first report was in the Sunday Star, a newspaper that according to 
Rob Davies et.al, was part of the English language commercial press that were “opposed 
to, and often critical of, specific aspects of apartheid policy, such as…blatant forms of 
repression considered likely to provoke a response from the oppressed masses or 
criticism from abroad.”29  In contrast, the second report, published in the Citizen, was a 
newspaper set up in 1976 by the former state Department of Information, “in a secret 
project to develop a conservative, „patriotic‟ English language morning newspaper.”30 
The similarity of the tone, register and language of the two reports was an indication that 
is suggestive of the effectiveness of the strategies advocated in the memo.  
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The relationship between the media, print media in particular, and the apartheid state was 
however contested. Whilst the relationship between the Afrikaans press and the state was 
initially one of symbiosis, during the 1980‟s that relationship “cooled drastically” as a 
result of P.W Botha‟s clampdown on media reporting. Jan-Ad Stemmet and Leo Barnard 
argue that: “Since the 1970‟s, and particularly the 1980‟s, the Afrikaans press became 
increasingly sober in its critique of the National Party and the National Party 
Governments. This does not mean to suggest that the Afrikaans press abandoned their 
allegiance to the party. They continued to support the basic tenets of the National Party‟s 
policy and the majority of the Government‟s plans and decisions.”31  
 
Whilst Stemmet and Barnard do not deal with the ways in which the Afrikaans press 
reported acts of violence, their findings on the terse relationship with the state, but also 
with the more liberal English press, are illuminating. For example, the Afrikaans press 
had blamed the English press for the governments media clamp down because of their 
(the English press) coverage of the political turmoil in South Africa.
32
 Concerning the 
English press having a longer history of being more critical of the apartheid government, 
Rob Davies et.al point to an interesting indication of the basic political stance of the 
liberal commercial press.
33
 They cite a slogan coined by the Rand Daily Mail in 1964, 
„Adapt or Perish‟ that prefigured “the slogan „Adapt or Die‟ later adopted by P. W. Botha 
to promote the Total Strategy.”34 
 
Generally, according to Amanda Armstrong, restrictions on the media, most harshly 
imposed with the issuing of the national state of emergency of 12 June 1986, had three 
goals.
35
 The state wanted to prevent the international world from knowing the extent of 
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repression and atrocities committed by its security forces as well as the extent of the 
opposition to apartheid. In South Africa, the apartheid state attempted to manufacture 
evidence of normality and prevent the publication of anything that could have a 
detrimental effect on public morale. Indeed, this was in keeping with the tone of the 
secret memo. Lastly, the state sought to silence individuals and organisations resisting 
apartheid. Organising campaigns through issuing pamphlets, by word of mouth, or 
through mass meetings were made unlawful. However, both the commercial and the more 
alternative press attempted to resist and limit the impact of media restrictions, though, 
according to Armstrong, the state strategy had “been fairly successful.”36 Concerning an 
apartheid state discourse in relation to the practice of necklacing, this is most evident in 
the two newspaper reports cited earlier. 
 
Despite the memo positing the notion of „black-on-black‟ violence not necessarily being 
emphasised, media reports of violent resistance increasingly employed this term as part 
of the rubric of the apartheid state.
37
 For the state, seemingly its purpose was to have the 
most impact in de-legitimising any form of resistance related to the anti-apartheid 
struggle. The notion of „black-on-black‟ violence encapsulated a rubric suggesting 
„tribal‟ or „traditional‟ rivalry that had little or nothing to do with the politically 
motivated protests of the anti-apartheid struggle.
38
 This was evident in the two reports 
that contain the earliest mention of the term „necklace‟. It was largely within this rubric 
that the apartheid state positioned the practice of necklacing. However, as discussed 
below with the aid of Deborah Posel, by employing the notion of „black-on-black‟ 
violence, the state inadvertently placed its own larger reform policies into question. 
 
Concerning „black-on-black‟ violence 
In her study of television coverage of violence during 1985-1988, Posel highlights the 
apartheid state‟s attempt to contest the representation of township violence as a „Peoples 
War‟, as one that had an articulate and democratic leadership with a clear programme and 
                                                 
36
 A. Armstrong, „“Hear no Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil”‟, 211-212. 
37
 See J. Frederikse, „South Africa‟s Media‟, 639-645. 
38
 For example, an article reporting on the violence between „indian‟ and „black‟ people in Natal in 
July/August of 1985, argued that the violence besetting South Africa could now be seen as openly „ethnic‟ 
in character. See, „Etniese geweld‟ in Die Burger (9 August 1985).  
 
 
 
 
 37 
strategy. Posel suggests that the state‟s discourse on violence was two-fold: “It sought to 
explain why township residents resorted to violence, and to explain and justify the 
violence perpetrated by the SADF and the SAP in townships.”39 However, whilst the 
state sought to isolate the liberation movement, the mechanisms it chose drew on long 
standing and deeply rooted white racist images and fears: “At the heart of the state‟s 
discourse on political violence was a familiar white fear of the rampant black mob, a 
threat to the „civilised order‟ which white society claim[ed] as its basis.”40 Inherent in the 
state‟s formulation was a construction of the opposition between supposedly primitive 
and civilised behaviour. In this sense, what enabled the apartheid state to render necklace 
killings as „black-on-black‟ violence was the perception of barbarism it attached to the 
practice.  
 
Posel points to principal symbols of township violence in the state discourse on violence, 
akin to the “thought manipulation” strategy advocated in the secret memo. For Posel, 
these included the visual and verbal shorthand‟s of “the crowd”, “stone-throwing” and 
“flames”. These shorthand‟s, Posel argues, taken together, “strongly connoted disorder, 
destruction, unbridled energy, and the absence of reason or intelligent purpose.”41 This 
view was juxtaposed with visual and verbal shorthand‟s of the representation of the 
SADF and SAP, that of, “evoking a sense of order, control and strength” in „controlling‟ 
township “unrest”.42 Posel thus argues that:  
The state‟s representation of violence perpetrated by the security forces used 
images and concepts which epitomised a „civilised order‟ – symbolised both by 
the language of rights and duties, and by the restraint, expertise and neutral 
rationality embodied in scientific and technical language. These images and 
concepts were starkly opposed to those of destruction, disorder, mindless energy 
and „primitiveness‟ which were attached to township violence. The overall 
message therefore, was that conflict between the crowd and security forces was 
one of opposing value systems and ways of life – one „civilised‟, „advanced‟, 
rational and orderly, and the other „uncivilised‟, „backward‟ and unreasonable. 
The heat and anarchy in the images of the crowd, stone throwing and flames 
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fanned fears of the overthrow of the „civilised‟ order; whereas the order and 
control associated with the images of the SADF-SAP established them as the 
custodians of „civilisation‟.43 
 
In the case of individuals being burnt or necklaced, televised images showing crowds 
gathered around a burning body were accompanied by verbal descriptions such as, “a 
barbaric method of intimidation” and as, “unspeakable savagery.”44 Indeed, this is 
evident in a SABC televised news clip on the 21 July 1985. There, images of Maki 
Skosana, killed in Duduza on the 20 July 1985, were aired showing her being beaten, 
encircled by a large group of people, a large rock being placed on her chest and followed 
by scenes of the lower part of her body in flames.
45
 This footage was aired on both 
national and international television and was widely used by the apartheid state in its 
justification of declaring the, partial, first state of emergency (21 July 1985).
46
  
 
Maki Skosana attended the funeral of eight members of the Congress of South African 
Students (COSAS) who had died whilst trying to detonate hand grenades which had been 
booby-trapped by state security force agents, the so named „Zero-Zero‟ operation.47 She 
was accused by members of the funeral procession of being involved in a relationship 
with a state agent who had posed as a MK operative (armed wing of the ANC). This 
alleged involvement with the agent had cast suspicion on her, leading to her murder at the 
funeral of the activists.
48
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December 2008 on SABC 3 in prime time news, in relation to the Day of Reconciliation and a memorial 
held for Maki Skosana (see Introduction).  
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Writing about the apartheid state‟s manipulation of the media, Julie Frederikse discusses 
P.W Botha‟s announcement of the state of emergency. This announcement was 
accompanied by footage of both Skosana‟s killing and the funeral of the „Cradock 4‟, 
four missing UDF activists whose charred bodies had been found on the 27 June 1985.
49
 
At their funeral, the head of the South African Council of Churches, Rev. Beyers Naude 
together with Rev. Allan Boesak (a founding member of the UDF) were both filmed so 
that they appeared to be speaking directly under the banner of the South African 
Communist Party (SACP). According to Frederikse, numerous other anti-government 
banners on display on the podium on which they were speaking were obscured. She 
therefore argues that: 
The SABC told viewers nothing of the situation that had sparked the „mindless 
violence‟: the suspected spy [Maki Skosana] had been linked to an apparent „dirty 
trick‟ in which seven youths (sic) had been supplied with booby-trapped grenades 
which exploded in the young men‟s faces and killed them. One TV critic summed 
up the widespread response to that piece of agitprop: „you don‟t have to be a 
psychologist to realise that the average viewer will perceive a causal link – the 
emergency announcement is justified by the rhetorical behaviour of two ministers 
of religion and the actions of murderers.
50
     
 
Here I wish to underscore the relationship between the “thought manipulation” advocated 
by the apartheid state as part of its discursive war and the media‟s “legitimis[ing] [of] 
particular sensorial dispositions over others within and beyond…public culture.” This 
follows Allen Feldman who has written convincingly of the ways in which the mass 
production of „facts‟ through the media materially moulds a subject and culture of 
perception. He suggests that the,  
mass media has universalising capacities that promote and inculcate sensory 
specializations…such as the priority of visual realism and the often commented 
on gendered and racial gaze…objective realism, the depictive grammar of the 
mass media, should not be perceived as an ahistorical given; it is an apparatus of 
internal and external perceptual colonization that disseminates and legitimizes 
particular sensorial dispositions over others within and beyond our public 
culture.
51
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A similar point about the interplay of the state and its visual media is made by Suren 
Pillay who suggests that,“[w]hat made this the „first‟ [Maki Skosana as the „first‟ to be 
„necklaced‟] was its coming to view to the South Africa that does not, and dares not go 
into a township.”52 In this sense, the murder of Maki Skosana further enabled the 
apartheid state to play into what Posel argues was the long standing and deeply rooted 
white racist images and fears; and in the case of Maki Skosana, of the township as the 
home “of the rampant black mob.” 
 
Thus, The Citizen had the following editorial on the 22 July 1985, the day the first state 
of emergency was put into effect: 
“Emergency” 
No government, anywhere, will allow radicals to take over part of a country 
without reacting in the strongest possible way, and South Africa‟s government, 
facing such serious unrest, could not act in any other way than it has. Even the 
mounting death toll – the figure has gone beyond 500 – could not be allowed to 
continue since the death of each person is exploited, each burial becomes an 
occasion for radical outbursts and incitement, each death adds to the image of a 
country getting out of control. And among those who die are also the victims of 
the mobs – like the young woman [Maki Skosana] who was savagely beaten to 
death at a funeral…53 
 
In the 1987 trial that followed the killing of Maki Skosana and the subsequent appeal 
case, the judge accepted as admissible an edited video.
54
 This video, taken from the same 
SABC news of the 21 July 1985, was filmed by a foreign-service news crew. Reporting 
on the killing of Maki Skosana a week after her death, the Sunday Times reported that: 
“The TV crew who filmed the savage mob killing of a screaming woman who was 
stoned, beaten and burnt to death spoke this week of their horror during the „most 
gruesome news-gathering assignment ever.‟” The report continued by citing one of the 
film crew, Stanley Vesi, as saying: “It‟s my duty to document the news as I see it – I 
would not have stopped the angry mob from killing that woman. If I‟d uttered a word I 
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don‟t doubt they would have turned on me.” The same report „explains‟ what had 
happened that day in Duduza: “It all began last week when an angry Duduza funeral 
procession turned on the defenseless Miss Skosana because they thought she was a police 
informer.”55 
 
After viewing the tape in the appeal trial of those individuals found guilty of the murder 
of Maki Skosana, judge J.A Hoexter, couched his judgement in language not dissimilar 
from that advocated in the secret memo discussed earlier. In this sense, the terms 
“ferocious”, “ruthless” and “savage”, reinforced the depictive grammar of the mass 
media, its objective realism perpetuated by the „objectivity‟ of the court.56 
 
Thus, similar to Feldman‟s examination of the trial of Rodney King‟s beating, just as 
Rodney King was, “deleted from the courtroom and from the video as a legal 
personality”57, so too Maki Skosana‟s personhood had been deleted from the “ahistorical 
given” of a “mood of the crowd” as “ferocious, ruthless and savage”. Feldman argues that 
he (Rodney King), “only existed at the moment of violence, only in relation to material 
disorder [and] never in relation to language, memory, explanation, emotion and 
reason.”58 I want to suggest that so too Maki Skosana came to exist as, “a young, helpless 
black woman being set ablaze by a carnival of black people reinforc[ing] what the 
colonial mentality had long warned of: the barbarism of the native.”59 
 
During 1985 and early 1986 the apartheid state attributed the practice of necklacing to 
„the mobs‟, that “carnival of black people”. The practice was only associated with the 
liberation movement, specifically the ANC and UDF. However, in April 1986, the speech 
of Winnie Mandela enabled the state to establish a direct link to the ANC. Indeed, in 
relation to a history of necklacing within the larger struggle narrative, this speech is an 
infamous iconic moment. Despite the fact that Winnie Mandela was banned, preventing 
South African media from publicising anything she said, Minister of Law and Order, Mr. 
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Louis le Grange made a special concession, allowing her infamous, “…with our boxes of 
matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country”, speech to be widely reported 
in the press.
 60
  
 
Whilst Winnie Mandela has continuously stressed that she was quoted out of context,
61
 
those remarks had the effect of grounding the apartheid state‟s claims that „the mobs‟ 
were being incited by the ANC. The Deputy Minister of Information, Mr. Louis Nel, 
stated that those words revealed the true colours of Winnie Mandela and the ANC. He 
further stated that: “It is well known that the „necklace‟ method is only one of several 
methods by which moderate Blacks who did not support the violence of the ANC were 
intimidated by radical Black revolutionaries…the word „necklace‟ has become the code-
word for elimination through violent death.”62 
 
Not surprisingly in P.W Botha‟s address to parliament on the 23 April 1986, in which he 
defended the Public Safety Amendment Bill that called for an extension of police powers, 
he stressed the importance of focusing on the, “phenomenon of black-on-black violence”. 
He argued that since the outbreak of „unrest‟ in September 1984: “508 people, mostly 
moderate blacks, were brutally murdered by radical blacks, by the so called „necklace‟ 
method.” Botha continued, stating that: “In addition to the people murdered, 439 people 
were killed during the same period by fellow blacks in so called tribal or faction fighting, 
which has nothing to do with so-called apartheid, or, for that matter, politics.”63 
 
Besides quantifying death, here a distinction was drawn between the killing of „moderate 
blacks‟ and the killing between supposed “tribal or faction fighting”. The assumption was 
that, if there was something (for Botha) such as „tribal‟ or „factional‟ fighting, it had 
nothing or very little to do with politics. The killing of „moderate blacks‟ however, had 
everything to do with politics. Thus despite the intended focus on the liberation 
                                                 
60
 See for example, „Mandela vra vryheid met vuurhoutjies‟ in Die Burger (16 April 1986). 
61
 See G. van Staden, „Winnie slams “hysterical” media reaction‟ in The Star (18 April 1986). In 1999 
Winnie Mandela had argued that her statement was more symbolic that an actual order to go out and 
necklace people. See, „Winnie onthul gedenkplaat met gebalde vuis: Vuurhoutjie-stelling “simbolies”‟ in 
Die Beeld (29 March 1999). 
62
 „Govt. will muster all power to protect SA‟ in The Citizen (16 April 1986). My emphasis. 
63
 As cited in „PW speaks on Black on Black violence‟ in The Sowetan (24 April 1986). My emphasis.  
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movement, Botha fell into a familiar racialising discourse.
64
 That Botha made this 
distinction pointed to a shift that may also be read as a tension in the state‟s discourse on 
violent resistance. The notion of „black-on-black‟ violence was meant to draw attention 
away from the political nature of „unrest‟, and as discussed earlier in this chapter, with 
emphasis placed rather on common-law crimes.  
 
Botha proceeded to call for an examination of the motive behind „black-on-black‟ 
violence, which, for Botha, could only be attributed to the ANC and its “communist 
allies”:  
It is common knowledge that innocent and moderate people are the victims of the 
so-called „necklace‟ executions in public, people who do not support the violent 
aims of the ANC and the instigators of violence. In the name of freedom and 
democracy, moderate blacks are being robbed of their freedom of choice – 
peace…and now the „necklace‟ alone is no more regarded as effective enough. 
The latest trend is to first chop off the arms of the victim at the elbows, and then, 
screaming helplessly, he is made a pathetic victim of what happens to those who 
oppose the will of the so-called liberators. Not having the spontaneous support for 
their violence among the masses, the ANC and its cohorts use the most callous 
and gruesome methods of terror and extreme violence to intimidate people in 
order to gain control of the various black population groups.
65
 
 
The last sentence of the above quote suggests that whilst Botha seemingly rejected the 
notion of „tribal‟ or „factional‟ fighting as shown in the paragraph before, he reverts back 
to this characterisation of „black-on-black‟ violence in assigning „ownership‟ to the ANC 
and “its cohorts”, the SACP and the UDF. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the emphasis placed 
on the protection of the „moderate blacks‟ was of critical significance because it was their 
support that Botha sought within his larger reform policies. 
 
                                                 
64
 Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson suggest that three types of „black-on-black violence could be discerned: 
“The first was genuinely internecine. It occurred within the domain of radical politics and was a 
consequence of intellectual absolutism, the territorial nature of political mobilisation, and third-party 
mischief-making…second was the violence that represented a more profound and probably more enduring 
political conflict. It took place between radicals and conservatives, notably the UDF and Inkatha…the third 
form was the violence between popular organizations and state functionaries or government hirelings – the 
councilors, the vigilantes, and the kitskonstabels.” This third type is most commonly referred to as the 
„third-force‟ in relation to state sanctioned violence by, what can be thought of as „other means‟. See T. 
Lodge and B. Nasson, All, Here, And Now, 201. 
65
 As cited in „PW speaks on Black on Black violence‟ in The Sowetan (24 April 1986). See also House of 
Assembly Debates (Hansard), Vol.8 (24 March-2 May). My emphasis. 
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Louis Nel‟s comment on the Winnie Mandela statement as well as the parliamentary 
debate just discussed, points to attempts at assigning „ownership‟ of the practice of 
necklacing to the ANC and in so doing justifying and legitimating the apartheid state‟s 
use of violence. A booklet published and circulated by the state‟s Bureau of Information 
in June 1986, revealed this discourse which I suggest enabled a „politics of ownership‟ to 
take form.
66
 The booklet comprised statements of various ANC, SACP and UDF leaders 
and formulated, or rather structured, by juxtaposing those with statements made by 
apartheid state officials. Of particular interest and relevance here is a section entitled, 
“ANC policy on violence”. The booklet provided, amongst others, the following 
statements by ANC officials: 
During a meeting at California State University on the 10 October 1985, ANC 
spokesman Alosi Moloi justified this policy [of the ANC] of violence as follows: 
“Among us we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You 
have to eliminate one to save hundreds of others.” 
His colleague, Tim Ngubane, told the same meeting that 
“We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never 
think of it.”67 
 
The booklet also cited a 4 May 1986 Radio Freedom broadcast with the following 
“message to South Africa”: 
Let us take all our weapons, both rudimentary and sophisticated, our necklacers 
[sic], our grenades, our machine guns…let us fight the vigilantes, the so-called 
„fathers‟, together with the apartheid regime, together with the police and the 
army.
68
  
 
The last statement cited was that of Winnie Mandela made on the 13 April 1986. 
Following this is a text box describing the South African government‟s policy on 
violence. Cited there are extracts of a speech given by P.W. Botha on the 15 May 1986: 
I would however shirk my responsibility if I did not state clearly that the 
government is adamant to maintain order. People who perpetrate violence must 
                                                 
66
 Talking with the ANC… (Johannesburg: Bureau of Information, 1986).  Note the title of the booklet for it 
implies actual dialogue with the ANC. This, however, was presumably a deliberate play on words. It was 
published in relation to calls from various quarters, both national and international, to „talk to the ANC‟, as 
well as the numerous delegations that were beginning to engage in talks with the exiled ANC. The 
statements cited were rather collected and importantly, selected, from alternative media publications 
including confiscated ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and UDF publications. Indeed, there 
are photographs of such banned publications that included the ANC journal Sechaba in the booklet. See 
Talking with the ANC…,18.   
67
 Talking with the ANC…, 26. 
68
 Talking with the ANC…, 26. 
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take note that if they do not renounce violence, they will inevitably face the full 
power at the disposal of the State, which has not nearly been applied to the full. In 
future there must be no misunderstanding about this. 
It is my deepest wish that senseless violence be abandoned now. I plead with the 
public media to assist in this regard.
69
 
 
The booklet, under the title, “Black-on-Black Violence”, cited extracts of the 
parliamentary debate just discussed. The juxtaposing of short extracts of ANC statements 
with the minimal of context provided, together with the detailed statements of P.W Botha 
is telling of a discourse on violent resistance encapsulated within a discursive war of 
propaganda strategies. The seemingly „radical‟ nature of the ANC‟s policy on violence, 
as presented in the booklet coupled with the seemingly „rational‟ and „orderly‟ statements 
of P.W Botha spoke to what Posel highlights. The booklet highlighted the apartheid 
state‟s construction of the opposition between supposedly primitive and civilised 
behaviour. In this regard, that booklet was more than merely justifying and legitimating 
the impending state of emergency declared nationally on the 12 June 1986.
70
   
 
Similarly, a year later, with the impending renewal of the state of emergency at midnight 
on the 12 June 1987, P. W Botha stated: 
Together with the rest of the civilised world, we reject them [the ANC and UDF] 
for elevating terrorism to morality, for rationalising the horrors of necklacing and 
for claiming responsibility for the atrocities of landmining and car-bombing. We 
will not talk to these people, we will fight them, for the simple reason that they 
are part and parcel of the terrorist curse besetting the world today.
71
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 Talking with the ANC…, 27. 
70
 There were attempts in numerous newspapers to suggest that violence had decreased since the national 
state of emergency had been in force. The Deputy Director of the Bureau of Information therefore, 
commenting on statistics provided on the number of necklace killings and burnings and the decrease in the 
number of those killed, stated that: “The decline in the numbers of both necklacings and the burnings since 
the declaration of the emergency indicated the efficiency of the of the measures taken, while in general the 
number of deaths caused illustrated the need for imposing the emergency.” See T. Stirling, „Hundred burnt 
to death by the necklace – Bureau‟ in The Citizen (21 August 1986). However, other reports suggested that 
in fact violence had increased but that the Bureau of Information was withholding information about 
violent incidents. See for example, R. Green, „Emergency is effective‟ in Pretoria News (28 June 1986) 
contrasted with, „Endemic Violence‟ in Cape Times (25 November 1986). The latter view is also evident 
after the first state of emergency of July 1985 as was argued by Alex Boraine. See, „Is SA getting the full 
Picture?‟ in The Star (9 August 1985). 
71
 Cited in C. Cairncross, „PW renews the State of Emergency‟ in Business Day (12 June 1987). My 
emphasis. Interestingly, as part of the emergency regulations of 20 July 1985: “The possession of petrol in 
a container other than a petrol tank of a motor car, and the siphoning of petrol in a container (except with 
the permission of a member of a force) was prohibited in certain specific areas.” This regulation was 
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Two notions are apparent and discernable from the excerpt of Botha‟s speech above. The 
first, that the practice of necklacing, for the state, was irrational, given Botha‟s claim of 
the liberation movement‟s “rationalising the horrors of necklacing”, and the other being 
that the practice was uncivilised and barbaric. The two notions are complementary in 
that, as shown above, they operated in a discourse constituted largely through a 
discursive war that had morality and rationality as its attending claims. Indeed the notions 
were political signifiers of a discourse on violence. Thus the question of violence (or 
resistance in the guise of violence) for the apartheid state, could not be framed in any 
other manner except within a discourse of „black-on-black‟ violence. Stated differently, 
the state strategically manipulated the term „violence‟ so that it only applied to actions by 
the liberation movement; the violence of the state disappeared, only to reappear in official 
discourse as legitimate force. In the rationality of the apartheid state, state sponsored 
violence that characterised the mid 1980‟s under the numerous states of emergencies, was 
legitimated. 
 
For the apartheid state therefore, the practice of necklacing was not construed as political 
violence: it was not to be given any legality as an act of political resistance. To have done 
so, would have been to surrender the hegemony of the state to the terms of the liberation 
movements. Such a position was inconceivable in the exceptionality with which the state 
constructed its moral right to govern. For the state, it understood resistance to apartheid 
as terrorist activities and the practice of necklacing specifically, as a criminal activity, a 
form of barbarism, and a marker of the violence and criminality that supposedly 
undergirded the liberation movements. The initial hesitation on the part of the ANC and 
UDF to the question of necklacing and later, as I argue more fully in the following 
chapter, their ambivalent responses (for the state, “rationalising the horrors of 
necklacing”), saw the apartheid state, in its rationality, justify its claim that „ownership‟ 
of necklacing belonged to the liberation movement.     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reintroduced with the second state of emergency that came into effect on the 12 June 1986. The Race 
Relations Survey (1985) posits that the above prohibition was a result of the number of killings by 
necklace. See C. Cooper et.al, Race Relations Survey, 1985 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1986), 455-460. 
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However, Posel points to an important contradiction in the formulation of the apartheid 
state‟s discourse on political violence, particularly its formulation of „black-on-black‟ 
violence. She argues that this ran contrary to the state‟s reformist project, which sought to 
render those reforms in non-racial terms. Posel thus cites P. W. Botha‟s claim that, “strife 
in South Africa is between communists and democrats, not the black and white races.”72 
Part of the state‟s reformist strategies was the idea of some form of political power-
sharing (albeit unequal), an idea that the state hoped to win support for from those it 
termed „moderate blacks‟. Thus, it was necessary to avoid racial perceptions of the 
violence besetting the country. However, in characterising political violence in terms of 
„black-on-black‟ violence, the apartheid state‟s discourse on violence, “recreated and 
reinforced exactly this perception” of racialising violence.73 
 
In this chapter therefore I argued that the apartheid state mainly set the discursive terrain 
on the practice of necklacing. The state positioned the practice in the realm of „black-on-
black‟ violence and in so doing claimed that the practice was criminal in nature and 
therefore, supposedly, without political affiliation. Yet contradictorily, assigning the 
practice of necklacing to the liberation movements, and through the state‟s rhetoric from 
April 1986, necklacing was clearly positioned in the realm of resistance politics.  
 
In relation to the quote that prefaces this chapter, I draw attention to that which was 
known to the ANC in 2005. They “knew” what happened in Duduza (where Maki 
Skosana had been killed whilst attending the funeral of the eight COSAS members); they 
“knew” who were described as „the mob‟ and “what the apartheid regime did to them”. 
This „knowing‟ I want to suggest is constitutive of a discursive war with the apartheid 
state. In stating that it was the late Oliver Tambo who stopped “„necklacing‟ started by 
the apartheid regime‟, Thabo Mbeki‟s statement points to a contestation over the 
„ownership‟ of the practice of necklacing, what I am calling a „politics of ownership‟, 
which came most forcefully to light at the TRC. (See Chapter Four). 
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 Cited in D. Posel, „A “battlefield of perceptions”‟, 273. 
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 D. Posel, „A “battlefield of perceptions”‟, 273. 
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Taking the above as a point of departure, the following chapter proceeds to examine what 
was said in relation to the question of necklacing in what I have suggested be viewed as 
an „official‟ non-state discourse on the practice of necklacing.There was an initial 
hesitancy on the part of the ANC and UDF to the emergence of the practice that was 
construed by the apartheid state as a condoning and propagating of the practice of 
necklacing. When liberation movement figures made statements in relation to the practice 
as shown above, the apartheid state used those statements as a counter for the justifying 
and legitimating of its own use of violence in quelling violent resistance to its 
governance.  
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Chapter Two 
On the „official‟ non-state discourse in relation to the practice of 
necklacing 
[W]e were opposed to any attack on so-called soft targets. On the contrary, our 
enemy did not hesitate to resort to terrorism to defeat our struggle and further 
entrench white minority domination… As this struggle continued, our movement 
insisted that to resort to terrorism would be to dishonour our struggle and to 
destroy its morality. It openly stated that it was against the very nature of our 
movement to show disrespect for human life and to deify the use of force as a 
means of ordering human relations. It was on this basis, for instance, that we 
condemned the use of the “necklace” and called on our people not to resort to this 
barbaric form of struggle. It came as no surprise that, subsequently, it was 
revealed that the use of the “necklace” had in fact been introduced by agents of 
the apartheid security forces as part of their determined effort to suppress the 
sustained mass uprising that spelt defeat for the apartheid system (Thabo Mbeki, 
ANC Today, September 2001).
1
 
 
If the state mainly set the discursive terrain on the practice of necklacing in the 1980‟s, 
this was in the absence of a clear response from the liberation movements and 
specifically, the ANC and UDF. Indeed the ANC and particularly the UDF, have been 
accused of “a shameful shuffling of feet around the issue of the necklace.”2 According to 
Steven Mufson, this lack of public response arose from, “fear of losing influence with the 
militant youth they wanted to restrain. Better to avoid public debate and to influence 
quietly, many thought.”3 The increasing detention of UDF leadership from 1985 onwards 
further hampered its efforts to respond. 
   
However, the escalation of necklace killings from July 1985 meant that the issue could 
not be avoided and subsequently leading figures in the ANC and UDF made a number of 
key statements regarding attacks on collaborators, which included the practice of 
necklacing. Besides the infamous Winnie Mandela statement quoted in the previous 
                                                 
1
 T. Mbeki, „Letter from the President: Acts of Terror must be condemned unreservedly‟ in ANC Today, 
Vol. 1, No. 34, (14-20 September 2001). This is an extract of a letter from former South African president 
Thabo Mbeki to the nation. It was part of the chorus of condemnation of the September 11 terror attacks in 
the United States of America.  
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2001/at34.htm  
2
 See for example S. Mufson, Fighting Years: Black Resistance and the Struggle for a New South Africa 
(Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1990), 97. 
3
 S. Mufson, Fighting Years, 103. 
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chapter, amongst the more prominent were those of then president of the ANC, Oliver 
Tambo, and MK‟s chief of staff, Chris Hani. Taken together these statements of both the 
ANC and UDF, I argue, constitute an „official‟ non-state discourse as it relates to the 
practice of necklacing.  
 
In this chapter, I examine what was said by the ANC and the UDF in relation to the 
question of necklacing. I argue that even when they officially condemned the practice of 
necklacing, their position was ambivalent. There were several ways in which public 
positions on necklace killings tended to produce what I have termed a prose of 
ambivalence.
4
 Firstly, the ANC and UDF were caught in a double bind in that they could 
not explicitly condemn the practice and risk losing their mass support base, or explicitly 
condone the practice and risk losing the support of important internal and international 
constituencies. Consequently, both organisations struggled to formulate a position 
without giving the apartheid state the upper hand in a discursive war on the moral and 
political legitimacy over using violence. 
 
This ambivalence was, however, not merely a tactical one. For underpinning the „official‟ 
non-state discourse on the practice of necklacing was an inherent formulation of the 
binary of resistance and oppression/repression. The practice understood within this 
framework was rendered causally as resistance arising from state oppression/repression. 
Ambivalence about the practice of necklacing was thus produced in the interstice of the 
resistance – oppression/repression binary. Leading from this, through offering a reading 
of Govan Mbeki‟s The Peasant‟s Revolt (1964), I argue more broadly that the 
problematic of violence in the ANC has a far longer history.
5
  
 
While the focus of this chapter is to trace ambivalence and to ask how that ambivalence 
was produced, I proceed to provide a brief overview of some of the ANC and UDF 
strategies in the early to mid 1980‟s. I then outline the key statements made by the ANC 
                                                 
4
 I borrow this phrasing rather liberally from the seminal work of Ranajit Guha as discussed in the 
Introduction to this thesis. See R. Guha, „The Prose of Counter-Insurgency‟ in Subaltern Studies Volume 11 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 45-84. 
5
 G. Mbeki, South Africa: The Peasants‟ Revolt (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1964). 
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and UDF on the practice of necklacing and/or violence in this period, before proceeding 
to discuss the UDF‟s formulation of „defensive violence‟ and Chris Hani‟s on the 
distinction between „mass‟ and „revolutionary violence/justice‟. Both these formulations 
enable an unravelling of the liberation movements prose of ambivalence.     
 
„Official‟ non-state strategies on (violent) resistance  
Around the same time as the apartheid state adopted „total strategy‟ in the late 1970‟s, the 
ANC produced The Green Book, a report on lessons learnt from the Vietnamese 
liberation struggle.
6
 This report placed emphasis on the strengthening of the underground 
and the building of mass organisations. The role of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the 
Nation - MK) would be to escalate the armed struggle but as a form of political armed 
propaganda, “whose immediate purpose [was] to support and stimulate political activity 
and organisation rather than to hit at the enemy.”7 Violence, while still central to what 
was conceived of as seizure of state power, would be the result of a mass revolutionary 
insurrectionary strategy (a „people‟s war‟) and insofar as MK would continue to play a 
leading role, this would be primarily political not military.
8
   
 
Three of these strategies – the all-round vanguard activity of the underground, the united 
mass action of the people, and the armed offensive spearheaded by MK – formed part of 
what was known as „the four pillars‟ strategy. The fourth pillar was the international 
drive to isolate the apartheid regime and win world-wide moral, political and material 
support for the ANC.
9
  
 
                                                 
6
 See The Green Book – Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission to the ANC National 
Executive Committee, August 1979. 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/green-book.html 
Interestingly, the first national strategy of the SSC, known as Boek 1/Belied: Die RSA se Belange en die 
RSA – Regeringse Doel, Doelstellings en Beleid, was known as „Die Groenboek‟ (The Green Book). TRC 
Research Notes.  
7
 See The Green Book.  
8
 See H. Barrell, „Conscripts of their Age: African National Congress Operational Strategy, 1976-1986‟, 
Unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford University (1993), 207-260. See also M. Legassick, „Armed Struggle in 
South Africa: Consequences of a Strategy Debate‟ in Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 
2 (2003), 285-302. 
9
 See January 8 Statement- 1984: President‟s message for 1984. 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/jan8-84.html  
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While the precise relationship between the internal mass organisations and the ANC 
remains unclear, the early 1980‟s saw significant mass mobilisation and organisation, 
including the launch in August 1983 of the UDF, a front of organisations which provided 
a broad organisational framework as well as symbolic coherence to anti apartheid 
resistance.
10
 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Rev. Alan Boesak and several former ANC and 
Congress Alliance members, including Albertina Sisulu (the president of the UDF) and 
Helen Joseph were amongst its prominent patrons and executive members. The UDF 
mobilised against reforms proposed by the Botha government, most notably the 
tricameral system which instituted racially segregated representation in central 
government for „coloured‟ and „indian‟ South Africans while excluding „black‟ 
representation except at a local level.
11
 The UDF, though ambiguously, propagated non-
violence: the forms of resistance, largely led by the UDF, varied from rent boycotts that 
had begun in late 1984, to bus and food boycotts, worker stay-aways and school boycotts.   
 
Following the boycott of black local elections in September 1984, there was escalating 
conflict between mobilised masses, mostly youth and students, and security forces.
12
 As 
political strife spread across the country, the UDF declared 1985 „From Protest to 
Challenge‟13 and in January 1985, the ANC called on South Africans to „Render South 
Africa Ungovernable‟.14 The state, as discussed in the previous chapter, increasingly 
shifted its strategy to one of „counter-revolutionary warfare‟. By July 1985 the state had 
declared a partial state of emergency and by 12 July 1986, a national state of emergency. 
This led to wide-spread detentions, significant and increasing number of deaths as a result 
                                                 
10
 See T. Lodge and B. Nasson, All, Here, And Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (Cape 
Town: Ford Foundation – David Philip, 1991); J. Seekings, The UDF: A history of the United Democratic 
Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000) and I. van Kessel, „“Beyond our 
Wildest Dreams”: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa‟, PhD thesis 
submitted at University of Leiden, (November 1995); G. F Houston, The National Liberation Struggle in 
South Africa: A case study of the United Democratic Front, 1983-1987 (Vermont: Ashgate, 1999) amongst 
others for detailed reviews of the UDF. See also H. Barrell for a discussion on the relation between the 
ANC‟s tactical strategies and the UDF, H. Barrell, „Conscripts of their Age‟, 261-297. 
11
 T. Lodge and B. Nasson, All, Here, And Now, 58-64. 
12
 See for example A. Marx, Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990 (Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press, 1992), 147-170. 
13
 See M. Swilling, „The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt‟ in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen 
(ed.), Popular Struggles in South Africa (London: James Curry, 1988), 103-105. 
14
 See „Render South Africa Ungovernable: President O.R. Tambo‟s message delivered in Lusaka on 
January 8, 1985‟ in Sechaba (March 1985). 
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of security force action, both in protest/street violence, cross border raids and via more 
sinister forms of covert action.
15
 The first report of necklace killings, most notably that of 
Councillor Benjamin Kinikini and his family members and Maki Skosana, emerged in 
early 1985 in this rising tide of mass political strife. Indeed, the killing of the Kinikini‟s 
followed the Langa massacre, while that of Maki Skosana was directly linked to a sinister 
form of covert action.
16
 
 
In June 1985 at its Kabwe Conference, the ANC approved a new and intensified mass-
based resistance strategy for a „People‟s War‟. At the same time, it provided some 
legitimacy to attacks on „soft targets‟ such as prominent government supporters, border 
area farmers, civil defence workers, state witnesses and police informers.
17
 This was seen 
in some quarters as a major deviation from earlier policy, departing from the ANC‟s 
earlier commitment to the Geneva Convention, and thus the protected status of non-
combatants.
18
 However, the ANC regarded many of the above as extensions of state force 
and thus legitimate targets. Shortly thereafter the ANC launched their land-mine 
campaign.
19
  
 
Through legitimating attacks on „soft targets‟, it is possible that inside South Africa this 
was read more broadly as legitimating the killing of collaborators. Thus, although the 
ANC‟s new policy on „soft targets‟ applied specifically to armed struggle, it could have 
                                                 
15
 See for example, D. Webster, „Repression and the State of Emergency‟ in G. Moss and I. Obery (eds.), 
South African Review 4 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 141-172. 
16
 See Introduction and Chapter One. 
17
 H. Barrell, „ANC Conference: “All for the Front”‟ in Work in Progress, Issue 38 (August 1985), 13 
18
 The ANC endorsed the Geneva Convention in 1980 binding itself to its stipulations.This was the first 
occasion that such a Declaration was formally made by a liberation movement before the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In a statement at the ceremony, President Tambo said that the “United 
Nations and the ICRC were to be congratulated. They had helped to develop the law so as to extend the 
concept of an international armed conflict to cover wars of national liberation in which, to use the language 
of Protocol I, „peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination‟.” See „The ANC signs the Geneva Protocols‟, 
The O‟Malley Archives. 
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv02918/06lv02928/07lv
02929.htm  
See also „Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions‟ of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
„Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)‟, 8 June 1977. 
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19
 See T. Lodge, „The African National Congress after the Kabwe Conference‟ in G. Moss and I. Obery 
(eds.), South African Review 4 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 7-10. 
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influenced the escalation of necklace killings and attacks on collaborators. This in turn 
created increasing pressure on the ANC and UDF to respond more clearly to necklace 
killings: the state had framed the practice of necklacing as barbaric and the escalation in 
necklacing killings and its associated negative publicity threatened growing support 
locally and internationally for the liberation movements.
20
 Indeed, the rise of necklace 
killings and associated media attention threatened to deflect attention from increasing 
security force violence in the townships. Both the UDF and ANC began to make public 
statements on the practice of necklacing, and more broadly on contested aspects of 
violence. These, however, were not always in unison; indeed, in many instances they 
were contradictory. It is to these statements that I now turn, highlighting an ambivalence 
that condemned the practice of necklacing, but condoned those who carried it out.  
    
Between „condemning‟ and „condoning‟  
Clergymen such as Reverend Alan Boesak and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, both patrons 
of the UDF, harshly condemned early necklace killings and burnings such as that of the 
Kinikini‟s and Skosana. Indeed, both clergymen are reported to have personally protected 
individuals from being necklaced.
21
 Despite this, according to journalist Steven Mufson, 
Bishop Tutu doubted whether his message of non-violence was getting through to the 
youth (who were mainly involved in the practice of necklacing): “Tutu himself said that 
if he were a young black, he wouldn‟t follow a man named Bishop Tutu.”22 This implied 
perhaps, on Tutu‟s part, a degree of understanding for those engaged in this practice.  
 
This condemnation was not, however, uniform. Mufson argues that, “[b]y taking violence 
to a new threshold, the necklace renewed the debate over the need for violence and limits 
on violence.”23 This debate is evident in key statements made by the UDF which wavered 
between condemnation and condonation, despite the Front‟s public stance on non-
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Persons Group (EPG) in the first half of 1986. See for example T. Lodge, „People‟s War or Negotiation? 
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violence. Initially key figures appeared to condone both the practice of necklacing and 
the killing of suspected collaborators.  
 
Seekings posits that the escalation of violence in 1985 forced the UDF to restate its 
commitment to non-violence. Although it had previously adopted a non-violent policy, 
this was not necessarily uniform or unanimous given the UDF‟s wide constituencies. 
According to Seekings while, “some leaders saw violence as morally suspect; others saw 
it as potentially counterproductive, a threat to sustained revolt; most favoured instead 
organisation building.” 24 On the other hand, others such as Eastern Cape publicity 
secretary, Stone Sizane, publicly and according to Mufson, “unambiguously” endorsed 
violence by stating in a speech at a funeral in Queenstown: 
When the youth die they do not die, but fall in the battle. We … must take over 
their spears, their AK‟s and go forward. When one nation subjugates another the 
first thing they do is disarm them. They disarm us and bring in their armed forces 
to kill and shoot us. They expect us to take it lying down. To wear black robes 
and mourn. To pray and ask God to liberate us. We say enough is enough. Now is 
the time to hit back. So that is why we say amabuthu must ever be strengthened, 
must ever be organised. They must be mobilised to hit more and most 
effectively.
25
 
 
Similarly, Transvaal UDF president Curtis Nkondo told a thousand strong crowd 
gathered in a church at a funeral in Alexandra for eight individuals killed: “Either you 
join the struggle or you join the police. There is no such thing as the politics of 
neutrality.”26 
 
This lack of unanimity played itself out in relation to the practice of necklacing. As a 
result, even when it re-stated its commitment to non-violence, this, according to 
Seekings, was “qualified in that the UDF refused to condemn what it called „defensive‟ 
violence of protestors against the state and its agents.”27 For example, at the UDF‟s 
annual general council in April 1985, shortly after the Langa massacre and the associated 
killings of the Kinikini‟s, Mosiuoa „Terror‟ Lekota, national public secretary of the UDF, 
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argued that the kind of violence meted out to community councillors  by angry residents 
was not “aggressive violence but defensive violence.” 28 In other words, “councillors were 
using a subtle type of violence against their own people as they (the councillors) were 
„little Vorsters and Bothas in black skin‟.” He continued by saying: “Our people are very 
angry at the whole system of apartheid and I would like to appeal once more to the 
councillors to resign their posts while there is still time.”29 At the same council though, 
the UDF noted that “in many areas, organisations trail behind the masses, thus making it 
more difficult for a disciplined mass action to take place. More often there is spontaneity 
of actions in the township.”30  
 
At other moments the UDF denied responsibility for the practice of necklacing and 
burnings. For example in March 1986, Paul Maseko, an executive UDF member 
according to the Cape Times, stated that police informers known to members of the UDF 
would “have been killed by now had the organisation been a violent one.” He was 
refuting claims that the UDF was a violent organisation that burnt people to death.
31
   
 
A few months later, on June 7 1986, youths returning from a UDF meeting in Alexandra 
calling for the unbanning of the ANC, 
captured a suspected informer, put a tire around his neck, and made him drink 
gasoline. He escaped while they went looking for his employer, whom they 
necklaced and stoned to death. Five days later the AAC [Alexander Action 
Committee, an affiliate of the UDF] executive condemned the killing, promised to 
discipline the youths, appointed a committee to protect the victims family, and 
offered to help with the funeral arrangements.
32
  
 
Although this handful of statements may not be complete, it is clear that there was not an 
overwhelming response. When the UDF did respond, its statements vacillated and were 
sometimes contradictory. Even when the UDF expressed a level of discomfort with the 
levels and forms of violence, its position was ambivalent. To return to Lekota, while his 
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comments were in line with the UDF‟s campaign to boycott local government structures 
and thus part of the campaign to pressure councillors to resign, his formulation can also 
be read as a broader statement on violence. That statement argued that the UDF could not 
condemn such violence because it was “defensive violence.” In this sense, the state was 
complicit, indeed responsible, for such acts of violence. The notion of „black-on-black‟ 
violence as propagated by the apartheid state was rendered nonsensical, as violence in 
effect remained state violence. Moreover, “defensive violence”, to some degree, 
sanctioned those carrying out the act, who in this formulation are rendered as responding 
to violence on the part of the state, and thus, in some ways innocent. It should be noted 
though, as Seekings points out, that while, “popular violence was often defended on the 
grounds that such violence itself was defensive… not all the targets of popular violence 
were themselves perpetrators of violence.”33  
 
Lekota‟s formulation is also evident in a statement made by Trevor Manuel, the Western 
Cape regional secretary of the UDF, after the lynching of Moegsien Abrahams following 
a UDF meeting at the Westridge Civic Centre, Mitchells Plain (Cape Town) on the 25 
May 1986.
34
 Two days after the incident, having “gathered the facts” according to 
Manuel,
35
 he released the following statement: 
The UDF regrets the loss of life of Moegsien Abrahams. However, it is important 
we understand his untimely death in context. The context is provided by the 
growing polarisation and concomitant anger which flows from the apartheid 
ordering our society. His death occurred in a manner which the UDF cannot be 
held responsible for…  
 
Following a careful explanation of the chain of events, Manuel continued: 
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In light of this, the UDF cannot and will not take responsibility, whether directly 
or indirectly, for his death. The blame rests four-square on the shoulders of those 
responsible for the breeding of hatred and anger by their maintenance of apartheid 
against the will of the people. Our struggle for an end to apartheid is a struggle for 
an end to the very brutality which led to the death of Moegsien Abrahams and so 
many others.
36
 
 
The question here is not whether or not Moegsien Abrahams was an „informer‟, or about 
the legitimacy of killing collaborators, but to demonstrate the continuity in the position 
which held that all political violence was ultimately state-sponsored violence. This move 
not only denies individual agency to those who physically killed him, but also places 
Abrahams in a category of fallen victims of apartheid. Thus Abrahams, a suspected 
informer and hence perpetrator, is also a victim. Indeed, he is a double victim both of 
context (read the system of apartheid) as well as direct physical violence. An editorial in 
the Cape Times posed the following question, “followed to its logical conclusion, it 
means that apartheid can be used as justification to do anything to anybody who may or 
may not be linked to the existing parliamentary system. Is that what the UDF is 
suggesting? That maiming and murder is excusable?”37 Seekings suggests that there was 
a, “continuing ambiguity” in the UDF‟s position on political violence, citing as an 
example the UDF‟s failure to unambiguously condemn the killing of Moegsien 
Abrahams.
38
  
 
The idea of “defensive violence” as justification is similarly evident in some comments 
of the ANC, although here too there was lack of unanimity. On the 29 October 1985, 
Oliver Tambo made a key statement in response to a question posed by the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of Commons in London regarding the ANC‟s policy on 
„soft targets‟ and whether they condemned the killing of suspected collaborators. Here he 
referred to the ANC‟s call at Kabwe to intensify the struggle but recognised that the 
intensification of armed struggle would inevitably lead to unavoidable civilian casualties. 
Countering the state‟s notion of „black-on-black‟ violence, Tambo said: 
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Now, this question of black versus black is generally misunderstood, I am afraid. 
The South African Government uses black police which it arms and which shoot 
at our people, so they have got an area of conflict between black and black, but it 
is not really between black and black, it is between the agencies of the regime - its 
armed police force killing civilians who are unarmed, and this has been presented 
as a conflict between black and black. It is not really, it is conflict between, on the 
one side, the victims of the apartheid system and the forces that represent and 
defend the apartheid system on the other. In the course of all this, of course, there 
are excesses which we do not condone, but we understand the circumstances in 
which all this is happening. There has been such an onslaught on our people by 
the Pretoria regime, there has been so much killing and shooting - shooting of 
children who do not have to be killed, they are killed because  they are taking a 
stone and throwing a stone, they cannot hurt anybody throwing a stone, but in 
return for it they are shot and killed. This enrages the people and makes them 
more angry and we can understand that they can go to excesses in the way that 
they respond to this unbridled violence by apartheid.
39
 
 
Here Tambo challenged the depiction of violence as „black-on-black‟; in its place he re-
asserted violence as state versus liberation movement, thereby designating all those 
targeted by the „comrades‟ as “represent(ing) and defend(ing)” the apartheid system and 
„the people‟ as victims of apartheid counter-revolutionary strategies. Tambo, however, 
acknowledged that excesses of violence had been carried out but here, although the ANC 
did not condone, it understood that, “the circumstances in which all this is 
happening…we can understand that they [„the people‟] can go to excesses in the way that 
they respond to this unbridled violence by apartheid.” In this sense, there is recourse to 
causality: insofar as „the people‟ engage in excesses of violence, it is a result of 
oppression/repression. Thus the oppression/repression framework is both explanation and 
legitimation over the use of violence as well as the sanctioning of “excesses” that may be 
outside the formal policy.  
 
Following Tambo‟s statement, a series of statements were made that openly supported 
violence (including by the practice of necklacing) against collaborators. In October 1985, 
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exiled ANC members and spokesmen Alosi Moloi and Tim Ngubane on the 10 October 
1985 stated: 
Among us we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You 
have to eliminate one to save hundreds of others. 
 
We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never 
think of it.
40
 
 
In the November 1985 issue of Sechaba
41
, one Cassius Mandla, in a discussion article 
stated that:  
life in the townships is no longer like it was before…here collaborators and 
informers live in fear of petrol, either as petrol bombs being hurled at their homes 
and reducing them to rack and ruin, or as petrol dousing their treacherous bodies 
which are set alight and burned to a charred despicable mess. No longer is it just 
lucrative and safe to commit unspeakable acts of treachery against the people; 
selling out under cover of innocence, and life being all beer and skittles. Lucrative 
it still is to sell out, but it carries the immediate hazard of having one‟s flesh and 
bones being reduced to unidentifiable ashes.
42
  
 
Mandla‟s comment served as a warning to those that would “sell out” and as to what the 
consequences of committing “unspeakable acts of treachery” would be. The infamous 
Winnie Mandela statement followed this on the 13 April 1986 and thereafter a 4 May 
1986 Radio Freedom broadcast:  
Let us take all our weapons, both rudimentary and sophisticated, our necklacers 
[sic], our grenades, our machine guns…let us fight the vigilantes, the so-called 
„fathers‟, together with the apartheid regime, together with the police and the 
army 
43
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While Tambo‟s statement, despite its somewhat ambivalent disapproval for the practice, 
was not reported in South Africa, as shown in the previous chapter, statements such as 
the above were widely used by the apartheid state. 
 
In early September 1986, Oliver Tambo more unequivocally criticised the practice of 
necklacing at a press conference at the Non-Aligned Movement conference in Harare, 
where the ANC had observer status. The Weekly Mail reported that Oliver Tambo had 
stated that the ANC was, “not happy with the necklace and hoped his supporters would 
take this into account.” However, according to the report: “He [Oliver Tambo] indicated 
also that he felt unable to condemn people who used the necklace because of the brutality 
they faced as a result of the South African system.” 44 Tambo further accused, “vigilantes 
of sometimes necklacing anti-apartheid activists and then blaming it on the ANC in the 
hope of discrediting the movement.”45 In concluding the report, it is stated that when 
asked about the extent of the ANC‟s control in South Africa, Oliver Tambo hinted that 
the ANC had, “structures inside South Africa to make the country ungovernable, 
however, it [the ANC] could not control all aspects of the revolt, such as necklacing.”46 
This statement thus re-states the earlier ambivalence of criticising yet being unwilling to 
condemn those responsible for necklacing. 
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Some weeks later though, in October 1986, then ANC Secretary General, Alfred Nzo was 
reported as having said to the London Sunday Times:  
“[w]hatever the people decide to use to eliminate those enemy elements is their 
decision. If they decide to use necklacing we support it.”47  
 
In September 1987, Oliver Tambo, again in Harare, this time at the Harare Conference on 
Children, made a further statement in which he called for the practice to stop. This 
„official‟48 condemnation of the practice of necklacing was widely seen as an eventual 
response to the statement made the previous year by Winnie Mandela and other 
statements that she and others had made.
 49
 In this regard, it was reported that the ANC 
viewed Madikizela-Mandela‟s statement as being “unfortunate”.50 This widely publicised 
statement had sparked controversy in that a liberation struggle icon, the then wife of 
Nelson Mandela, publicly endorsed the practice of necklacing. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the state had triumphantly seized upon the statement to de-legitimise the ANC. 
Neither organization, the ANC and UDF, criticized her statement publicly at the time.
51
  
  
According to the Weekly Mail, at the Harare Conference, Tambo and the ANC gave the 
following message to South African delegates: “The necklace as a form of punishment 
should stop. It has, rightly or wrongly, served its purpose and there is no way that people 
should continue with it.” When asked whether the practice of necklacing as a form of 
punishment was wrong, an ANC spokesperson at the conference replied, “they (people 
who had applied the necklace) knew very well why they had to resort to using it. 
Probably they were compelled by circumstances prevailing at the time.”52 Another 
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spokesperson responded as follows: “Our leadership has continually made it clear that the 
„necklace‟ is not a method we advocate or support. But we are not prepared to condemn 
our people.”53 Indeed, in the September 1986 criticism of the use of the practice of 
necklacing, Oliver Tambo had framed his critique in precisely this manner. 
 
It is this sentiment of the practice of necklacing, “rightly or wrongly” serving its 
“purpose” and of those that “knew very well why they had to resort” to the practice and 
of not being “prepared to condemn our people” that I consider a prose of ambivalence as 
it relates to the question of necklacing. This position echoes that of Trevor Manuel‟s 
response to the lynching of Moegsien Abrahams and Chris Hani‟s “comment on the 
necklace” in what follows. For it appears that whilst the ANC condemned the practice of 
necklacing, that is the practice itself, it did not condemn those who acted and carried out 
the practice. At the same time, although part and parcel of the larger national liberation 
struggle, Oliver Tambo was drawing a distinction between the ANC and „the people‟ or 
„the masses‟. This distinction is most visible in MK Chief of Staff, Chris Hani‟s 
“comment on the necklace”, which I examine more closely in order to demonstrate how 
this prose of ambivalence is constituted, and how attempts to escape it ultimately failed. 
 
A prose of ambivalence 
Following Zygmunt Bauman, if by ambivalence is meant “the possibility of assigning an 
object or an event to more than one category”,54 then Chris Hani‟s “comment on the 
necklace” qualifies as a prose of ambivalence.55 Hani‟s comment appeared in a December 
1986 issue of Sechaba and formed part of a more wide-ranging interview on the state of 
the struggle, the prospects of which he described as, “very very bright.” He further 
suggested that within South Africa, “we [read MK and ANC] have become part and 
parcel of the ongoing mass struggles of our people…our people should look forward to 
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the situation where, in the course of their confrontation with the enemy, units of MK will 
be with them.”56 He continued by arguing: 
We are going to come increasingly across a situation where comrades in anger are 
going to react… That is not the policy of the ANC…we are in a state of war…we 
want to deal with the enemy personnel, the police, the army, with the 
administration of the enemy… But in the process our people are going to get 
angry…the Botha regime is solely responsible for this sort of situation. We are 
not authors of the situation…And I want to repeat that we are not responsible for 
this situation…We are a revolutionary movement.57 
 
Hani‟s “comment on the necklace” was situated within a merging of the “mass struggles 
of our people” and MK being there every step of the way.58 The practice of necklacing, 
for Hani, was in part located within this claiming of the mass struggle of „the people‟ as 
being bound to the larger struggle with the proviso that those in the ANC were not the 
“autho[rs] of the [violent] situation.” Importantly here as well was the assertion by Hani 
of the ANC being a revolutionary movement with revolutionary approaches to dealing 
with “the enemy”. The category of “the enemy” however, was not merely the apartheid 
regime (the “Botha regime”); it broadly included those who collaborated with that 
regime.  
 
Hani proceeded to open his “comment on the necklace” by situating South Africa as a 
“colonialist power of a special type.” This formulation, as explained in a April 1985 issue 
of Sechaba, was understood as a, 
form of capitalist state power in the hands of an internally settled White minority 
which has industrialised racism and violence as instruments of coercion to 
perpetuate the racial domination, the racial oppression and the racial exploitation 
of the aboriginal African majority, the Coloured, Indian and other national 
minorities of South Africa. And this state is essentially fascist!
59
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Having placed the apartheid state in a field of moral indefensibility, Hani stated that in 
the context of a society that was “very abnormal… [p]eople are angry because [they] are 
fighting fascism in that country.”60 Hani then linked South Africa to other situations of 
“classic colonialism” such as India, Kenya, the old Tanganyika in which the “active 
collaboration by puppets” was essential to colonialism‟s survival.61  
 
In South Africa these collaborators were identified as the “Black policeman, the Black 
special branch and the Black agent [who] stay in the same townships as we do [and who] 
have been the conduit through which information about our activities, about our plans 
ha[ve] been passed to the enemy [making] organisation and mobilisation very difficult.”62 
Hani named those considered as collaborators, as legitimate targets that included both 
„soft‟ and „hard‟ targets. Indeed, at the end of 1985 an official ANC leaflet, Take the 
Struggle to White Areas!, was distributed in South Africa stating that, “we have created 
combat groups and mobile units to defend ourselves and our leaders by confronting the 
racist army, police, death squads, agents and stooges in our midst.” Before concluding, 
the leaflet implicitly warned those who do not throw in “their lot with the fighters for 
liberation”: 
The issue today is not whether or not freedom for the people will come. The 
question is on which side you should be – whether to perish with apartheid or to 
live with the forces of democracy and peace.
 63
 
 
While there was no elaboration of who “agents and stooges” were, though the phrasing is 
seemingly synonymous with collaborators, the targeting of such “agents and stooges” 
was presumably part of a sanctioned discourse regarding the legitimacy of carrying out 
sanctioned operations against collaborators. For example in 1983, the ANC had 
established „suicide squads‟ or „grenade squads‟ that attacked township councillors and 
those considered „collaborators‟.64 By late 1985 though, when the above-mentioned 
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leaflet was distributed, it was mainly not official MK cadres carrying out the sanctioned 
targeting and killing of “stooges” or collaborators. Rather, it was predominantly local 
township youth mobilised by the UDF and other organisations.
65
  
 
Hani continued however by cautioning „the people‟: “But we are saying here our people 
must be careful, in the sense that the enemy would employ provocateurs to use the 
necklace, even against activists.”66 Oliver Tambo, in his condemning of the practice of 
necklacing as elaborated earlier, had criticised the work of vigilantes in killing anti-
apartheid activists and in so doing seeking to discredit the ANC. Indeed, this 
complication permeated Hani‟s prose of ambivalence.  
 
The context for the emergence of necklace killings, for Hani, is that of 
oppression/repression from the apartheid regime. It is in this context of resistance then 
that, “the necklace was a weapon devised by the oppressed themselves to remove this 
cancer from our society, the cancer of collaboration of the puppets.” 67 Hani explicitly 
stated that the practice was not a “weapon of the ANC”, ambiguously distancing the 
ANC from the practice of necklacing and from „the masses‟. Rather it was, “a weapon of 
the masses themselves to cleanse the townships from the very disruptive and even lethal 
activities of the puppets and collaborators.” 68 In this sense, the practice of necklacing as 
resistance was assigned to the “masses themselves.” 
 
At the same time though, Hani distanced but simultaneously claimed „ownership‟ of „the 
masses‟: “We do understand our people when they use the necklace because it is an 
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attempt to render our townships, to render our areas and country ungovernable, to make 
the enemy‟s access to information very difficult.”69 Rendering the “country 
ungovernable” as a strategy of resistance leading towards liberation enabled an 
understanding of why the practice of necklacing emerged amongst „the masses‟ and 
continued to be used. In this understanding however, the practice was also thus arguably 
aligned with the ANC.  
 
Following the above, the relationship between those that could kill legitimately with 
those that could be legitimately killed was also blurred. In other words, when it called for 
a „People‟s War,‟ the ANC attempted (although failed) to clarify who was considered a 
legitimate target; what it did not address at all was whether killings could be conducted 
by members of its mass support base as Hani shows here. 
  
Up to this point then Hani‟s position largely repeats the ambivalence that is apparent in 
those statements from the ANC and UDF concerning the condemning of practices such as 
necklacing and burning. He positioned the state as “fascist” and morally indefensible; the 
“people/masses” were angry and lashed out at collaborators. In this sense, necklacing as 
resistance was not the policy or practice of the UDF or ANC but it was at the very least 
understandable/explicable, and thus justified (albeit ambivalently so). The above 
arguments therefore also echo some of the same formulations suggested by Lekota, 
Manuel and Tambo. However, where Hani differs from those formulations is his attempt 
to resolve the impasse between condemning and condoning through a discussion on the 
difference, or as I wish to argue, the interplay, between what he called “revolutionary 
justice” and “traditional forms of justice”, to which I now turn.  
 
Several noteworthy aspects are discernable in Hani‟s attempt to resolve that impasse. 
Firstly, Hani characterised the practice of necklacing as “traditional forms of justice”.70 
What is interesting is that Hani did not refer to the practice of necklacing as punishment, 
nor violence, but as a form of justice. This begs the question as to how naming the 
                                                 
69
 Chris Hani, „25 years of armed struggle‟, 18. My emphasis. 
70
 Chris Hani, „25 years of armed struggle‟, 18. 
 
 
 
 
 68 
practice as justice works to legitimise necklace killings as opposed to it being named as 
punishment. In other words, within the notion of justice there is implicitly an element of 
legitimacy. At the same time however, “traditional forms of justice” were regarded as 
undesirable by Hani, perhaps because of the capacity of „tradition‟ to resonate with the 
state‟s characterisation of the practice as barbaric or primoridal and as a form of „black-
on-black‟ violence. 
 
Hani proposed a move away from “traditional forms of justice” to forms of justice that 
are “revolutionary”. In not characterising the practice as punishment, the concept justice, 
I suggest, served as a mechanism to enable a move to “revolutionary justice”. Indeed, 
Hani posed the question, “What is revolutionary justice?”71 It appears that it was only 
through the setting up of revolutionary structures that the question of revolutionary 
justice could be responded to or rather be actualised. He therefore stated: 
One fact is that, where agents and collaborators are concerned, we should 
establish, where is it (sic) possible our own revolutionary courts where justice 
should be meted out. And in those courts we should involve some of our best 
cadres so that our forms of justice do not denigrate into kangaroo justice. We 
would like to maintain revolutionary forms of justice.
72
  
 
Here there is an implicit association of “traditional forms of justice” with “kangaroo 
courts” when Hani stated, “…we should involve some of our best cadres so that our 
forms of justice do not degenerate into kangaroo justice.” It should be recalled that in 
relation to the practice of necklacing, “kangaroo courts” were blamed by the apartheid 
state as being the official institutions through which, supposedly, the ANC and the UDF 
were propagating the practice of necklacing as being part of its „intimidation strategy‟.73 
The UDF responded to and propagated „people‟s courts‟ from 1985 with its call to 
„people‟s power‟. Kangaroo courts, on the other hand, were chastised harshly. 74 
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In “maintaining revolutionary forms of justice”, it is possible that Hani was also referring 
to a document released at the Kabwe Conference dealing with MK‟s military code that 
stressed the positive relationship between MK and, “the revolutionary sections of our 
people.”75 Despite the document‟s Preamble stating that: “[r]ecognising that our army, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, must define its aims and objects in clear and precise terms, and that 
the rights and duties of each member should be likewise defined without ambiguity…” 
there was no clear definition of how collaborators were to be dealt with by members. The 
document stressed that all members of the ANC and combatants were required to respect 
the terms of the Geneva Convention and that any violation of these terms would be an 
offence.
76
  
 
Interestingly, in a subsection titled “Punishment” the document stated that, “[t]he purpose 
of punishment is to deter members from committing an offence, assist offenders to 
rehabilitate and protect the ANC, Umkhonto, liberation and the revolution. In imposing 
punishment, the competent authorities shall be guided by high political principles to the 
exclusion of personal animosity or any trace of vendetta. Punishments shall be 
administered humanely and without undue harshness or cruelty.”77 Here it is apparent 
that in Hani characterising the practice of necklacing as justice and not punishment, the 
killing of collaborators by individuals claiming allegiance to the liberation movements, 
who were not members of MK but “revolutionary sections of our people”, seemingly fell 
outside the military ambit of MK‟s code of conduct. 
 
Hani continued and argued: “We know even the negative and the positive aspects of the 
necklace. There is a lot of discussion of the necklace. But it is not this silly conclusion 
that it is Black on Black violence. The necklace has been used against those who have 
been actively collaborating with the enemy.”78 The negative aspects presumably are what 
Hani referred to earlier in his comment, namely that, “the enemy would employ 
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provocateurs to use the necklace, even against activists.”79 The positive aspects 
presumably are that the necklace was effective in, “mak[ing] the enemy‟s access to 
information very difficult.” That the practice of necklacing for Hani was not „black-on-
black‟ violence, that “silly conclusion”, points not only to the interplay of the dominant 
discourses in contest for the legitimation and justification over the use of violence, but 
also of Hani attempting to move away from the impasse between „condemning‟ and 
„condoning‟.  
 
The second notable aspect therefore is that, just as Hani‟s characterising of the practice of 
necklacing as having emerged as a form of „traditional justice‟ was suggestive of the 
separation between “revolutionary justice” and “traditional forms of justice”, so too it 
suggested a separation of „the masses‟ from the movement, the ANC. In this regard three 
categories of subjectivities that operated within the broader liberation struggle can be 
discerned; „the masses‟- („the people‟); the militants – (MK), and the movement itself – 
(the ANC). However, as sketched out above, there appears to be an oscillatory effect by 
Hani claiming „the masses‟ as constitutive with the militants of MK and thus the ANC 
whilst at the same moment an attempt at maintaining a distinction between those 
subjectivities. 
 
A productive means of underscoring the significance as well as the limit of this 
oscillatory effect is possibly in relation to Nigel Gibson‟s reading of Frantz Fanon and 
anti-colonial violence. The stage preceding decolonization “is manifestly Manichean” 
and Gibson suggests this be understood as the dualism of resistance and 
oppression/repression.
80
 For Fanon, according to Gibson, the liberation movement will 
seek to divide collaborators from „the people‟ in an attempt to isolate, “those who work 
for or support „native institutions‟ [by] liquidating collaborators as publicly as possible to 
encourage others.”81 Gibson however, does not examine this complication and it appears 
that neither does Fanon.
82
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Though Fanon does posit, “for a man in the thick of the fight it is an urgent matter to 
decide on the means and the tactics to employ: that is to say, how to conduct and organise 
the movement. If this coherence is not present there is only a blind will to freedom, with 
the terrible reactionary risks which it entails.”83 
 
In the case of the practice of necklacing however, it was not the liberation movement 
“liquidating collaborators”, but „the people‟, those whom Hani both sought to claim but 
also separate from the liberation movement. Yet Hani stressed that:  
[t]he ANC will never abandon its leading role. We say to our people, whatever 
method you devise, there should be democratic participation, there should be 
democratic discussion and whatever method we use, that method should conform 
to the norms of the revolutionary movement. As I say we understand why the 
necklace has been used.
84
 
 
Here one can suggest that the ANC and MK did not want to abandon its leading role 
simply because “traditional forms of justice” were employed. Rather, it is possible to read 
this not merely as a distinction but more so as a plea for progress from “traditional forms 
of justice” to “revolutionary forms of justice.”85 
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This then is the third noteworthy aspect, namely that such a plea for progress is further 
enabled by Hani characterising the practice as “justice” in that the ANC‟s leading role 
was ultimately one of future governance. As with the idea of “revolutionary courts” being 
institutions that should reflect democratic values, by 1985, the ANC had come to regard 
itself as a government in waiting. For example in a discussion on „Questions of Justice 
and War‟, one Sipho Jama, argued that the ANC was a “legitimate authority” given that:  
The ANC is, in effect, given legitimacy by the oppressed majority of South 
Africans, while the apartheid regime is rightfully considered illegitimate. 
Umkhonto we Sizwe [MK] is what most South Africans believe it to be, the 
people‟s army, and the ANC, by virtue of its support in the country, is surely the 
legitimate voice of the people of South Africa.” He proceeded to cite Mark Uhlig 
who argued: “Nelson Mandela…would easily defeat any other potential 
presidential candidate, White or Black if free multiracial elections were held 
today.
86
 
 
It is in this sense that when Hani stated, “[t]he question of the necklace belongs to all of 
us, to the ANC, to the democratic movement. We should just sit down and discuss 
amongst ourselves how we should mete out justice”, it is possible that the interplay 
between the practice of necklacing as a “traditional form of justice” and the call for 
“revolutionary justice” was possibly also a call to sense the possibility of freedom. This is 
akin to what Franz Fanon had called “the creation of humanity by revolutionary 
beginnings.”87 
 
To return to Gibson‟s reading of Fanon, it is not violence itself that is central, but the 
process of liberation that is central to the “„embodiment of history‟ and the creation of a 
revolutionary agency that begins to strip away colonial reification.”88 In other words, “the 
native transcends nativehood only insofar as subjectivity is intimately connected to self-
determination and is intrinsic to revolution. What now is crucial are not the traditions 
which initially sustained an elemental resistance, but rather the new sense of the 
possibility of freedom.”89 Hani‟s “comment on the necklace” was thus concluded by him 
                                                 
86
 See S. Jama, „A Discussion Article: Questions of Justice and War‟ in Sechaba (January 1985), 18. 
87
 N. C. Gibson, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination, 117 
88
 N. C. Gibson, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination, 117 
89
  N. C. Gibson, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination, 117 
 
 
 
 
 73 
reiterating, “[t]he movement should be vigilant to ensure that whatever sentence is passed 
on anybody, it is a result of participation by the revolutionary elements of our struggle.”90  
 
Ambivalence about the practice of necklacing in Hani‟s “comment on the necklace” was 
produced in the interstice of the resistance – oppression/repression binary. Similar to the 
way Oliver Tambo condemned the practice of necklacing but not „the people‟, Hani 
characterised the practice between “traditional forms of justice” and “revolutionary forms 
of justice” with resistance as the constitutive element of both forms of justice. Whilst 
Hani attempted to distinguish between “traditional forms of justice” and “revolutionary 
justice”, the interplay between those characterisations of resistance, rather enabled a 
circular logic of ambivalence towards the question of necklacing. 
 
Thus, in relation to Baumans formulation of ambivalence, ambivalence persists by Hani 
placing the practice of necklacing as resistance under the name of justice in the categories 
of “traditional forms of justice” with a plea for “revolutionary justice”. This was despite 
his attempt of a move towards justice and away from punishment as the constitutive 
element in dealing with collaborators. Hani therefore faltered in escaping the impasse 
between condemning and condoning. In this sense, it is possible that Hani also implicitly 
exposed the limits of MK in defending communities as well as its capacity to be solely 
responsible for liberation violence/justice/punishment. 
 
As mentioned, during the 1980‟s there was a blurring between official MK cadres and 
those individuals who regarded themselves as supporters of the anti-apartheid movement 
under the auspices of the ANC and the UDF, in other words, operating outside the 
political and military ambit (of MK) of these two organisations. The latter perpetrated the 
majority of necklace killings. It is suggestive that at the time when the ANC turned 
towards armed struggle, a similar blurring of legitimate targets was evident. The banning 
of the ANC and the numerous emergency regulations imposed by the state from 24 
March 1960 meant that it had to operate underground.
91
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The armed struggle, through MK operations, took the form of guerrilla attacks on non-
civilian targets defined in the Operation Mayibuye document of 1963  as, “strategic road, 
railways and other communications; power stations; police stations, camps, and military 
forces; and irredeemable government stooges.”92 There is no expanding of who falls into 
the category of “irredeemable government stooges”. The document however, implicitly 
identified these as individuals running trading stations as well as chiefs and their 
headmen. In the section just before defining the targets, the intelligence department of the 
operation was advised to study and report on the “location of trading stations and chiefs 
and headmen's kraals.” What follows then is a reading of Govan Mbeki‟s The Peasants 
Revolt (1964) and leading from this I want to argue more broadly that the problematic of 
violence and associated ambivalence in dealing with accused collaborators within the 
ANC has a far longer history.  
 
Tracing ambivalence 
In the late 1950‟s and 1960 rural protests turned violent as peasants engaged in beatings 
and killings of local authorities and their supporters who were seen as collaborators. 
There were certain common threads, most significantly the attacking and at times killing 
of individuals deemed „collaborators‟. The Mpondoland revolt stands out in particular 
because it was well structured and organised compared to other rural revolts and 
uprisings of the time that Tom Lodge describes as, “largely a parochial affair.”93 The 
revolt broke out in March 1960 with grievances such as objections to land rehabilitation, 
heavier taxation as the region began to contribute more to administration and increasingly 
authoritarian local government in the form of tribal authorities.
94
 Similar to the revolts in 
Zeerust (1957) and Thembuland (1962-3), the brunt of peasants‟ anger in Mpondoland 
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were taken out on local chiefs and headmen who were regarded as collaborators and 
traitors to „the people‟. Chiefs who supported government policies were attacked; their 
homes burnt down and in some cases, particularly in the Mpondoland Revolt, where 
seventeen chiefs, their headmen or their bodyguards and a further five suspected of being 
police informers, were murdered.
95
  
 
I would like to suggest that responses to and accounts of the attacking and killing of 
chiefs and informers deemed as collaborators be read as indicative of an ambivalence on 
the part of the liberation movement, specifically the ANC. Consider Govan Mbeki‟s The 
Peasants‟ Revolt in which he provided a detailed account of the injustices against 
peasants in rural areas and the response of those peasants in the form of revolt. According 
to Govan Mbeki, discussing the Zeerust revolt:  
Government officials attributed the peasant opposition in the Zeerust area to 
„agitators‟, essentially the African National Congress…ANC volunteers from the 
towns did go to their home villages to dissuade their wives from taking out 
passbooks and cooperating with the implementation of apartheid…The A.N.C, 
men and women, with many others who belonged to no political body at all, were 
able to lead only because the people were clamouring to follow.
96
 
 
And in the case of the Mpondoland revolt: 
…the aim of resistance became the attainment of basic political ends. Towards 
this end the movement adopted the full programme of the African National 
Congress and its allies as embodied in the Freedom Charter. Consequently the 
struggle in Pondoland became linked with the national struggle for liberation, and 
brought alive to the leadership of the A.N.C…97 
 
For Govan Mbeki, there was a clear relationship between the ANC and peasant 
insurgents, seen as one of mutual reinforcement. In so doing, he argued that what was 
happening in rural areas was not isolated from the broader national struggle and this for 
Govan Mbeki was the „vital feature‟ that the Mpondoland revolt disclosed and which, 
“had a resounding impact both on the thinking of the Congress leadership and the people 
themselves. The Pondo movement succeeded by example in accomplishing what 
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discussion had failed to do in a generation - convincing the leadership of the importance 
of the peasants in the reserve to the entire national struggle.”98  Indeed, one of the 
purposes for Govan Mbeki writing The Peasants‟ Revolt was to make the case for the 
importance of peasants in the reserves and homelands to the entire national struggle.
99
  
 
Govan Mbeki later recalled that, “the most important books on guerrilla warfare that were 
available at the time in South Africa were the writings of Mao Tse-Tung on the Chinese 
experience and of Che Guevara on the Latin experience…[which] emphasised the 
importance of enlisting the support of the peasantry if a revolutionary war is to 
succeed.”100 Lodge argues that Govan Mbeki, “[did] not explore the more popular 
historical continuities manifested in the Mpondo revolt: the mountain committees, the 
people‟s courts, store boycotts, hut burnings and tax embargoes all suddenly appear in the 
idiom of peasant struggle without any reference to historical precedents.”101 Lodge posits 
that notwithstanding this critique, for Govan Mbeki, it was important to highlight the 
peasants‟ modernity rather than their retentions from the past so that as much as urban 
workers, Mpondo peasants belong to “a single common society.”102 
 
This link between the local and national struggle, or rather of the local folding into a 
national political consciousness, speaks to the methods of resistance that Govan Mbeki 
propagated. He had argued that hut-burning was the most effective method of resistance 
in dealing with collaborators. He had argued further that another technique of struggle, 
“the ostracism in life and death of those supporting Bantu Authorities”, was an effective 
means of reducing the number of collaborators. In total, three methods of resistance and 
struggle were mentioned by Govan Mbeki; the hut burnings, boycotts and the ostracism 
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of collaborators.
103
 The killing of collaborators however was a technique of struggle that 
was implicitly condoned though indicative of ambivalence. When discussing the revolts 
in Zululand, Govan Mbeki states: 
The anger of the resistors was now turned on these families, who were regarded 
as traitors. A party of over 200 attacked the collaborators, killing two. This 
resulted in 29 being charged, originally with murder, though in the end only 14 
were convicted, on lesser charges, to various periods of imprisonment ranging 
from 8 to 14 years. The remarks of the judge in this case were significant. He said 
it was clear that there was deep resentment against Bantu Authorities and that the 
administration had been aware of this but had imposed the scheme in spite of 
opposition. In passing sentence he therefore regarded this resentment as 
extenuating circumstance.
104
 
 
The representation of the killing of the two collaborators by Govan Mbeki is indicative of 
ambivalence. The original murder charge was dropped for lesser charges by the judge. 
On one level, judgement or rather, condemnation of the killing was positioned in relation 
to the very system that was meant to be resisted against. On another, that system was 
implicitly shown to be complicit in the killing from within that system itself. Most 
striking, however, is an elision of the killing of the two collaborators in favour of an 
implicit condoning of the killing. This implicit condonation arose through naming it as 
resistance which arose from a justifiable cause. 
 
Resentment against the Bantu authorities and the administrations failure to address that 
resentment was cause for the killing of those regarded as traitors. However, the main 
point that is evident is the exonerating of violence by turning to a resistance discourse. In 
exonerating, the implication is that the killing of the two collaborators was made rational.  
By way of the discussion on the subsequent trial of those accused of the murder and the 
judge‟s remarks that implicitly implicated the government as accomplice to the murders 
for not addressing the issues that the resistors had with the Bantu Authorities, the killing 
can be seen to be named as resistance. 
 
By 1964, when The Peasants‟ Revolt was published, the armed wing of the ANC, MK, 
had been formed. MK‟s campaign of 1961 to 1964 also saw collaborators being attacked 
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but despite “the national high command‟s intention to avoid bloodshed…there were 23 
attacks on policemen, their informers or people regarded as collaborators”, mainly in East 
London and Port Elizabeth.
105
 In East London and surrounds, early MK activities largely 
focussed on attacks on collaborators. Cornelius Thomas account of violence in Duncan 
Village, (just outside East London in the Eastern Cape) is instructive because it points to 
the distancing of the ANC from the violence that “permeated places like Duncan.”106  
 
It is not only the ambivalence surrounding the killing of collaborators or even that Hani‟s 
“comments on the necklace” assigns the practice to more than one category, but that the 
ANC‟s initial call to armed violence was beset by a similar ambivalence. Here an apt 
example is that of Chief Albert Luthuli and his seeming wavering between condoning 
and condemning the call to violent armed struggle.   
 
At a meeting in June 1961 of the ANC national executive, the ANC decided that it would 
not change its official non-violent standpoint but that members who felt the need to begin 
an armed response, such as Nelson Mandela, could do so. In other words, those who 
opposed violence, such as the then ANC president Chief Albert Luthuli who was in part 
inspired by Ghandi„s strategies of non-violence, did so, according to Lodge, on “grounds 
of principle and not expedience.”107  
 
Scott Everett Couper cites a fitting example of a wavering between condemning and 
condoning by Luthuli. He cites Luthuli‟s statement in response to the Rivonia (1964) 
convictions: 
…no one can blame brave just men for seeking justice by the use of violent 
methods; nor could they be blamed if they tried to create an organised force in 
order to ultimately establish peace and racial harmony… 108 
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Everett Couper suggests that Luthuli drafted this statement only to convey “solidarity, not 
agreement” with those that resorted to violence. He continues and argues that what is not 
recognised is the sentence that prefaced that portion of the statement:  
The African National Congress never abandoned its method of militant, non-
violent struggle, and of creating in the process a spirit of militancy in the 
people.
109
 
 
Everett Couper thus argues that Luthuli, “intentionally made distinctions between 
„support‟ and „condemnation‟ and between the „ANC‟ that he led as President-General 
and the „brave just men‟ who could not be blamed if their patience became exhausted.”110 
Everett Couper‟s reading of Luthuli‟s statement, thus, has certain parallels with the 
„official‟ non-state discourse on the practice of necklacing.  
 
It is tempting therefore to suggest that just as Lekota, Manuel, Tambo and Hani 
condemned the act of violence itself, the killing of suspected collaborators (including 
necklace killings), but were unwilling to condemn those who committed such acts, a 
similar order of ambivalence is evident in Luthuli‟s statement regarding the ANC‟s turn 
to armed violent struggle. As a means of both concluding this chapter and anticipating the 
argument of the following chapter, I want to briefly consider Mahmood Mamdani‟s 
formulation of the initial hesitancy of the liberation movements to respond to the rise of 
necklace killings. 
 
Mamdani briefly draws parallels between the practice of necklacing in South Africa and 
suicide bombings in Palestine. He suggests that the debate around necklacing had two 
sides to it: a moral side that, “sounded less like a critique on necklacing than a settler 
discourse on the lack of civilization among natives” and the political effectiveness of 
necklacing in thwarting the „proliferation‟ of informers.111 Mamdani continues and 
argues that the reason there was a slow response to the speech given by Winnie Mandela 
was that as long as there was no effective political alternative to the situation in South 
Africa, “it was difficult to discredit necklacing politically.” Though, “once a non-violent 
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way of ending apartheid did appear as an alternative, it was as if the sun had come up, the 
fog lifted, and there was a new dawn; in a land where few had dared even to whisper 
criticism yesterday, hardly anyone could be found to champion necklacing the day 
after.”112  
 
Indeed, the quote that prefaces this chapter underscores Mamdani‟s formulation. In that 
ANC statement, written as part of the condemnation of the World Trade Centre attacks in 
New York City (11 September 2001), a clear sense of condemnation to the practice of 
necklacing is asserted whilst at the same time the assigning of „ownership‟ of the practice 
to the former apartheid state. The assigning of „ownership‟ of the practice of necklacing 
points to the interplay of the dominant discourses on the practice. That formulation also 
echoes what was said by prominent ANC and UDF leaders in relation to the rise of 
necklace killings and the killing of collaborators, namely that whilst condemning a 
“barbaric form of struggle”, it was nonetheless a form of struggle, though as I have 
argued; ambivalently caught in the interstice of resistance and oppression/repression.        
 
Mamdani‟s formulation also speaks to a shift of a resistance discourse to one of irrational 
political violence in which the implicit condoning of violent resistance no longer makes 
sense. Explaining necklacing once it was clear that a transition from the oppressive 
apartheid system to one of a democracy championing human rights caused for pause. 
Indeed, as I argue in the following chapter, the ways in which the practice of necklacing 
has been made sense of in scholarly works is located within that pause but filtered 
through the interplay of the dominant discourses in relation to the practice of necklacing. 
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Chapter Three 
Making sense of the practice of necklacing 
 
[A] strategic practice of criticism will ask whether the moment of normalization 
of a paradigm is not also the moment when it is necessary to reconstruct and 
reinterrogate the ground of questions themselves through which it was brought 
into being in the first place; to ask whether the critical yield of the normal 
problem-space continues to be what it was when it first emerged; and, if not, to 
ask what set of questions is emerging in the new problem-space that might 
reconfigure and so expand the conceptual terrain in which an object is located 
(David Scott).
 1
 
 
In the previous two chapters of this thesis, I have shown how the emergence of 
necklacing from 1985 onwards was inextricably bound to both the apartheid state‟s larger 
discourse on violent resistance and attempts by the „official‟ non-state to counter that 
discourse. Indeed, these discourses, relational as they are, converge and diverge at the 
nexus over competing claims of the „ownership‟ of both the practice of necklacing and its 
discourses. Yet it is in the divergence that these discourses on necklacing speak to the 
ambivalence that I showed in the previous chapter. While the apartheid state 
characterised necklacing by marking it as „black-on-black‟ violence and a marker of 
barbarism attempting to assert its moral and political legitimacy to use violence; the ANC 
and the UDF characterised the practice within a duality of resistance and 
oppression/repression in which the state, not the liberation movement, bore moral and 
political culpability for the practice. Thus in attempting to respond to the inaugural 
question this thesis seeks to examine: how necklacing is written into the narrative of 
struggle history, this chapter asks how the practice has been made sense of within 
scholarly works. 
 
Despite necklace killings not always having been politically motivated during the mid 
1980‟s, scholarly works attempting to make sense of the practice overwhelmingly 
position it within a political violence framework.
2
 This is in itself an indication of the 
influence of the dominant discourses on the practice of necklacing and their interplay. 
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Indeed, an extensive corpus of literature exists on the question of resistance and/or 
political violence in South Africa. However, the majority of that corpus relegates 
necklacing to the margins of their enquiry as moments of the violence that „accompanied‟ 
the liberation struggle in the 1980‟s.3 
 
Although a small but significant body of work on the practice of necklacing itself has 
surfaced in South African studies, the discipline of history has been especially silent. 
Those scholarly works attempting to make sense of the practice derive from the 
disciplines of anthropology, psychology, sociology, political science and literary theory. 
The most substantial works on the practice of necklacing have come from Pumla 
Gobodo-Madikizela, Joanna Ball, Leonard Praeg and from N. Nomoyi and W. Schurink.
4
 
Their engagement with the practice is inter-disciplinary, though specifically within 
frameworks of collective violence and witchcraft and ritual although these frameworks 
overlap to some extent.  
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However, their analyses, cannot escape being filtered and re-articulated through the 
interplay of the dominant discourses on necklacing. Specifically, their analyses operate 
within an overarching resistance paradigm characterised as political violence. I want to 
argue that a resistance paradigm points to the limits of what is said about politically 
motivated violence. Indeed, in the case of necklacing, ambivalence is symptomatic of its 
rationalisation. Ambivalence is articulated and re-articulated precisely because these 
scholarly works run up against the limit of a dominant resistance paradigm at making 
sense of the practice of necklacing.
5
 In this sense, violence is condemned through 
understanding but never grasped in its historicality. 
 
On political violence and the practice of necklacing 
My argument is prompted in part by a shift in the language scholars and commentators 
used to describe politically motivated violence: what in the 1980‟s had been called, and 
was understood as resistance, in the 1990‟s was increasingly referred to as political 
violence. An example of this shift is evident in the two Journal of Southern African 
Studies (JSAS) special issues produced in 1992 as scholars tried to make sense of the 
violence of the early 1990‟s. The first, edited by leading social history scholars, Shula 
Marks and Stanley Trapido, was on „The Social History of Resistance in South Africa‟ 
(March 1992) and interestingly points to some of the limitations of social history, arguing 
that the social and economic context, as directed by the state and its institutions, is crucial 
to understanding resistance and struggle.
6
 In other words, in doing „history from below‟, 
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„history from above‟ has to be done, the two are not mutually exclusive. Several months 
later, the language and frameworks of resistance had been replaced by political violence. 
 
For the ANC and the UDF, understanding the violence of the 1980‟s and necklace 
killings specifically was conceived of as regrettable but unavoidable as popular resistance 
against the apartheid state deepened. At the same time excesses (such as necklace 
killings) were neither justified nor condoned explicitly. According to Andre du Toit, the 
unbanning of anti-apartheid organisations and the ushering in of the negotiated 
compromise that culminated in the first non-racial democratic elections in South Africa 
(April 1994) was intended to signal a shift from a “politics of violence” to a “politics of 
non-violent negotiation.”7 What was unexpected was the sustained and massively 
increased levels of violence that threatened the entire negotiation process. This violence 
physically took place not between state and liberation movement, but between civilian 
groupings, albeit with state involvement.
8
 
 
In attempting to come to grips with this, Du Toit argues that the violence of the 1980‟s 
can be understood if political violence is described as “claims to a special moral or public 
legitimation for the injury and harm done to others, as well as by the representative 
character of the agents and targets of these acts of violence.”9  In qualifying this, Du Toit 
suggests that some kinds of political violence have a “notable symbolic and discursive 
character: these deeds of violence acquire and generate special public significance 
resonating far beyond the immediate harm and injury done.”10 Arguably the practice of 
necklacing certainly qualifies as this type of political violence. 
 
Thus for Du Toit it is when, “political violence escalates and proliferates in ways which 
seem to confound the conventional criteria for moral legitimation and do not readily 
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make sense in terms of instrumental rationality …that we are confronted with a more 
radical problem of understanding such political violence.”11 He argues that: 
[t]he escalation of violent and polarized political conflict that had so long been in 
the making ha[d] been overtaken by a politics of negotiation and rational 
compromise. But, precisely when these developments in turn could be expected to 
bring the earlier cycle of violence to an end…there was a proliferation of 
sustained political violence, now robbed of much of its earlier significance and 
rationality.
12
 
 
In other words, Du Toit points to a resistance framework that had run up against a limit in 
relation to political violence. Violence described as political violence in the context of 
resistance was explicable. However, without the context of resistance to 
oppression/repression, the markers of “significance and rationality” ceased to exist. In 
this sense, political violence was rendered inexplicable. 
  
Taking the above as a point of departure, I want to proceed by providing a brief 
discussion of the second JSAS special issue (September 1992) that signaled the shift in 
language from resistance to political violence. In particular, an article by historian 
William Beinart pointed to the difficulty historians and social scientists have in providing 
explanations of violence “within or between African communities”. He points to six ways 
in which this difficulty is approached. Firstly, each incident or episode of “internal 
violence” is treated as discrete and as “potentially having a different line of causation” 
and that this leads to dispensing any notion of “intrinsic tendencies towards violence”.13 
Secondly, violence between or within African communities is seen as a result of divisions 
caused by the nature of colonial or settler rule. Beinart then points to a variant of this 
second explanation in that the state is seen as directly intervening to take advantage of 
colonially produced fractures in African communities by empowering or arming one 
branch, in other words, “brutalising by adoption rather than neglect.”14 A fourth way is to 
see violence as a reflection of impoverishment and social ills, particularly those produced 
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in the processes of industrialisation and global capitalism. Fifthly, such violence is seen 
as a result of differential policing of white and black areas. Lastly, Beinart points to the 
increase in systematic liberatory political violence in local township politics in South 
Africa, “the growth of the liberation movement within the country in the 1980‟s 
intensified the political struggle… politicised conflict...exacerbate[d] existing social 
fractures.”15 As Beinart recognises, all six approaches comprise contextual analyses that 
come to be informed through a causality framework. 
 
Referring to forms of violence in the first half of the twentieth century, Beinart however 
explicitly states that contextual analyses alone are not sufficient in themselves to explain 
violence. He argues that while it is “right” to assert the need to locate violence in its 
colonial historical context, there is however a tendency to, “include the ahistorical 
assumption that African violence was born in the colonial era.”16 Therefore, for Beinart, 
“while it is wrong to see pre-colonial African society as intrinsically violent, it is no less 
misleading to see it as without violence.”17  
 
Similarly Beinart argues that the violence of the 1980‟s and 1990‟s cannot all be reduced 
to apartheid violence. He therefore states that while, “it is helpful to disaggregate types of 
violence, to concentrate on contextual analysis, and to explore different lines of causation 
there is a certain irreducibility about acts of physical violence and it is perhaps inadequate 
to see violence purely as an epiphenomenon of different forms of conflict or politics.”18 
In this sense, Beinart posits that: 
Much public violence is part of an assertion of political power – either an attempt 
to monopolize coercion and control, or to break that monopoly. But war, police 
brutality, riot, insurrection, sabotage, „faction fight‟, ethnic violence, gang fight, 
public beating or „necklacing‟…may be extensions of rather different political 
contests.
19
  
 
For Beinart therefore it is pertinent to expand on the aforementioned explanatory 
frameworks by taking into consideration cultural expressions of violence in relation to 
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what was then contemporary violence, the violence of both the 1980‟s and the early 
1990‟s. In discussing state sanctioned violence of the 1990‟s, Beinart argues that, “the 
discourse of total strategy and the notion of the country being at „war‟ [had] clearly been 
important justificatory ideas for excessive force by white southern Africans who have not 
found it difficult to explain why they go so far to defend their position.”20 He continues 
by citing Alex Boraine‟s argument, that for the police, a “cop culture” developed that saw 
their “professional constraints” erode and that when P.W Botha increasingly incorporated 
the security apparatus into state decision making, “police felt they had authority to 
broaden their roles.”21 Beinart thus suggests that, in this context, “the scope for cruelty 
and atrocity escalate[d] so that they [became]”, following Hannah Arendt, “terrifyingly 
normal”.22  
 
Similarly in respect to the liberation movement, „comrades‟ had conceived themselves as 
soldiers of the liberation movement and that the, “militarisation of their subculture [was] 
endemic.”23 Thus according to Beinart, whilst the struggle was seen as a process of 
counter-violence, it was nevertheless a struggle that involved fighting back and affirming 
unity. In this sense a “defensive violence”, according to Beinart, was increasingly 
legitimated where violence was portrayed as “against the system.”24 This indeed was the 
formulation of Mosiuoa Lekota and the legitimation and justification offered by the UDF 
in relation to the lynching of Moegsien Abrahams as was shown in the previous chapter. 
 
However (and here Beinart appears to agree with Jeremy Seekings), “much collective 
violence on the part of the “community” was not directed against targets which were 
unambiguously part of the system, but rather on the margins of the community.”25 Citing 
as an example the „necklace‟ killing of Maki Skosana, Beinart asserts that her murder 
was the result of an outburst of community anger that was led by a “youth who already 
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had convictions for assault.”26 Here Maki Skosana‟s killing appears as the result of a 
wider political violence discourse but at the same time its perpetration by a convicted 
criminal links it to a discourse of criminality. Thus the violence of „comrades‟, according 
to Ari Sitas whom Beinart is citing here, was “seldom co-ordinated and controlled by 
ANC discipline.”27  Thus, Beinart argues:  
The necklace, with its symbolic references to industrial waste, barricades, fire and 
sacrifice was a creation of the cultural bricoleurs of the locations [read 
townships], not the exiled political movements. It was a modern weapon of 
punishment and social purification, but reminiscent of older purificatory 
movements against those perceived to betray the community.
28
 
 
Beinart‟s reading of the practice of necklacing, based on the way in which his argument 
unfolds as shown above, points to the interplay of the dominant discourses on necklacing. 
On the one hand, there is the discourse that places the practice within a resistance 
framework (in the anti-apartheid struggle sense) and on the other, there is the merging of 
this discourse with one of criminality, a discourse reminiscent of the apartheid state with 
the practice‟s emergence from 1985 onwards. That Beinart highlights the leader of the 
group that killed Maki Skosana as having been previously convicted for assault, followed 
by his explanation of the practice, points to a limit of the „official‟ non-state discourse on 
the practice of necklacing. What Beinart opens here are therefore questions of cultures of 
violence, or rather cultural expressions of violence, and crowd/collective violence to 
which I now turn. 
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On crowd/collective violence and the practice of necklacing
29
 
Scholarly attempts at rendering the practice of necklacing intelligible have engaged 
theories of crowd/collective violence given that the practice was largely „performed‟ in 
crowd settings.
 30 
Here the focus has been on perpetrators and factors that influenced 
individual participation in necklace killings. The most common theory used to explain 
crowd violence in relation to the practice of necklacing has been that of deindividuation 
or mob psychosis theory. This theory posits that individuals loose their sense of self and 
become absorbed into the collective self of a crowd.
31
 For example, Gill Straker 
examines the Maki Skosana killing through the lens of deindividuation thesis and the 
brutalisation of township youth.
32
  
 
Many of Straker's interviewees had severe misgivings about burning or necklacing 
people.
33
 Straker points out that killing people, according to the interviewees, could be 
justified because it was punishment (for being police-informers), or that it was a warning 
to other members of the community. However, the unnecessary cruelty of the act 
disturbed them. Thus, for example a teenager, „Stanley‟, was “worried” by the brutality 
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 Of the most notable is D. Foster, P. Haupt and M. de Beer, The Theatre of Violence: Narratives of 
Protagonists in the South African Conflict (Johannesburg: HSRC Press, 2005). This study deals specifically 
with narratives of violence from the perspectives of the perpetrators. The authors point to the shifting 
subjectivities of those deemed responsible for violence and question the static victim-perpetrator binary. 
Necklacing here is located within lateral or horizontal violence and the authors argue that necklacing was 
structured around the central axis of struggle - in other words, within a liberation/resistance framework. See 
61-62. 
31
 This theory was first proposed by Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd (London: Ernest Benn, 1896). In relation 
to the South African situation, see amongst others D. Foster, P. Haupt and M. de Beer, The Theatre of 
Violence: Narratives of Protagonists in the South African Conflict, 80.; P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies 
of Violence‟,78-80. 
32
 G. Straker, Faces in the Revolution: The Psychological Effects of Violence on Township Youth in South 
Africa (Cape Town: David Phillip, 1992), 119-124. In relation to the role of youth in perpetrating violent 
acts, see M. Marks, Young Warriors: Youth Politics, Identity and Violence in South Africa (Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press, 2001), 87-112. 
33
 The youth interviewed by Monique Marks also had misgivings, though one of the youth interviewed 
openly supported the practice of necklacing. See M. Marks, Young Warriors, 99. 
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of Maki Skosana‟s killing.34 Despite this private ambivalence, Straker posits, for 
„Stanley‟ and other interviewees, execution by burning was quite justified.35 
 
This justification, in my reading of Straker‟s analysis is related to what it meant to be a 
freedom fighter or comrade, or, what the signifier, „freedom fighter‟ entailed within the 
broader discourse of liberation. „Stanley‟ regarded himself as acting as a soldier and in 
his identity as a „freedom fighter‟ was “prepared to carry out tasks which might go 
against the grain…he [Stanley] ascribe[d] meaning to it, and so justifie[d] it.”36 Straker 
makes sense of this in relation to the „authority system‟ thesis used to explain violence in 
times of war against civilians: 
For Stanley, the „authority‟ in question was not that of a superior officer but that 
of „the people‟. It is important to bear in mind the rhetoric and rallying cries 
which prevailed at the time. The whole basis for mass mobilisation revolves 
around ideas that „the people‟ shall govern. Slogans continually refer to „the 
power of the people‟. The notion of the collective as the ultimate authority was, 
and to some extent remains, the dominant ideology in the townships. The 
importance of individual accountability to the group, to the community and to the 
people is constantly stressed.
37
 
  
Deindividuation thesis in the broader discourse of liberation sees the signifier „freedom 
fighter‟ as being at once apart from an individual identity as well as from a collective 
political identity. The deindividuation thesis was common in arguing for mitigation in 
criminal trials for those found „guilty‟ of participating in collective violence, including 
necklacings and burnings and in many instances psychologists provided expert witness in 
such cases.
38
 In using deindividuation thesis, the psychologists could argue that the 
                                                 
34
 G. Straker, Faces in the Revolution, 120-121. 
35
 G. Straker, Faces in the Revolution, 119-132. 
36
 G. Straker, Faces in the Revolution, 121. 
37
 G. Straker, Faces in the Revolution, 122. Straker cites Kelman (1973), “In certain authority systems, the 
governing ideology places the highest value on the loyalty of functionaries to the leader as a person or to 
the organization. Those committed to such a system may well see it as their duty to follow authoritative 
orders regardless of their personal preferences. Within their value system the order calls forth what they 
would consider a moral obligation that overrides any other moral systems they might have. Usual standards 
of morality are considered inapplicable. Functionaries do not expect to be held personally responsible for 
their actions. They are agents and extensions of the authorities and thus by definition are assured of their 
protection…They identify with the authority system and are caught up in its glory and mystique.” See 
Straker, Faces in the Revolution, 121. 
38
 See for example, A.M Coleman, „Crowd Psychology in South African Murder Trials‟ in American 
Psychologist, Vol. 46, No. 10 (Oct. , 1991), G. A, Tyson, „Response to „Crowd Psychology in South 
 
 
 
 
 91 
accused could not be held accountable for their behaviour in a crowd since their 
responsibility in a crowd, “is reduced to a point where it is almost negligible.”39   
 
However, as pointed out by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, South African psychologists 
were caught in a paradox: “using deindividuation argument to mitigate sentence in 
political trials and by so doing rendering, at least from a theoretical point of view, anti-
apartheid activism to be meaningless rampage motivated by irrational elements.”40 In 
dealing with this problem, Gobodo-Madikizela develops a theoretical model based and 
expanded upon by social identity theory (that builds upon deindividuation thesis), that 
“explains the relationship between collective identity in a crowd and personal identity 
factors that emerge in a crowd.” 41 
 
Her analysis of the necklacing of Nosipho Zamela as a case study is based on trying to 
understand the actions of individuals that commit “indescribable unspeakable” acts. 
Through numerous interviews of participants and bystanders of individuals present, 
Gobodo-Madikizela reconstructs the antecedents to the necklace killing. She particularly 
examines the gathering process of the crowd and specifically the way in which 
information spread about the behaviour of Nosipho Zamela and the language used.
42
 She 
                                                                                                                                                 
African Murder Trials‟ in American Psychologist (1993) as well as N. C Manganyi, „Crowds and their 
vicissitudes: psychology and law in the South African court-room‟ in N. C Manganyi and A. du Toit (eds.), 
Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa (Johannesburg: Southern Publishers, 1990). 
39
 Cited in P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 77. 
40
 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 78. It should be remembered, as pointed out in Chapter 
One, that necklacings and burnings, for the state, did not constitute political violence and thus trials that 
emerged from such killings were conceived as criminal trials as opposed to political trials. 
41
 P.Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, iv. 
42
 Nosipho Zamela was accused of having sexual relations with a policeman, labelled an „impimpi„  
(informer) and was necklaced on the 8 December 1985. Gobodo-Madikizela examines the spread of 
information as „rumour‟ and argues that this was central to the actions that led to the necklacing. (118) 
Indeed, rumour is a critical historical methodological tool. See L. White, Speaking with Vampires (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2000), 86. See also G. Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, 
Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67-91 as well as G.C 
Spivak, „Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography (1985)‟ in D. Landry and G. Maclean (eds.), 
The Spivak Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 221-226. A brief but useful deconstruction 
of the label „impimpi‟ is provided by Gobodo-Madikizela for thinking about the way in which language 
through rumour is used to de-humanise individuals accused of being informers. She posits that in labelling 
an individual as „impimpi‟, the individual is marked as a devalued other and this is a “necessary step in the 
continuum of destruction” of the individual so labelled (125). Similarly, in the killing of Maki Skosana, it 
was reported that the mob that so viciously attacked her were chanting „mayife lenja‟ (this dog must die). 
See „Kill the dog‟ in Sowetan (13 March 1987). Interestingly there were reports by the SPCA of dogs being 
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examines the dynamics of the crowd and likens the necklacing to spectacle.
43
 Whilst I 
find Gobodo-Madikizela‟s symbolic articulation of the necklacing of Nosipho Zamela 
intriguing, for present purposes, the way in which she reconstructs the antecedents of the 
necklace killing is of greater interest. The antecedents are of interest because analyses 
thereof resort to causality within the resistance and oppression/repression framework and 
point to a re-articulation of the „official‟ non-state discourse on the practice of 
necklacing.  
 
Gobodo-Madikizela wants to, “deconstruct th[e] myth [of blacks going on a rampage of 
mindless unprovoked killing] and to place the incident [the necklacing of Nosipho 
Zamela] in its proper political context.”44 In order to do so, she seeks to explain 
politically motivated violence by exploring the complexities of crowd violence discussed 
earlier. According to Gobodo-Madikizela there are “pressures that mediate behaviour 
whenever individuals are thrown into violent situations.”45 She thus provides a narrative 
of the necklacing of Nosipho Zamela that begins with “triggers”, “pressures” to the 
murder. Specifically, she examines police violence in Mlungisi (where Nosipho Zamela 
was necklaced) as part of the precursors to the necklacing and emphasises its importance 
in the necklacing that unfolded.
46
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
necklaced in 1986 as well as a case where a decapitated body with three tyres around the torso was found 
10 meters from the carcass of a necklaced dog. See „Decapitated body: three men face murder charges‟ in 
Evening Post (13 August 1987) and „PE police find decapitated body, then head‟ in EP Herald (12 August 
1987) and relating to the dogs being necklaced, see „Dogs being necklaced‟ in City Press (2 November 
1986) as well as „Children necklace puppy‟ in Cape Times (6 August 1986).  
43
 The notion of spectacle is used to denote the public display of necklacing. This display was not only 
public in that large crowds witnessed and partook in the act of necklacing but also that a much wider 
audience was inadvertently also brought to bear witness to acts of necklacing by way of  heightened media 
reporting and the state‟s manipulation thereof. Gobodo-Madikizela points to a powerlessness, on the part of 
those individuals involved in the killing, in her psychological analysis of the necklacing of Nosipho 
Zamela, and the relation between Nosipho and the crowd. (151). She suggests that Nosipho‟s burning body 
was a signifier of both the seen and the unseen. (136). The crowd do not literally see the body being 
necklaced as it is enveloped with fire and smoke. The tyre is a necklace that adorns the body and this forms 
part of the distancing that according to Gobodo Madikizela, “enables people in a necklace crowd to watch 
this act of destruction par excellence until the victim disintegrates into nothingness.”(136). See also M. 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991), 58 as well as F. Graziano, Divine Violence: Spectacle, Psychosexuality, and Radical 
Christianity in the Argentine “Dirty War” (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992). 
44
 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 24-25.  
45
 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 273. 
46
 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 105-109. 
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The „first‟ necklacings of Maki Skosana and Benjamin Kinikini and family members are 
also cited as examples to show how police violence or rather “police riots” are causal to 
necklace murders.
47
 Gobodo-Madikizela argues that “what police do when they engage in 
violence is consistent with their ethic and is part of the conventional repertoire of their 
behaviour” and cites the work of Brogden and Shearing (1994) who suggest that there is 
a link between apartheid‟s “discourse of supremacy” and the injustices visited by the 
police upon black people in townships. Gobodo-Madikizela therefore suggests that the 
intensive surveillance of townships and its accompanying violence meted out to residents 
resulted in reciprocal violent protests.
48
 In this formulation, it becomes evident that the 
rhetoric of the liberation movement, that of violence begetting violence, is re-invoked. It 
is a language of resistance with recourse to causality - causality being the oppression of 
the police and by association, the apartheid system. 
 
Gobodo-Madikizela argues that the dominant discourse on violence in South African 
literature on political violence of the 1980‟s is the language of „faction fights‟, „tribal 
fights‟ and „ethnic conflict‟ that ignores or is silent on apartheid-state sponsored 
violence.
49
 She cites as one example of this silence the study on the practice of 
necklacing by Nomoyi and Shurink.  Nomoyi and Shurink quote an interviewee who 
describes a scene in which a policeman is burnt to death while other policemen watch and 
“keep a low profile.”50 According to Gobodo-Madikizela, the authors ignore “the critical 
significance of this detail” in their analysis.51 Nomoyi and Shurink argue that, “although 
necklacing was barbaric, it mobilized the black youth against the apartheid government 
and curbed common crime…”52 
                                                 
47
 The phrase, “police riots”, as used by Gobodo-Madikizela, is borrowed from Stark (1972) and Bergesen 
(1982). See Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 105. 
48
 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 105. The parallels between the circumstances or the 
“pressures” (police intervention leading to the killing of numerous individuals followed by mass funerals 
leading to a necklacing), that led to the murders of Maki Skosana (20 July 1985) and Benjamin Kinikini a 
few months earlier (23 March 1985) are striking. In the case of Maki Skosana, it was the funeral of the 
COSAS members that had been killed by police booby- trapping hand grenades and in the case of Kinikini 
and his family members, it was the Langa massacre. See Introduction and Chapter One.  
49
 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 28-31. 
50
 N. Nomoyi and W. Schurink, „Ukunxityiswa kwempimpi itayari njengotshaba lomzabakaza: An 
exploratory study of insider accounts of necklacing in three Port Elizabeth townships‟, 157. 
51
 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, „Legacies of Violence‟, 30-31. 
52
 N. Nomoyi and W. Schurink, „Ukunxityiswa kwempimpi itayari njengotshaba lomzabakaza: An 
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An admission of barbarism by the authors, whilst at the same time attaching a positive 
attribute to the practice of necklacing - that of curbing crime and mobilising the youth 
against the apartheid government - points to ambivalence at making sense of the practice. 
Somewhat similar to Beinart merging a resistance discourse with one of criminality in his 
explanation of the practice of necklacing, the findings of Nomoyi and Shurink further 
point to the interplay of the dominant discourses on necklacing. However the point that 
Gobodo-Madikizela wants to particularly emphasise is that the failure of police to 
intervene makes them complicit, directly or indirectly, in that incident. For Gobodo-
Madikizela, this is a silence in the literature of inter-civilian violence in black townships 
during apartheid.
53
  
 
Also working with the notion of collective violence, Monique Marks argues, “[i]n 
understanding political or collective violence, it is important to understand the link 
between violent acts of the state and those of collective actors. Acts of collective violence 
carried out by politically active youth in the „80‟s and early „90‟s…should not be 
understood simply as „mob rule‟ but rather as having a distinct rationality understood by 
participants…they should be viewed not as discrete and indiscriminate acts, but as part of 
a broad continuum of a broad range of collective action…political violence carried out by 
members or supporters of social movements is largely as a result of the repressive actions 
of the state.”54 For Marks therefore, collective violence and the practice of neckacing 
included, “remained rational and purposive even if the purposes became more contested 
and controversial”55 and she thus endorses the „official‟ non-state discourse regarding the 
apartheid state. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
exploratory study of insider accounts of necklacing in three Port Elizabeth townships‟, 171-2.  
53
 In particular the theory of political violence, so named the „third-force‟ theory has had wide currency. 
According to this theory the apartheid government orchestrated a „third force‟ made up of the SAP, the 
SADF, the IFP, vigilantes and „hit squads‟ to destroy the ANC. See for example S. Ellis, „The Historical 
Significance of South Africa‟s Third Force‟ in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 
1998), 261-299; J, Kane-Berman, Political Violence in South Africa, 16-19. See also TRC Report, Vol 2, 
Chapter 7. 
54
 M. Marks, Young Warriors, 87-88. My emphasis. 
55
 M. Marks, Young Warriors, 88. 
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Belinda Bozzoli, in a spatial and temporal study of the „Alexandra Rebellion‟ of 1986 
underscores these contests and controversies in examining people‟s courts. Bozzoli 
brings to the fore the manipulation of power and its multifaceted meanings by the 
residents of Alexandra township.
56
  
 
Although Bozzoli does not specifically focus on the practice of necklacing as the central 
object of her study nevertheless it forms part of the wider context of the „Alexandra 
Rebellion‟ of 1986. The necklace killing of Theresa Maseko on 12 April 1986 is rendered 
intelligible as part of the “repertoire of township resistance” in its “highly dramatic 
spectacular form.”57 By using testimonies of family members and participants in the 
necklace murder, Bozzoli points to meanings associated with the practice, particularly in 
relation to „comrades‟ control of the spatial dynamics of the township after the „Six-Day 
War‟. 
 
The „comrades‟ rendered Alexandra a no-go zone for the state. Necklace killings, through 
people‟s courts, were a mechanism of defending Alexander from both collaborators and 
served as a warning for would be collaborators. While the rise of people‟s courts have 
been linked to the de-legitimising of police by township residents, she suggests that it 
was youth who, “projected a transformative moral vision which shaped the discourses of 
the township [Alexandra] in general, and which challenged the moral authority of older 
residents in particular.”58 Bozzoli posits that the necklace was “highly dramatic in form”; 
alongside other acts of resistance such as boycotts and the persecution of councillors, it 
“constructed new audiences, actors and scripts… [this] dramatic construction of events 
posing good against evil, cast the comrades as liberators and moral protectors.”59 She 
points to an ambivalence with which the community of Alexandria viewed the comrades, 
“although not every audience applauded them - and adults in particular, sometimes found 
                                                 
56
 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004), 
15. The terms revolt and rebellion are used interchangeably by Bozzoli. The „six day war‟ was the main 
part of the revolt/rebellion, the first sic days of a six month long revolt/rebellion. 
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 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle, 137. 
58
 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle, 2. 
59
 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle, 142. 
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themselves cast on the wrong side - there is no doubt that these dramas furthered the 
broader possibilities of rebellion.”60  
 
Bozzoli‟s key purpose is to understand the violence, with the practice of necklacing as 
one act characterising the violence, through the lens of performativity, and via this 
agency, challenge the notion of “immutable laws of history” to explain why people resist 
their oppressors.
61
 However what is of relevance here is the dominant framework that 
guides her analysis. This framework challenges the role of resistance organisations as 
ultimately one framed by resistance to the broader oppression, the structural violence if 
you will, of the apartheid state. In relation to the necklacing of Theresa Maseko, Bozzoli 
posits that, “the „mob‟ was perhaps more overtly political that it had been in the case of 
the first victim, Maki Skhosana…”62  
 
In her discussion of people‟s courts and the role of „comrades‟, Bozzoli argues that 
“some [„comrades‟] took part in spectacular mob burnings and necklacings of those 
whom they believed were witches and informers; the line between the two forms of 
accusation was a fine one.”63 Indeed, the killing of accused witches through collective 
violence by means of the practice of necklacing has received attention by scholars. I 
proceed therefore to look at the ways in which the practice of necklacing has been made 
sense of in relation to witchcraft and ritual. 
 
On witchcraft, ritual and the practice of necklacing 
During the months of April and May 1986, 150 individuals were accused of being 
witches in the Mapulaneng district of Lebowa (North-Eastern Transvaal), and thirty of 
those individuals were necklaced. In writing about this particular moment, Edwin 
Ritchken argues that, “witches are to black culture what the snake was to Eve” and this 
                                                 
60
 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle, 142. 
61
 Here Bozzoli argues that such explanations do not necessarily mean that people resist their oppressors 
because of the presence of revolutionary organisations such as the ANC in exile because not all oppressed 
peoples rebel and not all rebellious populations are “notably and consistently oppressed.” B. Bozzoli, 
Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid, 3. 
62
 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid, 137. 
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 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid, 177. My emphasis. 
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metaphor captured the “dominant world-view in Lebowa”.64 For Ritchken, it is not 
important to “prove” the existence of witches, but rather to understand why a belief in 
witches, “at different times and in different places…has such different meanings and 
political effects.”65 He thus argues that:  
In Mapulaleng witch accusations had both a private meaning (in that they were 
used to resolve private conflicts) and a necessary public meaning. In as much as a 
community councillor is necklaced as a symbol of a system of antagonistic 
relationships (i.e apartheid) and in as much as the public nature of this punishment 
serves as an example for all to see and learn from, so the burning of witches 
served the same function for the people living in Mapulaneng.
66
 
 
Here Ritchken is pointing to witchcraft allegations as not only limited to “private 
individual antagonisms” but such allegations could also arise out of conflicts “between 
the people and the system.” 67 For Ritchken, making sense of the witch killings by 
necklace in Lebowa is partly a reflection of a struggle by youth organisations to assert 
legitimacy in the context of a power vacuum. This power vacuum was left after the 
transformation of chiefly power to a “bureaucratic figurehead”68; a result of apartheid 
policies akin to what Mahmood Mamdani calls “indirect rule.”69 
 
                                                 
64
 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa: Burning the Herbs‟ in Work in Progress, Issue 48 
(July 1987), 18. 
65
 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa‟, 18. 
66
 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa‟, 18. I want to highlight here the characterising of 
witch killings by necklace as “punishment” by Ritchken and not “justice” as I discussed in the previous 
chapter in relation to Chris Hani and his “comment on the necklace”. 
67
 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa‟, 18. Indeed, in his work on witchcraft practices in 
Soweto, Adam Ashforth argues that the practice of necklacing “though appalling to most people, was 
understood as an unfortunate but necessary community defence against the secret agents of the evil system 
of apartheid.” More specifically, by referring to the “System” of apartheid as „evil‟, Ashforth posits that the 
community of Soweto collectively took a stand at weeding out those who threatened their social solidarity. 
According to Ashforth, no one doubted that the “system” as the apartheid state was called, was nothing 
other than evil. He states that “virtually no one in Soweto doubted the justice of their cause or the necessity 
of standing together…” See A. Ashforth, Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 102, 268. 
68
 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa‟, 21. See also I. Niehaus, Witchcraft, Power and 
Politics: Exploring the Occult in the South African Lowveld (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 146, 170. 
69
 Mamdani posits that indirect rule can better be understood as decentralised despotism and that this form 
of power was to “create a dependent but autonomous system of rule, one that combined accountability to 
superiors with a flexible response to the subject population , a capacity to implement central directives with 
one to absorb local shocks.” M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 60. 
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In this sense, Ritchken posits that Mapulaneng‟s rural youth (who set up grassroots 
political structures, „charged and „sentenced‟ those accused of witchcraft) were “victims 
of a historical process that [was] beyond their control. The witch attacks… [were] 
essentially their revolt against a society that [could] no longer support them.”70 Noting 
the link between witchcraft beliefs in a rural area and the wider national struggle for 
liberation, Ritchken argues that, “the problem of an autocratic youth culture and political 
practice remains. These practices, like the centrality of witches, do not spontaneously 
disappear. They have been historically written into everyday life. And under the present 
repressive situation it is almost impossible to organise openly and democratically.”71  
 
What is interesting about the Lebowa case was that those necklaced were identified 
explicitly as witches. Ritchken explains the process of that identification as occurring 
within grassroots political structures.
72
 According to Ritchken, those grassroots political 
structures, specifically the youth organisation that identified the witches, were dictatorial 
and extremely violent with discipline being “imposed on the populace by sjambok or 
necklace” and where “power could be manipulated to achieve selfish ends.”73 It is with 
this in mind that Ritchken argues that, “under the present political conditions (he was 
writing in 1987), it may be necessary to organise for survival now, and leave protest for 
some later date.”74 By “survival”, he presumably meant in relation to the “reign of terror” 
imposed on the residents of the Mapulaneng district by the youth organisation. 
 
Joanna Ball, referring to the Lebowa case as well, argues that, “[t]he fact that at the start 
of these burnings [necklace killings] witches appear to have been the dominant victims.  
She argues that it was only later that collaborators began to receive the same punishment 
and that this “is of secondary importance.” Ball therefore suggests that: “Given the 
situation in South Africa during the mid-eighties with much political unrest and 
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 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa‟, 22. 
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 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa‟, 22. 
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 E. Ritchken, „Youth politics and witches in Lebowa‟, 21-22. 
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 99 
frustration, the transferral would seem almost inevitable, and from the mid-eighties 
apartheid‟s spies and puppets and “witches” often became interchangeable.”75   
 
Indeed, both Ball and Leonard Praeg‟s attempt to link so called collaborators or informers 
to the killing of witches suggests a continuity between traditional witch burning and what 
Praeg calls “contemporary post-colonial versions of the ritual”, namely necklace 
murders.
76
 Ball attempts to develop a clearer understanding of the practice as a specific 
form of burning which has a longer history in South Africa. She suggests that necklace 
killings cannot be understood outside this wider context of burning.
77
 Praeg however 
takes issue with Ball when she argues that, “collaborators are also seen to be traitors, 
[who] break the social solidarity of the group, [who] „sell out‟ to the enemy and assist in 
the continued suppression of the black community.”78 For Praeg, the political 
consequences are not “one perceived [as] betrayal to the solidarity of the community”, 
but rather, “the original sin of the victims was primordial, fundamental. They were 
traitors to that interdependence which everything, including political liberation, 
depended.”79 
 
Ball does however question the notion of necklace killings as confined only to political 
punishment. Rather, noting the wide range of victims of necklace killings (“criminals, 
rapists, murderers, shebeen owners, other ethnic groups, witches and wizards”), she 
argues that they are all seen to be traitors to the social solidarity of the community.
80
 In 
this way, she proposes a ritualistic continuity between the burning of witches prior to the 
1980‟s and the emergence and prominence of necklace killings from the mid 1980‟s 
onwards. 
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 J. Ball, „The Ritual of the Necklace‟, 8. 
76
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Despite Ball‟s assertion that the practice of necklacing exceeds political punishment, she 
reverts to the “oppressive apartheid system” as having been the reason for social tensions 
in both townships and rural areas. Within this context, “the struggle for new economic 
and social positions by the poorer and more marginalised sectors of the black community, 
within shifting and uncertain social and economic contexts, is one of the fundamental 
roots of the violence.”81 Ball thus suggests that “[a]t the time it was very difficult for 
black people to oppose apartheid and so their frustration would appear to have turned 
inward, to the excising of the internal „enemy‟ in an attempt to grasp some form of 
control over their lives.”82 
 
Praeg however, in making sense of necklace killings associated with witchcraft killings, 
suggests that ambivalence arises within what he terms the paradox of the “cusp of 
modernity”. Both necklace killings and witchcraft killings are a form of pre-colonial 
cultural practice and at the same time reflect tensions with the project of modernity. 
Praeg thus posits that: 
In their continuity as archaic sacrificial rituals necklace murders speak of an 
ontological order of interdependence captured by Mbiti‟s dictum of identity, I am 
because we are. At the same time, however, they are concerned with bringing 
about an imagined, democratic community that values human rights, contractual 
equality and individualism. The fact that, at the moment of their occurrence, 
necklace murders speak the language of the former in an attempt to bring about 
the latter is what renders them foundational (Girard) and hence, in a sense, 
indecipherable (Derrida). This paradox captures what I refer to as the cusp of 
modernity.
83
 
 
In anticipating a critique of his view that necklace killings be understood as a 
continuation of pre-colonial cultural practice, Praeg suggests that his understanding will 
allow for a reflection of the “historical continuity on which [Rene] Girard‟s theory is 
based and allows for the tracing of genealogical changes [which] such rituals represent in 
the transition to post-coloniality.”84 He refers to a participant in the killing of Maki 
Skosana, Linda Hlope, who stated that his participation in the killing arose from a desire 
to appear on television. For Praeg, Hlope‟s admission raises a number of questions about 
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“contemporary culture, modern notions of personhood and the nature of the imagined 
community that is created through such contemporary acts [necklacing] of founding 
violence.” The critique that Praeg anticipates is therefore also one of differences between 
a “traditional pre-colonial community and a politicised community engaged in the 
struggle for liberation.”85 In this sense therefore, Praeg cannot but attend to a struggle 
discourse that, Du Toit argues, was embedded within a modernising narrative,
86
 although 
for Praeg it appears as if it is the transition to modernity that leads to ambivalence in 
making sense of the practice of necklacing. 
 
Questions of modernity also frame Bozzoli‟s analysis. The case of the „Alexandra 
Rebellion‟, is, for her, “emblematic, if not rigidly representative” of the broader patterns 
of urban struggle in South Africa in the 1980‟s. Bozzoli suggests that recently urbanised 
peoples inhabit a space where aspects of modernity co-exist with beliefs in witchcraft and 
magic. She argues that the resistance framework, widely used in scholarly analyses suffer 
“analytical awkwardness‟s” in African settings. Unless the “stalled modernities and 
frustrated capitalism” associated with resistance is taken on board, African examples of 
rebellions and resistance risk becoming “mere „illustrations‟ of tendencies elsewhere, 
exceptions that „prove the rule‟, or „extreme examples‟”.87 Thus even though at first 
glance phenomena such as necklace killings do resemble the three features of revolt as 
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described by Charles Tilly (“parochial, bifurcated and particular”), in the case of 
Alexandra,  
[o]rdinary people were indeed involved in direct action and did indeed have 
patrons to take wider issues further- but…. although the parochial and the national 
appeared bifurcated, nationalism also had roots in the local community which 
could not be explained away by simple reference to patronage….so the revolt 
does not appear to be clearly pre-modern.
88
  
 
Bozzoli therefore proposes the word “syncretic”  to describe revolts in townships, such as 
those in South Africa in the 1980‟s and particularly Alexandra, that displays 
characteristics of revolt that were neither clearly modern nor pre-modern and was clearly 
not a transitional phase of development/progress.
89
 
 
Jean and John Comaroff, in relation to post-apartheid South Africa, present a somewhat 
similar argument. In citing the necklace killing of a baboon in March 1996 thought to 
have been a witch in disguise, the Comaroff‟s wish to draw attention to the ambivalence 
present in millennial capitalism, “that odd fusion of the modern and the postmodern, of 
hope and hopelessness, of utility and futility, of promise and its perversions.”90 Citing as 
“extraordinary” that the ANC commissioned the Inquiry into Witchcraft, 91 they argue 
that “post-apartheid South Africa, to put it bluntly, is trying to construct a modernist 
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nation-state under postmodern conditions, a historical endeavour fraught with 
contradictions.” 92   
 
Witchcraft discourse then, as Adam Ashforth posits, “[w]ith all the possibilities of 
nefarious interactions with invisible agencies it exposes, serves primarily as subtext – 
that which is not said but without which one cannot comprehend what is spoken.”93 In 
this regard, the work of Paolo Israel provokes possible new directions into thinking about 
the practice of necklacing not taken by the scholars discussed here. He does this by tacitly 
invoking Giorgio Agamben‟s notion of “bare life”. Israel provides the usual list of 
theories constituting witchcraft discourse such as, “where sorcery is an explanation of 
misfortune, where witchcraft crises link social tensions and historic upheavals, where 
occult discourse is characterised by an ambiguous rationality, and where witch-hunts are 
forms of sacral, communitarian violence which inhere in the social as a limit point, one 
called upon to restore its illusory seamlessness.”94  
 
In his work on the so named „War of the Lions‟ in Mozambique, Israel offers a reading of 
the Muidumbe Easter lynching of 2003. He suggests that whilst other lynchings of this 
type were considered acts of “popular irrationality”, the Easter lynching, “had an overt 
political character and symbolism” that was considered as an act of “political rebellion” 
by the government. Israel therefore argues that, “it should be taken as the accomplished 
expression of the previous lynchings, as the one that did and said what the others wished 
but had not dared to.”95 Politically motivated necklace killings of the mid 1980s were the 
“accomplished expression[s]” of „the masses‟ and they were ambivalently but 
overwhelmingly claimed by the liberation movements. Indeed this thesis has shown that 
necklace killings were both overtly political and symbolic precisely because of the 
interplay of the apartheid state and „official‟ non-state discourses on the practice of 
necklacing. 
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Though, as mentioned, it is more in Israel‟s tacit invoking of Giorgio Agamben‟s notion 
of „bare life‟ that possibly points to a provocative new direction at making sense of the 
practice of necklacing. In a footnote, Israel suggests that necklacing is akin to the 
Shimakonde verb, kutannola (the name by which the lynchings in the struggle for 
liberation in Mozambique were denoted): 
Kutannola is a paradoxical trope not dissimilar from the once – obscure figure of 
Roman law homo sacer. Kutannola is a collective killing that only apparently 
implies a sacrifice. The ritualism of the execution disguises the fact that the 
crowds are performing the same operation for which the victim is being killed: the 
drawing of „bare life‟. And is not „necklacing‟ the crudest form of producing „bare 
life‟, of annihilating without sacrificing?96  
 
Indeed, in a chapter titled, „The Ambivalence of the Sacred‟, Agamben posits that: 
“There are two kinds of sacred things, the auspicious and the inauspicious. Not only in 
there no clear border between these two opposite kinds, but the same object can pass 
from one to another without changing nature. The impure is made pure, and vice versa. 
The ambiguity of the sacred consists in the possibility of this transmutation.” He 
continues, and this I find interesting and of possible relevance to future attempts at 
making sense of the practice of necklacing:  
An enigmatic archaic Roman legal figure that seems to embody contradictory 
traits and therefore had to be explained thus begins to resonate with the religious 
category of the sacred when this category irrevocably loses its significance and 
comes to assume contradictory meanings. Once placed in relation with the 
ethnographic concept of taboo, this ambivalence is then used – with perfect 
circularity – to explain the figure of homo sacer. There is a moment in the life of 
concepts when they lose their immediate intelligibility and can then, like all 
empty terms, be overburdened with contradictory meanings.
 97
 
 
This provokes one of many possible questions: Is it possible that necklacing, as re-
articulated in scholarly works attempting to make sense of the practice, represents that 
moment of losing its “immediate intelligibility” and is thus “overburdened with 
contradictory meanings”? In other words, attempts at distinguishing the practice of 
necklacing from the official state discourse on the practice, as shown in the previous 
chapter with the ANC and UDF, are also evident in scholarly works attempting to make 
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sense of the practice of necklacing. That state discourse, to restate, was to characterise the 
practice as criminal in nature with pre-modern tendencies.  
 
Indeed, Gobodo-Madikizela strongly criticises scholarly works linking necklace killings 
with the practice of witch killings arguing that it “racialises brutality” and perpetuates 
notions of „black-on-black‟ violence and its imagery of black savagery.98 She therefore 
questions the link between necklace killings (and perhaps placing it within a wider 
context of burning) and witchcraft killings in that how should scholars account for the 
burning of „black‟ bodies by „white‟ security police under apartheid. 99  It is precisely this 
type of question, posed by Gobodo-Madikizela, which in part speaks to the difficulty of 
writing necklacing into a history of liberation struggle as discussed more fully in the 
following chapter. However, for now, it may be productive to consider Zoe Wicomb‟s 
reading of the relationship between the practice of necklacing and the notion of the braai 
(barbeque). 
 
Towards writing necklacing into a history of liberation struggle 
In a discussion on the necessity of having to “speak about the unspeakable”, such as the 
relationship between the practice of necklacing and the notion of the braai, Wicomb 
raises the problem of culture and its self-representation – what she refers to as a “politics 
of culture.” 100 She also alludes to a disruption of temporality and subjectivities in having 
to “speak about the unspeakable.” Here she refers to Rian Malan‟s description in the 
book, My Traitors Heart, of his investigation into the murder of Dennis Mosheweshwe at 
the side of a swimming pool whilst his murderers were braai‟ing.101 Wicomb suggests: 
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We do not have access to the necessary transformations through which Malan‟s 
story has passed, but the translation can be seen as a model for the “rewording” of 
braaivleis [barbequed meat] as necklacing, where a number of invariants underpin 
these cultural activities. The most obvious recursive feature is the act of burning 
as a communal activity; necklacing, like the braaivleis, is never a private affair. 
Both activities are marked by the iconography of postindustrial culture: the 
swimming pool (itself a wry transformation from the veld) is topologically 
rewritten as the waste from another coveted marker of bourgeois culture, the 
motor car, the discarded tire that is placed around the victim‟s neck. Both 
originate in the need to survive: Boers trekking from British domination relied on 
shooting buck and eating the roasted meat in the open veld; necklacing eliminates 
those who endanger the community by spying for the community. Necklacing 
then is about displacing Boer culture both physically and symbolically. It is about 
positioning: placing the victim as other within an isolated circle of fire and 
outside of the community; replacing the decorative necklace with the destructive 
tire, a symbolic reminder to victims of where they have placed themselves as they 
embraced the enemy with its lure of lucre; and positioning the necklacers above 
such treachery. Amid hunger and homelessness, even the piffling amount offered 
to individuals by the South African Police is hard to resist, and the hungry, 
homeless, and outraged communities respond with acts that challenge our liberal 
humanist assumptions. Necklacing does not tell us about communities pitted 
against each other, but about cohesion within communities who take collective 
responsibility for such a death and who honour the dead with sympathetic 
ululations as if it were a natural one. The barbarism of such cultural activity 
speaks of a topological process, a generative transformation in the barbarism of 
official white culture. Necklacing responds to the countless deaths in the 
townships recorded as unrest-related and therefore not worthy of investigation, 
deaths caused by the agents of government who use impimpis to destabilize black 
communities. The “official” status of necklacing was confirmed in a recent news 
report of its use in Maputo, where the community used burning tires as 
punishment for theft, yet another transmutation for our export culture.
102
 
 
Wicomb points to the public spectacle that is the practice of necklacing and likens it to 
the communal activity of the Afrikaaner barbecue, the braai. Both these activities for 
Wicomb speak to a post-industrial culture as originating in the need for survival. Thus, 
for the „Boer‟ it was the shooting of buck and roasting it on an open fire in the veld. For 
the „black‟ community, it was the elimination of an individual that endangered the very 
survival of the community by way of spying for the government. The practice of 
necklacing comes to symbolise both. For Wicomb, this displaces Boer culture both 
physically and symbolically. This displacing is about positionality as it relates to the 
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practice of necklacing in that “victims” are placed in an “isolating circle of fire” and is a 
symbolic reminder of where “victims” have positioned themselves in spying for the 
government. I cannot help but go back to thinking of Cassius Mandla‟s warning to those 
who “commit unspeakable acts of treachery against the people.”103 
 
Similar to Ball and Praeg, for Wicomb, the practice of necklacing is about cohesion 
within communities. It is a response to the oppression, the repression of, “the countless 
deaths in townships recorded as unrest-related and therefore not worthy of investigation, 
deaths caused by the agents of government who use impimpis to destabilise black 
communities.” Yet Wicomb also removes necklacing from a resistance framework when 
she states that the „official‟ status of the practice was confirmed with its usage in Maputo, 
Mozambique, as punishment for theft. This for her is a, “transmutation of our export 
culture” but more so, it suggests the practice of necklacing being assigned to the 
categories of both punishment and resistance. 
 
She concludes by positing: 
[w]e need a radical pedagogy that will sensitise those whose privilege has blinded 
them to the ironies of power. Only then can we speak of an interracial culture of 
readers and writers who are not passive consumers of culture, but rather who 
interrogate received news, who interrogate the magisterial discourse of the New 
South Africa and its cultural institutions, and who above all interrogate the fixed 
positions that we have allowed ourselves to adopt and assign to others in our 
practice of necklacing. And with competent readers, who knows, we may even 
develop a way of reading, which is to say disambiguating…104 
 
Necklacing for Wicomb, it appears, is used as a metaphor for racial tensions; in 
categorising race, those very categories are akin to being placed in that “isolating circle 
of fire.” It also appears that Wicomb‟s reading is a call for something like a nationalist 
post-apartheid South Africa where the ambiguities of the past are rendered intelligible by 
interrogating the very categories that South Africans have allowed themselves to be fixed 
in, our cultural identities and by implication, our political identities. However, for 
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Wicomb, the disambiguating that is called for is also only something, for her, that can be 
hoped for.   
   
Thus to return to Beinart‟s similar call of taking seriously cultural expressions of violence 
as Wicomb does, a related criticism levelled against such an approach comes from 
Mahmood Mamdani. He argues that, “even when political identities are drawn from the 
domain of culture, they need to be understood as distinct from cultural identities.”105 He 
continues and suggests that, “when the raw material of political identity is drawn from 
the domain of culture …it is the link between identity and power that allows us to 
understand how cultural identities are translated into political identities and thus 
distinguish between them.”106 An example of this approach is in When Victims Become 
Killers, an account of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Mamdani argues that his “ main 
objective…is to make the popular agency in the Rwandan genocide thinkable…by taking 
seriously the historical backdrop to political events, [he] hope[s] to historicise both 
political choices and those who made these choices…To benefit from a historically 
informed insight is not the same as to lapse into a politically irresponsible historicism.”107 
A possible question here though would be to ask if there is such a thing as a politically 
„responsible‟ historicism and what that would entail and therefore imply.  
 
Leading from Mamdani‟s “taking seriously the historical backdrop of political events”, 
conventionally, to explain episodes of violence such as necklace killings, has been to 
show that it is a necessary consequence of events and structures that have preceded it. 
Violence is represented as instrumental to processes of domination, hegemony and 
resistance. Robert Thornton, in examining the shooting at Uitenhage, the Langa 
massacre, argues that: 
[t]o understand the event of violence- that is to go beyond an account of the 
structures and concepts that provide its context and make it more or less likely to 
happen - we must look at how violence itself comes to constitute social forms and 
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meanings, and at how it comes into being as a peculiar kind of social 
interaction.
108
  
 
It is not only the event of violence itself and its destructive consequences that are causally 
effective, but rather narratives about violence that are constructed after the event of 
violence.
109
 Violence interrupts, ruptures, and terminates parts or all of previous social 
relations and therefore requires new stories to be told to explain the loss, to account for 
the disruptions, and to rebuild social relations after its occurrence. This makes violence 
appear to be located at the beginning of new social forms, new behaviours, and new 
accounts, and thus to appear as their cause, but this is a false perception based on what 
Thornton calls the “peculiar temporality of violence” and its chaotic nature. In other 
words, it is only clear that it happened, and only clear that it was really violence 
(particularly in times of resistance struggles against the state) in retrospect. Thornton 
therefore suggests that “the creative or constructive aspect of the violent event is not the 
occurrence of violence itself, but rather the interpretations, memories and memorials that 
violence evokes after the fact.”110      
 
In anticipating the argument of the following chapter, I want to return to Du Toit‟s 
argument that in order to understand South Africa‟s political violence, the historical 
context needs to be taken seriously. This is to trace the emergence of “a master-narrative 
structuring conventional understandings of political violence in relation to the general 
project of modernization.”111 He argues that violent resistance against apartheid was 
“justified and criticized from moral, political and strategic points of view, but precisely 
for those reasons it was also conceived as embedded in, and subservient to, these larger 
concerns.”112 In this regard, Du Toit posits that once the turn to armed struggle had been 
taken, the “mainstream liberation movement could not entirely define and contain the 
thrust of popular violent insurrections such as the proliferation of „necklace‟ killings”.113  
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Yet importantly for Du Toit, certain “irruptions of political violence during the apartheid 
era included a number of episodes which hardly fit into the master narrative (that of the 
mainstream liberation movement) at all.” Here he cites the Durban riots of 1949, the 
Poqo insurrections of the early 1960‟s and the emergence of the “right-wing vigilante 
factions in black communities at the height of the populist anti-apartheid struggles of the 
mid-1980‟s.”114 These Du Toit argues do, “not fit into the modern understanding of 
resistance against the apartheid state.”115 The practice of necklacing for Du Toit 
seemingly fits into that master-narrative. However, in the following chapter, I take issue 
with this, arguing that necklacing does not seamlessly fit into the master-narrative of 
struggle discourse.   
 
„the problem of understanding‟ 
Gobodo-Madikizela argues that there is an inherent ambivalence in the project to 
understand why atrocities, murders, and other acts of „indescribable unspeakable‟ 
violence take place and specifically, the motivation behind such acts. This ambivalence 
arises in the form of “explanations that could be read as implicitly exonerating killers 
from responsibility.” She adds that the “balance between explaining how perpetrators got 
to participate in atrocities and the extent of their responsibility in their behaviour is a 
difficult one to achieve,”116 and suggests the concept of a “double move” which is “to 
seek an explanation but also to resist explanation.”117 Gobodo-Madikizela elaborates on 
this with the help of Rosenbaum: 
[This means] not to resist all or any inquiry, not to resist thought, but to resist the 
misleading exculpatory corollaries of explanation. To resist the way of 
explanation can become evasion or consolation …by shifting responsibility from 
[the perpetrator] to faceless abstractions, inexorable forces, or irresistible 
compulsions that gave him no choice or made his choice irrelevant.
118
 
 
Gobodo-Madikizela is unable to negotiate this ambivalence and she concludes by stating 
that “it is one thing to know what happened, but it is another to understand how it 
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happened” and posits that beyond understanding is the challenge of what can be learned 
from history and how.
119
 I would argue that it is not what can be learned from a history of 
necklacing, but rather to ask how something like a history of necklacing operates within 
the discursive terrain of struggle histories.   
 
Thus in relation to the quote that prefaces this chapter, I would suggest taking up David 
Scott‟s challenge to dehistoricise history. By this he means to “refuse history its 
subjectivity, its constancy, its eternity; to think it otherwise than as the pasts hold over the 
present, to interrupt its seemingly irrepressible succession, causality, its sovereign claim 
to determinancy.”120  
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Chapter Four 
“A difficult legacy”?: Writing necklacing into a history of liberation struggle in 
South Africa 
                                                                                                 
In the foundation of the state, discourse will justify the recourse to violence by 
alleging the founding, in progress or to come, of a new law. As this law to come 
will in return legitimate, retrospectively, the violence that may offend a sense of 
justice, its future anterior already justifies it…The founding moment of the state is 
outside time, in that, until the state has already been founded, its foundation is in 
question, and, as a state, it does not exist. In retrospect, it will seem as if a certain 
act constituted the moment of foundation; at the time when that act takes 
place…the violence that accompanies it cannot be legitimized. These moments 
are terrifying – they involve suffering, crimes, tortures – and they are also „in their 
very violence, uninterpretable or indecipherable. (J. Derrida)
 1
  
 
 
This thesis is guided by the question of how necklacing is written into the narrative of 
struggle history in South Africa. Earlier chapters have attempted to show how the 
interplay of the dominant discourses on necklacing, that of the apartheid state and of what 
I have called „official‟ non-state discourses, have been re-articulated within scholarly 
works attempting to make sense of the practice of necklacing. The present chapter argues 
that this interplay of the dominant discourses is still visible in „official‟ histories of the 
liberation struggle in South Africa. 
 
While necklacing is not limited to these „official‟ histories, it nevertheless serves as a 
repressed but consequential element in struggle histories. By „official‟ histories, I am 
referring specifically to the way in which the liberation movement (read the ANC) 
constructs a history of struggle and more importantly, their (non)articulation of 
necklacing through testimonies and submissions at the TRC as well as subsequent 
„histories‟. By considering Every Step of the Way: The Journey to Freedom in South 
Africa, a text produced for public consumption under the auspices of the current ANC 
government as part of the „Ten years of freedom‟ celebrations in 2004, I ask how 
necklacing is narrated or not narrated in relation to struggle histories constructed under 
                                                 
1
 J. Derrida, „Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority‟ in D.Cornell and M. Rosenfield (eds.), 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), 36.  
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the rubric of the nation.
2
 Put differently, this chapter through examining Every Step of the 
Way, asks how necklacing is rendered intelligible as part of a national history of struggle. 
 
That Every Step of the Way was produced as a nationalist text, as is shown in this chapter, 
prompts the question of the relationship between history, disciplinary history, nation and 
the place of violence. The critique of nationalism has long entertained a critique of 
history.
3
 I am however interested in the ways in which nationalism operates in rendering 
violence (non)-narratable specifically the extent to which nationalist histories elide 
violence in favour of larger political projects, namely nation building and nationhood. 
Guided by some of the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective, this chapter examines 
and questions the ways in which disciplinary history works to construct narratives of 
struggle that marginalise moments of violence in favour of grand narratives of nation and 
progress. In taking this as a point of departure, the larger question guiding this chapter is 
to ask what it might mean to write necklacing into a history of the liberation struggle of 
South Africa. 
 
Forgetting to remember necklacing 
In 2004, ten years after South Africa‟s first democratic elections, the Ministry of 
Education commissioned and funded the book, Every Step of the Way: The Journey to 
Freedom in South Africa, written by journalist Michael Morris. The text, with Bill 
                                                 
2
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way: The Journey to Freedom in South Africa (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 
2004). 
3
  See amongst others, T. Ranger, „Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the 
Nation: the Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe‟ in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 
(June 2004), 215-234; C. Rassool, „The biographic order: further notes on biography in South African 
public culture after apartheid‟, Paper presented at the Institutions of Public Culture Workshop, Cape Town 
(7-9 July 2005). This view of nationalism entertaining a critique of history has also come across most 
forcefully through the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective. Subaltern Studies began as a critique of 
earlier orthodox nationalist and Marxist historical writings on India and at its inception resembled social 
history or „history from below‟. The initial recovery project of the Collective shifted to one of locating the 
subaltern within the intersections of dominant discourses, or rather attempts to analyse how subalternity 
was constituted in dominant discourses. See for example G. Pandey, „Subaltern Studies: From a Critique of 
Nationalism, to a Critique of History‟, paper presented at “Problematising History and Agency: From 
Nationalism to Subalternity”, Conference at Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town (22-24 
October 1997). See also R. Guha, „The Small Voice of History‟ in S. Amin and D. Chakrabarty (eds.) in 
Subaltern Studies IX: Writings on South Asian History and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 1-12. For a most stimulating engagement with the works of Subaltern Studies in relation to South 
African history/historiography, see  P. Lalu, The Deaths of Hintsa: Postapartheid South Africa and the 
Shape of Recurring Pasts (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2009). 
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Nasson as historical advisor, was aimed at a wide audience, though specifically at high 
school teenagers, to “brighten the study of history”.4 Despite some quibbles, 
overwhelmingly the text was lauded for its deft handling of South Africa‟s past in taking 
account of a multitude of perspectives and for its accessibility.
5
 One reviewer, however, 
argued that, “the book was written to fulfill the needs of a particular historical moment 
and a particular political purpose, if nothing else, this book shows that a much wider 
renaissance in the discipline of history in South Africa over the next few years is 
necessary to ensure that the old mythologies of the South African past are not simply 
replaced by new ones.”6  
 
Interestingly only one review mentioned the practice of necklacing and this in relation to 
„white‟ South Africans having to forget their “amnesia” and “Black‟s… hav[ing] to live 
with demons like Boipatong, necklacing and the abuse of women and children.”7 Another 
reviewer, A.J.B Humphreys, hinted either at the practice of necklacing, though refusing 
to name it as such, or alluded to township revolts that saw the use of burning tyres as 
barricades: “Morris sets the scene with „fire‟ – from the fires first harnessed by early 
humans and the profound implications of this advance through to the fire of burning tyres 
and the fires lit in attempts to dispose of the evidence in the defense of apartheid…”8 
 
Essentially presented as a nationalist text aimed at remembering the past in a 
postapartheid present, as the then current Minister of Education Kader Asmal takes pains 
to emphasise in the Forward; the Prologue, entitled „Fires‟, begins with the following 
statement:  
                                                 
4
 See T. Smith, „Our past through other people‟s eyes‟ in Cape Argus (21 May 2004). Bill Nasson is a higly 
regarded social historian. 
5
 For example Patrick Laurence argues that despite Kader Asmal being the driving force behind the text, 
“Morris is too competent a journalist to have degenerated into a propagandist. Though he obviously 
sympathises with the quest for liberation by South Africa‟s oppressed black majority, he does not allow his 
sympathies to clutter the text. To put it differently, he survives his sponsor.” See P. Laurence, „History or 
hero worship?‟ in This Day (24 June 2004).  
6
 A. G Cobley, „Review: [Untitled]‟ in African Studies Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Dec., 2006), 92-94. 
7
 J. Loos, „Lest we forget, a visit to our recent past‟ in Cape Argus (25 June 2004). 
8
  A.J.B Humphreys, „Review: [Untitled]‟ in The South African Archaeological Bulletin, Vol. 59, No. 180 
(Dec., 2004), 71 
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It was going to be a long night, but the five men sitting around the braai, talking 
and drinking beer, had the patience for it. If it took the whole night, well, they 
would just have to sit it out.
9
 
 
Morris explains that this was the night of the horrific burning of Sizwe Kondile‟s body in 
1981 by five South African police officers as they drank beer and had a braai (barbeque) 
on a separate fire. The prologue proceeds to give a broad overview of the history of fire, 
its uses and abuses, in South Africa. Towards the end of the prologue, Morris writes that 
“for most black South Africans… (apartheid‟s) repression was a raw daily experience, 
and there was no mistaking it for anything less than systematic brutality. It was a reality 
that bred seething anger and spurred communities and individuals to harsh measures and 
excesses.”10 Arguably, the most pronounced „excess‟ was the necklace and Morris 
continues by writing that “ a sense of the rage that gave potency to the „necklace‟ is 
evident in [the] controversial passage from a speech by Winnie Madela…”, referring to 
the speech in which she proclaimed that, “We have no guns – we have only stones, boxes 
of matches and petrol. Together, hand in hand, with our boxes of matches and our 
necklaces we shall liberate this country.” 11 
 
 The “necklace”, writes Morris “became a powerful political tool, and a gut wrenching 
image.”12 The prologue concludes with the following paragraph: 
To test how much heat it takes to harden an arrow point is to explore an ancient 
technology that, however remotely, helped shape South African life. Then again, 
to ask how much fire – and for how long – to burn a fellow human being to ash is 
a terrible, unavoidable question of our own time. We cannot afford to flinch from 
it. If we did, we‟d be turning back to the dark.13 
 
This concluding paragraph is presumably in relation to the burning of Sizwe Kondile and 
not in relation to the practice of necklacing as the above cited review by Humphrey‟s 
alludes to. The practice of necklacing certainly qualifies as one of the abuses of fire that 
the Prologue wishes to highlight, though as (re)presented in the text, it was an abuse that 
to some degree is justified even rational, given the harshness of apartheid‟s repression 
                                                 
9
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 1. 
10
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 6. 
11
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 6. 
12
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 7. 
13
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 7. 
 
 
 
 
 116 
and its structural violence. In contrast, the burning of Sizwe Kondile‟s body by apartheid 
policemen is presented as that which „black‟ South Africans were forced to face as a 
lived reality. The burning of Sizwe Kondile‟s body by the SAP is juxtaposed with the 
necklace killings of those individuals suspected of being police informers or collaborators 
by “communities and individuals”. Necklacing is positioned as causal to “a sense of rage” 
by „black‟ South Africans for whom apartheid‟s “repression was a raw, daily experience, 
and there was no mistaking it for anything less than systematic brutality.” The burning of 
Sizwe Kondile‟s body is  positioned as proof of the “systematic brutality” of apartheid 
and the callousness of apartheid‟s functionaries as shown in the Prologue by the citing of 
the TRC testimony of former policeman Dirk Coetzee who was present at the „braai‟ing‟ 
of Sizwe Kondile.
14
 
 
Necklace killings are briefly mentioned and discussed thrice in Every Step of the Way, 
first in the Prologue and later in the chapter titled, „Storming the fortress‟. Here it is 
referred to in contradictory terms of cause and effect: 
The petrol soaked tyre, placed round a bound victim‟s neck and set alight was 
called a „necklace‟, an awful term for something that was never pretty, nor was 
meant to be. Necklace victims were usually people who were merely suspected of 
being police informers. Nobody even bothered to establish any proof. The bitter 
rivalry of the township conflicts did not allow the time or the scope for niceties. It 
was a problem, a contradiction, for a „struggle‟ which proclaimed its ideals as 
being justice, freedom and democracy for all.
15
 
 
This “problem” and the contradictory terms that surround the practice is highlighted by 
the historian William Beinart who argues that: 
[w]hile the [exiled] ANC called for ungovernability, it was not able to establish 
formal internal organization, and a number of Congress and UDF members were 
uneasy with the excesses of the Comrades…Some UDF militants justified 
violence, yet the movement had to be careful not to make itself even more 
vulnerable to state retaliation by openly espousing armed struggle…activists 
recognized by 1986 that some rebels were not only „ungovernable to the enemy‟, 
but „ungovernable‟ to their own organisations‟. These tensions were to leave a 
difficult legacy for the liberation movements when they came to government.
16
 
 
                                                 
14
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 6.  
15
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 236. 
16
 W. Beinart cited in M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 236. See also W. Beinart, Twentieth-Century South 
Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 261. My emphasis. 
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The third time that the practice of necklacing is mentioned is in the chapter titled, „When 
that sunrise comes‟, in relation to the 2003 rise of vigilantism that included the return of 
the necklace as a tactic. In that year cases of individuals being apprehended and burnt to 
death and necklaced by members of communities, frustrated by what they perceived to be 
the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system, resurfaced in South African society.
17
 
The practice of necklacing still, according to Beinart, presents a “difficult legacy for the 
liberation movements when they came to government.”  
 
The last chapter of the book titled „[endpiece] Remembering the future‟ concludes by 
noting that: 
There is an entirely unimaginable, and unthinkable, quality to the night-long fire 
that burned Sizwe Kondile to ash in 1981, as much as to the lives and thoughts of 
the policemen who perpetrated the atrocity. These seem to belong to another 
country – that other country – yet they are features of the historical landscape 
South Africans still occupy. To overlook them is to remain in the shadowed world 
of forgetting. Remembering them is an act of optimism, a letting in of light.
18
 
 
What is striking about Every Step of the Way is its structure and register. The text begins 
with the burning of Sizwe Kondile‟s body and ends with that horrific „defacement‟ of his 
body.
19
 In characterising this as “unimaginable and unthinkable”, the killing by the 
practice of necklacing, in contrast, seemingly appears as „imaginable and thinkable‟. If to 
overlook the killing of Sizwe Kondile is tantamount to remaining in the “shadowed world 
                                                 
17
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 310. As cited in the previous chapter, one should recall here the HSRC 
sociological study on the practice of necklacing done by Nomoyi and Shurink in 1998: “Perhaps the finding 
with the most pertinent policy implication relates to the suggestion [of those interviewed] that necklacing 
might be reintroduced to curb the high rate of serious crime confronting many communities in the new 
South Africa.” Indeed, their prediction unfolded in 2003. See N. Nomoyi and W. Schurink, „Ukunxityiswa 
kwempimpi itayari njengotshaba lomzabakaza: An exploratory study of insider accounts of necklacing in 
three Port Elizabeth townships‟ in E. Bornman, Y. Muthien, R. Van Eeden and M. Wentzel (eds.), Violence 
in South Africa: A Variety of Perspectives (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 1998), 171-2. Numerous newspapers ran 
editorials on the rise of vigilantism and traced the practice of necklacing back to the mid 1980‟s. See for 
example J. Maluleke, „Necklace anger is back‟ in The Citizen (27 June 2003); P. Laurence, „When mob is 
judge, jury, executioner‟ in Cape Times (26 June 2003) and T. Nhlapo, „Necklace Horror‟ in The Star (23 
May 2003). 
18
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 322. 
19
 I use the word „defacement‟ and cannot but think of Michael Taussig‟s argument that the 
“characterisation of defacement can never confront its object head-on, if only because defacement catches 
us unawares and can only be known unexpectedly, complicit with the violence of daily life. The writer 
must confront the resistances. Why else do we write? The shortest way between two points, between 
violence and its analysis, is the long way round, tracing the edge sideways, like the crab scuttling.” See M. 
Taussig, Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 2. 
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of forgetting” by flinching from it and in so doing “turning back to the dark,” then what 
would it mean to remember necklacing? Is to remember necklacing not also “an act of 
optimism, a letting in of the light”? Just as much as asking “how much fire – and for how 
long – to burn a fellow human being to ash is a terrible, unavoidable question of our own 
time,” surely so too is the question of necklacing as it relates to the “historical landscape 
[which] South Africans still occupy”, that “difficult legacy”? Notwithstanding Kader 
Asmal‟s claim that “Every Step of the Way asks its readers to confront the tangled stories, 
records and other fragments which make up our history”20, the text, in my reading, 
forgets to remember that necklacing is just as constituted by “tangled stories, records and 
other fragments” that require confronting.21  
 
If Every Step of the Way is considered as an „official‟ history, then in relation to the 
question of what it would mean to write necklacing into a history of liberation struggle in 
South Africa, I want to proceed by asking how this juxtaposing of the burning of Sizwe 
Kondile‟s body by the SAP and the killing of suspected informers and collaborators by 
the practice of necklacing works towards and/or against overcoming the “difficult 
legacy” that necklacing poses. In the (re)construction of „the history‟ of South Africa‟s 
liberation struggle, evoking the burning of Sizwe Kondile‟s body in relation to necklace 
killings can be traced to the early 1990‟s and more forcefully to the TRC process.  
 
In particular what follows underscores a struggle over the „ownership‟ of forms of 
violence that, at the TRC, saw the former apartheid government strategically attempt to 
assign what was said and what was not said about the practice of necklacing by the ANC 
and UDF as the ultimate proof that necklacing was „owned‟ by those organisations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 K. Asmal, „Forward‟ to M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, ix. 
21
 This is somewhat similar to Shahid Amin‟s argument in relation to Chauri Chaura in which “all Indians, 
when commemorating the nation, are obliged to remember – only in order to forget – …” See S. Amin, 
Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922-1992 (Berkley, Los Angeles: University of California 
Press and Oxford University Press, 1995), 1.  
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Can necklacing be owned? 
In a recent article, Nicky Rousseau posits that a, “side skirmish in the struggles over the 
ownership of forms of violence” has been elicited in the light of testimony by former 
state security agents to the TRC. In particular, she suggests that the testimony of 
Vlakplaas
22
 commander Dirk Coetzee that detailed the killing of Sizwe Kondile in 1981 
was perhaps the most iconic image of violence entering public consciousness in the wake 
of the TRC. Rousseau points out that this, and similar burnings of bodies by state security 
agents, has led to a triumphant seizing upon by the liberation movement, specifically the 
ANC, “as evidence that the origin of the practice of „necklacing‟ lies with the state, thus 
reversing the state‟s earlier account of „necklacing‟ as some kind of moral marker of 
barbarism of the liberation movements‟.”23 
 
Indeed, following an allegation by one of the TRC commissioners, Dumiza Ntsebeza, 
that the origins of the practice lay with the state, a verbal skirmish ensued and former 
police commissioner, General Johan van de Merwe challenged Ntsebeza to provide 
evidence of the police burning people alive. The media-director of the National Party 
(NP), Mr. Daryl Swanepoel argued that, “to use the gruesome necklace method, from 
wherever it may originate, is sick and barbaric. The ANC made it its own and propagated 
it,” thereafter citing the infamous Winnie Mandela speech.24 
                                                 
22
 The Vlakplaas unit was extablished under the directive of the Security Branch in 1979. According to the 
TRC Report, it was initially a “rehabilitation” farm where former ANC and PAC activists were turned into 
askaris, police informers. The Report continues as states that “by the end of 1982, Vlakplaas operatives 
were increasingly becoming „the special forces‟ of the Security Branch” and were responsible for numerous 
murders of liberation movement persons. See TRC Report, Vol. 2 (Cape Town: Juta, 1998), 30.  
23
 N. Rousseau, „The Farm, The River and The Picnic Spot: Topographies of Terror‟ in African Studies, 
Vol. 68, Issue 3 (December 2009), 367.  
24
 According to the Daily Dispatch, a local newspaper in the Eastern Cape, Dumiza Ntsebeza, a TRC 
investigations head in November 1997, had said that, “[t]he South African police and their paid agitators 
were responsible for introducing necklacing into South Africa from the former Rhodesia – and not the 
African National Congress as previously alleged.” Ntsebeza argued that his team had found evidence that 
two MK soldiers had been burned before being buried. See „Ntsebeza says necklacing introduced to SA by 
police‟ in Daily Dispatch, (7 November 1997); C. van Staden, „Hoe WVK man in storm oor 
halsbandmoord‟ in Die Burger (14 November 1997) and H. de Vos, „NP en VF kap Ntsebeza se uitlatings 
oor halsbandmoord‟ in Die Burger (10 November 1997). Earlier that year, the renowned anti-apartheid 
journalist, Max du Preez claimed in the television series „Truth Commission Special Report‟ that: 
 “[b]etween September 1984 and August 1989, 771 people were necklaced or doused with fuel and burnt to 
death. The myth perpetuated by the State then was that this was an example of African brutality. The truth 
we know now is that this repulsive form of killing was first started by white Rhodesian security forces in 
the 1970s and then brought to South Africa by the security police…” He was made to retract the statement 
 
 
 
 
 120 
 
With the TRC as a platform through which apartheid human rights violations were 
brought to light, the question of necklacing was one that arguably epitomised a battle 
over the moral high ground of the liberation struggle. In response to allegations that it 
was the former apartheid government that „fathered‟ the practice of necklacing, 25 the 
evidence supplied by representatives of the former government and its security force 
functionaries were the statements made by liberation movement leaders and icons in the 
1980s. The ANC‟s strategy of a „People‟s War‟ was produced as further proof that 
necklacing was „owned‟ by the ANC. For example in Major-Gen H.D Stadler‟s The 
Other Side of the Story: A true perspective, „ownership‟ of the practice of necklacing is 
assigned to the ANC and the UDF.
 26
  
 
This book served as a submission to the TRC to defend the SAP against claims of gross 
human rights violations. It ought to be read as a version of an apartheid state discourse on 
violence. On one hand, the violence unleashed by the state, or in this case more 
specifically the SAP, was regarded as the „unfortunate but necessary cost of progress‟ and 
the practice of necklacing on the other, as a particular excess of revolutionary violence by 
the liberation movement (particularly the ANC and UDF) and as barbaric and primitive. 
Stadler provided an historical overview of the liberation movements (ANC, UDF, 
PAC/APLA) and the revolutionary total onslaught that warranted the total strategy and 
later counter-revolutionary warfare of the state in the 1980‟s. In this sense, Stadler 
provides a perfect execution of McCuen‟s rules in that Stadler turned back the argument 
of the liberation movement that the state was responsible for violence, arguing instead 
that the liberation movement was responsible for state violence.
27
 This move of course 
elides both the repression and everyday violence of apartheid disciplinary rule.  
                                                                                                                                                 
after it was found that there was no or little evidence to substantiate the claim. See „SABC found guilty 
over claim about necklacing‟ in SAPA Report (June 16 1997). http://www.rhodesia.nl/truthlie.htm 
25
 Even before the official sanctioning of the TRC, media reports with questions pertaining to the „origins‟ 
of the practice of necklacing circulated in the early 1990‟s. One such report, an editorial comment in The 
New Nation (a UDF orientated weekly) suggested that state security forces introduced the practice. See, 
„Who is the father of the necklace?‟ in The New Nation (25 June 1993). 
26
 Maj-Gen HD Stadler, The Other Side of the Story: A True Perspective (Pretoria: Contact Publishers, 
1997). 
27
 See Chapter One. 
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The submission provided very little account of the forms of violence used by the SAP 
itself. Instead, it was as though by providing an account of the revolutionary violence of 
the liberation movements‟, Stadler was able to argue that the SAP and by association, the 
apartheid state, were merely responding to a violence prescribed by the liberation 
movements, a process of action leading to reaction leading to further action and reaction; 
or of violence begetting violence. For Stadler, it was the practice of necklacing that was 
the ultimate act of “savagery”. He said this much when he claimed that; “to put a petrol-
soaked tyre around the neck of a human being and set it alight, for that person to slowly 
burn to death, can only be described as savagery of the highest degree.”28  
 
Stadler set up a formulation in which the notion of „Peoples‟ War‟ and its intended 
consequences was used as a condoning and propagating of the practice of necklacing by 
the ANC and UDF. He argued that: 
Neither the ANC or [sic] the UDF can deny the facts, i.e: 
-That members of the street committees and other structures of „people‟s war‟ had 
been directly responsible for these inhuman and barbaric actions. 
-That the ANC had been directly and indirectly responsible for this strategy. 
-That the UDF played a major role in these manifestations at grass roots level. 
-That it was the ANC strategy to make South Africa ungovernable and set up 
alternative structures, etc. 
-That the ANC ordered the elimination of „collaborators‟29 
 
Stadler continued and posed the question, “surely the ANC and the UDF, if they did not 
order these actions, must have foreseen the probable consequences of that which they 
propagated, or was this in fact that which was actually intended?”30 In this formulation a 
claim for equivalence between the liberation movements and the Security Forces was 
being made in terms of accountability for atrocities committed. The practice of 
necklacing, for Stadler, underscored the “challenges” that the SAP faced. The spirit of 
reconciliation in which the submission was supposedly meant to be presented, came 
across more as a damning indictment of the ANC and UDF in their discourse of violent 
resistance. According to Stadler it appeared therefore, that the practice of necklacing as 
an act of revolutionary violence represented the ultimate justification for state violence. 
                                                 
28
 Maj-Gen HD Stadler, The Other Side of the Story, 180. 
29
 Maj-Gen HD Stadler, The Other Side of the Story, 180-181. 
30
 Maj-Gen HD Stadler, The Other Side of the Story, 181.  
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Similarly, in the former ruling party, the National Party‟s (NP) second submission to the 
TRC, former state president F.W de Klerk, dedicated a sub-section to the question of 
necklacing.
31
 To emphasise the view of „ownership‟ belonging to the ANC and linking it 
to the political prisoner indemnity saga
32
, de Klerk argued that: 
It is also significant that some of the 525 prisoners whose release the ANC 
demanded on 26 September 1992 as its price for returning to the negotiating table 
had been convicted of necklace murders and other heinous offences. Nevertheless, 
the ANC claimed them for its own. One of these people, George Skosana, said on 
his release from prison that “he would do it again if he had to.” He said that he 
remembered the dying screams of the "police informer" he helped to burn alive in 
Saulsville: 
“We were angry and he was our enemy, so we necklaced him. I felt happy 
watching him burn.” Another of those released at the insistence of the ANC was 
Lucky Malaza who described how he had helped to kill a man called Fanayana: 
“….We put the tyre around him, poured petrol on him and lit a match. He 
screamed and screamed and tried to pull the tyre off, but could not. I looked at his 
face. It was like meat. He took a long time to die.”33  
 
Of significance in this statement was the allegation of the ANC “claiming them for their 
own”. This implied that in “claiming” perpetrators of necklace killings, according to De 
                                                 
31
 Second Submission of the National Party to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (23 March 1997) 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/np2.htm  
32
  In 1991, there was dispute as to whether prisoners convicted of necklace murders should qualify for 
political prisoner status and thus be eligible for indemnity. In the „first‟ round of negotiations in 1990, the 
„Groote Schuur Minute‟ (4 May 1990) stipulated an agreement to “release political prisoners and the 
granting of immunity in respect of political offences to those inside and outside South Africa.” By the 6 
August 1990, it was agreed and confirmed in the „Pretoria Minute‟ that all political prisoners would be 
released by the 30 April 1991. However on the 1 May 1991, the Daily Dispatch ran the following article, 
„FW rejects freedom for necklace killers‟. Former South African president F.W de Klerk is reported as 
having stated that of the applications received from individuals for consideration of release and indemnity, 
had included applicants who had been convicted of particularly brutal methods, many of them involving the 
necklace method…A significant group of these people were…opportunists or dangerous criminals. The 
majority, however, fall within a grey area regarding the question of whether the crime was politically 
motivated or not.” See „FW rejects freedom for necklace killers‟ in Daily Dispatch (1 May 1991). 
Similarly, in 1987, a number of individuals accused of necklace murders were on trial and former Minister 
of Law and Order, Adrian Vlok argued that, “as long as gruesome and senseless killings such as necklace 
murders and public funeral pyres are committed, no one can claim pardon for such brutal killers…these 
acts can never be condoned and must be treated by competent courts of law as crime and nothing else.” 
See, „Necklace Killings: No Pardon, says Vlok‟ in The Sowetan (4 September 1987). This was in response 
to calls for the apartheid state to dispense with capital punishment. 
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Klerk, the ANC must be held responsible for such killings. Effectively, this would 
“remove whatever moral base it [the ANC] may have had to point fingers at others 
concerning the violence.” Indeed, this was the argument that De Klerk presented in 1992 
through an open letter to Nelson Mandela.
 34
 In particular, in the TRC submission, De 
Klerk was attempting to point out the gross violations of human rights committed by the 
ANC and the lack of candor in their submission as to responsibility and accountability for 
such violations. He argued that the ANC condoned the practice and that by implication, 
“blame” rested solely with the ANC for the loss of lives by that practice. 
 
In its submissions and testimonies, the ANC juxtaposed Oliver Tambo‟s official   
condemning of the practice of necklacing in September 1987 and the apartheid state‟s 
refusal to publicise it with the extensive publicity given by the apartheid state to the 
statement by Winnie Mandela.
35
 The intended effect of this strategy, it appears, was to 
counter the former apartheid government and its functionaries‟ claims that the failure of 
the ANC and its ally, the UDF, to condemn necklacing more vociferously was 
tantamount to „ownership‟ and hence responsibility of and for the emergence of the 
practice.  
 
In the NP second submission, F. W de Klerk pointed to certain “facts” that “contradict” 
the ANC‟s claims that it never supported or condoned the practice. De Klerk cited certain 
key statements made in relation to the practice of necklacing, (the same statements as 
those cited in the propaganda booklet, Talking with the ANC… See Chapter One),36 such 
as Winnie Mandela‟s April 1986 speech as well as statements made by Alosi Moloi 
(“Among us we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You have to 
eliminate one to save hundreds of others”) and Tim Ngubane (“We want to make the 
                                                 
34
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death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of it”) in October 1985 
made at California State University in the USA.
37
 In particular, De Klerk cited the 
December 1986 Chris Hani “comment on the necklace” in which Hani stated: 
So the necklace was a weapon devised by the oppressed themselves to remove 
this cancer from our society, the cancer of collaboration of the puppets. We have 
our own revolutionary methods of dealing with collaborators, the methods of the 
ANC. But I refuse to condemn our people when they meet out their own 
traditional forms of justice to those who collaborate. As far as I am concerned the 
question of the necklace and how it should be used belongs to all of us, to the 
ANC, to the democratic movement.
38
  
 
Interestingly in the NP Party Recall, De Klerk stated that: 
If I read the ANC's evidence… correctly they say they were not in favour of 
necklacing… And I must accept if there is evidence from the ANC's leadership that 
they tried to stop it although as I point out there are quotes from the late Chris Hani 
and so on which indicates that they actually condoned this.
39
 
 
De Klerk acknowledged, even affirmed that the ANC was “not in favour of necklacing” 
but questioned whether the ANC leadership “tried to stop it.” Though it was the Hani 
“comment on the necklace” that de Klerk argued was proof that Hani both claimed 
„ownership‟ of the practice of necklacing (on behalf of the ANC and the UDF) and 
propagated its usage as a liberatory tool. As I have shown in Chapter Two, however, 
those responses were more ambivalent than any outright condoning or condemning of the 
practice of necklacing, that is, in condemning the practice, the ANC refuse[d] to 
condemn, to disown, those who partook in the practice. For the former apartheid 
government, by implication and by claiming responsibility for those who partook in acts 
of necklace killings, responsibility and „ownership‟ of the practice lay with the legacy of 
the liberation movement. 
 
The ANC criticised such allegations by arguing that it was, “a profoundly dishonest 
attempt to create the impression that Chris Hani expressed approval of, and claimed ANC 
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responsibility for, the phenomenon of „necklacing‟ by quoting one sentence from a 
lengthy response he made to a question on the ANC's attitude towards „necklacing‟.”40  
 
Speaking on behalf of the ANC, Mac Maharaj admitted that the ANC made a “mistake” 
in delaying outright condemnation of the practice of necklacing. Azhar Cachalia did the 
same in the UDF‟s submission to the TRC. 41 The reason both Maharaj and Cachelia gave 
for this hesitation in responding was that the organisations had not wanted to alienate 
their mass support base. For the ANC particularly, Mac Maharaj responded in part as 
follows:  
And the masses in this country need a huge tribute to be paid to them for where 
we are today, because by and large again, just as we focus sometimes on the 
violations and the larger picture disappears, and it appears as if the entire struggle 
of the masses was characterised by necklacing, it is the strikes, the 
demonstrations, it is the youth fighting with sticks and stones against saracens and 
tanks that has been an indispensable ingredient of where we are today. So the 
ANC in its efforts to reach home needed to interact with the masses in motion and 
it needed to appreciate anything that they did even if it looked to us from a 
distance to be a form that we did not like. It needed to locate its appreciation in 
that context. The result is both the necklacing and various other activities that 
took place could not be reacted to by immediately having the benefit of the 
knowledge that the enemy was perpetrating those acts and seeking to discredit us. 
It had to be reacted to as something that the masses had taken up under conditions 
of extreme brutalisation and repression.
42
 
 
The apartheid state, through its discourse, had in large part characterised the struggle of 
„the masses‟ in relation to necklace killings. Importantly however, as shown with the 
Hani statement of December 1986 as was discussed in Chapter Two, one is able to 
discern an implicit assigning of necklacing to „the masses‟ by the ANC whilst at the same 
time a claiming of „the masses‟ as belonging to the ANC. This, what I have called 
„between condemning and condoning‟, is indicative of the ambivalence towards 
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necklacing in relation to a history of the liberation struggle. Necklacing here was 
explained but was also explained away by claiming that it was the apartheid state and its 
security forces that introduced the practice. As the preceding quote makes explicit, they 
were “perpetrating those acts and seeking to discredit us [ANC and UDF].” From this 
observation can be suggested that the ANC and UDF were constantly attempting to 
counter the apartheid state‟s strategy of de-legitimising the liberation movement by 
assigning „ownership‟ of necklacing to the apartheid state.  
 
Magnus Malan, former Minister of Defense during the 1980‟s, posed the following 
question in his submission to the TRC, “Who conceived the „necklace‟ method and 
ordered the application thereof? Who chose and authorised the targets?” He proceeded by 
citing similar statements in relation to necklacing by prominent ANC leaders as done in 
the official NP submission, and his explanation for using those statements were: 
Why do I refer to these public utterances by the ANC leadership? What is their 
relevance to the actions of the South African Defence Force? The Commission 
should keep in mind that neither the actions of MK, nor the actions of the South 
African Defence Force occurred in isolation. Members of the South African 
Defence Force were kept informed of the statements by the ANC. Their sense of 
morality was obviously shaped and influenced by the sentiments expressed by the 
ANC leadership. This should be taken into account when the bona fides of the 
actions of members of the South African Defence Force is considered…. The 
purpose of these quotations is not to fuel the fire of criticism against the ANC, but 
to illustrate to this Commission the atmosphere which prevailed at the time when 
objectives were set, planning was done and orders were given, interpreted and 
executed.
43
 
 
Malan‟s statement points to a crucial aspect of the propaganda strategies of the 1980‟s - 
that of morality. If the statements made by ANC leaders shaped the moral standing of 
state security forces, then not only was a propaganda war being fought, on both sides, for 
justification of the legitimate use of violence, but also a battle for the moral high ground. 
From claims such as above therefore, the question of which was more morally 
reprehensible and more barbaric was invoked; security force agents disposing of bodies 
through burning (such as the case of Sizwe Kondile) or township crowds‟, „the masses‟ 
killing by necklace a perceived collaborator by the necklace? 
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Formulations such as that of Stadler‟s and Malan‟s highlight a claim for equivalence with 
regards to accountability for atrocities committed in relation to the liberation 
movements‟. Yet it is through the invoking of the above sort of question and through the 
submissions of both sides that the struggle for „ownership‟ played itself out at the TRC. 
During the mid 1980‟s, „ownership‟ of the practice of necklacing was in relation to larger 
strategies of de-legitimation and conversely legitimation over the use of violence in 
securing political aims. At the TRC, in the context of the indefensibility of apartheid and 
its forms of violence, the state waged a desperate battle to reclaim some moral ground, if 
only via a strategy of staining the ANC‟s record. In this sense, arguably whomsoever 
„owned‟ the practice of necklacing would be relegated to the annals of history as being 
the more morally bankrupt, reprehensible and barbaric in the struggle that beset South 
African society with greater intensity since the mid 1970‟s.44 
 
If the aporia persists, it is only because the claims of morality are founded on the grounds 
of the immediacy of violence, not its theorisation. We may want to heed the suggestion of 
Michel Foucault that, “no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it 
since it always occurs in the interstice.”45 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow‟s reading 
of this statement is insightful and helps to qualify the point I wish to make in reference to 
the quagmire posited by the argument about morality and violence. They suggest that:  
…the play of forces in any particular historical situation is made possible by the 
space which defines them. It is this field or clearing that is primary…this field or 
clearing is understood as the result of long term practices and as the field in which 
those practices operate…what takes place in the field is not simply the 
permutation of meaningless serious speech acts. These are social manoeuvres of 
great consequence for those involved.
46
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 Wendy Brown posits that the “interstice”, also called a “non-place”, a “place of 
confrontation” is a,  
non-place because in the confrontation or battle…at the site of emergence, 
contestants do not oppose each other within an order that houses them both, 
instead, each fights to bring into being an order in their respective images. The 
“place” that will feature the constituents recognized by the historian does not exist 
until the contest has been (provisionally) won; the contestants do not acquire their 
identities until the battle is (provisionally) over; the elements in a new regime do 
not exist until that regime has (provisionally) emerged, until a new order of 
meaning and power has been brought into being.
47
 
 
In response to the question posed at the TRC as to why the ANC took so long to respond 
to the rise of the practice of necklacing, Mac Maharaj cautioned that, “if some people say 
our condemnation was made too late we can say, in all honesty that yes, it is possible to 
make that judgement from hindsight, but it would not be a judgement that would be very 
wisely made, and should not be too lightly made.”48 A similar caution is advanced by 
Kader Asmal when he posits that Every Step of the Way “is a strikingly humane history, 
aware of the ease with which hindsight can lead us into harsh judgements of our past.”49   
 
Perhaps the most blatant attempt at making such a judgement has recently come from 
Anthea Jeffery who argues that whilst the ANC and the UDF did not “openly endorse 
such executions [necklace killings]…neither did it condemn them. On some occasions, 
members of the organization seemed almost to welcome them.”50 To qualify this claim, 
Jeffery cites the same statements cited by the former apartheid government and former 
state security agents as discussed in this chapter. Whilst the overall argument of Jeffery‟s 
„history‟ is that the ANC is responsible for the some 20 500 people that died between 
1984 and 1994
51
, necklacing is cast in a very similar discourse to that suggested by the 
apartheid state during the mid-1980s and at the TRC in the mid-1990s. Despite Jeffery 
implicitly acknowledging ambivalence on the part of the ANC and UDF, this 
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ambivalence, it appears, is tantamount to responsibility with no recourse to further 
analysis.
52
 For Jeffery, the practice of necklacing is (re)presented simply as an aid to the 
ANC‟s policy of „People‟s War‟ through terror and intimidation in securing a “virtual 
monopoly on power.”53 
 
Thus for Jeffery, Oliver Tambo‟s „official‟ condemning of the practice of necklacing in 
September 1987 is formulated against a broader discussion of those that openly 
condemned the practice. She cites AZAPO and Inkatha statements as juxtaposed to those 
statements of the ANC and UDF who presumably for Jeffery, despite the implied 
ambivalence, condoned the practice. In this regard, Jeffery cites Oliver Tambo‟s 
denouncing of the practice but then proceeds to cite statements made by certain leaders of 
the ANC made later, such as the Chris Hani interview of December 1986 that supposedly 
propagated the practice.
54
 Whilst Jeffery‟s book sparked a debate between herself and 
Mac Maharaj concerning the validity of Jeffery‟s claims,55 I wish to point out that in 
attempting to write a history of South Africa‟s liberation struggle, more needs to be done 
than simply inverting the binaries in which that struggle was fought. For Jeffery, as it 
relates to necklacing, this includes her not merely engaging but to some extent 
perpetuating the same rhetoric as that of the apartheid state and its allies, so-called 
„moderate blacks‟ and in so doing, perpetuates a historicist rendering of so-called „black-
on-black‟ violence.56 
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While Every Step of the Way engages the „official‟ non-state discourse on necklacing, it 
also perpetuates the rhetoric of that discourse but in a way that I suggest is somewhat 
similar to Slavoj Zizek‟s formulation of a “fetishist disavowal”: “„I know, but I don‟t 
want to know that I know, so I don‟t know‟”. Zizek continues and adds: “I know it, but I 
refuse to fully assume the consequences of this knowledge, so that I can continue acting 
as if I don‟t know.”57 It is somewhat similar because it is not that in Every Step of the 
Way there is a refusal to “assume the consequences” of necklace killings. Rather, despite 
the “unimaginable and unthinkable” nature of such acts of violence as the burning of 
Sizwe Kondile‟s body, there is a plea for a remembering, for inserting such acts into 
history. Necklacing however, seemingly rendered as „imaginable and thinkable‟, is also 
seemingly forgotten, being rendered, I want to suggest, as outside of history. Yet it is also 
that very juxtaposing that allows for the limits of the relation between history and 
violence to become visible. Just as the liberation movement (here specifically the ANC) 
struggles to confront acts of violence such as necklace killings, so too history, or rather 
disciplinary history, is faced with an impasse, that of the difficulty of coming to terms 
with violence, of rendering violence narratable.  
 
Before proceeding, it must be stressed that the argument being presented here is not one 
of re-engaging the struggle over necklacing in relation to „ownership‟, or of engaging a 
politics of blame. Rather my argument is that recourse to struggles over the „ownership‟ 
of necklacing limits what can be said about the liberation struggle. This is insofar as the 
seeming obsession with the „ownership‟ of necklacing and the politics of blame has at its 
root a question of how a history of liberation struggle incorporated within a nationalist 
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project works in and/or against coming to terms with “a difficult legacy”. With this in 
mind, what follows is a broader discussion of the interplay between history, violence and 
nation with the aid of, amongst others, Gyanendra Pandey. 
 
History-violence-nation 
One of Pandey‟s central arguments in his study of Partition in India is that, “violence and 
community constitute one another” in many different ways and that therefore, “narratives 
of particular experiences of violence go towards making the „community‟- and the 
subject of history.”58 The subject of history then is „community‟, that can be read as the 
local that constitutes the nation. Following this argument, Pandey suggests that, “violence 
becomes the language that constitutes - and reconstitutes - the subject.”59 Indeed, in 
South African liberation struggle discourse, the subject constituted and reconstituted are 
„the masses‟ as Chris Hani emphasised in 1986 and as Mac Maharaj took pains to 
emphasise at the TRC. 
 
In relation to nationalist histories, Pandey cites E. Valentine Daniel‟s argument that in the 
founding of nation-states, there is an “aestheticising impulse” as regards the official 
claims and denials of violence. For Daniel more specifically, “the nation-state is 
aestheticized by the nationalisation of its past, which is projected onto the future – by 
which act the present is appeased.”60 This impulse at “aestheticising” in Every Step of the 
Way comes to the fore when Kader Asmal writes of a “national experience” of a shared 
past, present and future and struggle beginning with,  
[p]olitical protests and civil struggles against the injustices and oppression of 
undemocratic rule. Different sorts of people were involved, often disputing among 
themselves how resistance might be conducted most effectively. Towards the end, 
a militant minority took up arms and confronted repression with bloody 
consequences…when the shooting was effectively over, a new and more inclusive 
politics started…out of this grew the civilized conditions for shared citizenship in 
a single yet healthy plural nation, with a great assortment of peoples, 
communities, customs, cultures, religions, traditions and life chances. Perhaps, 
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more than anything, inclusion was what people most wanted from their new 
statehood…this is, self-evidently, not the description of an imaginary country. It 
is a description of South Africa at the turn of the 20
th
 century…for our purposes 
what matters is the historical point: South Africans are like others in the ways in 
which they have come to the challenge of hammering together a nation. If 
building a nation has involved robust arguments, principled disputes, the 
resolution of conflict through compromise, or mediation between the haves and 
have-nots, that is how nations all over the world have come to be made. 
Nationhood has also come about when people have faced up squarely to the 
nature of their past, and to the questions it has raised, even when these have not 
been easy questions. Equally, it is present history which moves them forward, 
always into unknown territory. With the past behind and future ahead, all of us 
face futures we can only but imagine, carried by the hope that through the right 
choices and influence, things will go our way rather than come to get us.
61
     
 
The “aestheticising impulse”, according to Pandey, is perpetuated when „history‟ works 
to produce the „truth‟ of violence but denies its force at the same time, naming an event 
and yet denying its eventfulness. In Every Step of the Way, necklacing is named as 
resistance but there is a shying away from such acts of resistance, somewhat similar to 
what Shahid Amin means when he argues that, “[t]he nationalist master 
narrative…induces a selective national amnesia in relation to specified events that would 
fit awkwardly, even seriously inconvenienc[ing] [that] neatly woven pattern.”62 In the 
case of liberation struggle narratives in South Africa, that “neatly woven pattern” is the 
resistance narrative. Pandey thus points to (re)constructions of the nation, particularly 
through violent struggle, that invariably gets cast through the language of violence, yet 
denying that violence, of it being somehow outside of history at the same time.  
 
Thus in Every Step of the Way, necklacing, as it relates to a history of the liberation 
struggle, is rendered as outside the (non)imaginary nation which Kader Asmal 
propagates. Whilst I take the point offered by Amitav Ghosh that “what a book says is 
much more important than what it does not say”,63 I suggest that it is within the interstice 
of what Every Step of the Way says and what it does not say that possibly allows for a 
consideration of what it might mean to write necklacing into a history of liberation 
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struggle in South Africa. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to examine the work 
of history in (not) narrating moments of violence so as to argue that the interplay of 
history, violence and nation may shed light on “the shadowed world of forgetting.”64 
 
Pandey highlights common ways in which disciplinary history has dealt with violence. 
One such way has been to proclaim violence as non-narratable. Here, as in societies that 
experienced “uniquely unique” instances of traumatic, genocidal violence, a “limit case” 
of history is declared. A second way is the localising of violence, “in time, as a freak 
occurrence, like a natural calamity, which requires no historical explanation (these things 
happen); or in space, as a characteristic happening in some unassimilated part of the 
society or the world (these things happen there).”65 A third way in which violence 
becomes non-narratable is “through transforming the history of the event into a history of 
its causes or origins - which, thus, themselves become the event.”66 
 
In the previous chapter, I pointed out that some of these limits were not just restricted to 
disciplinary history but to the social sciences more broadly, which rendered the practice 
of necklacing explicable via the turn to causality. Whilst recourse to causality suggests a 
limit in rendering violence intelligible, there is an irreducibility in turning to causality as 
an interpretative framework. In this sense, Reinhart Koselleck argues that, “[i]f one 
wishes to comprehend the singularity of a historical event, one can only use causal 
inferences in a subsidiary role.”67 An example of this would be the approach to history 
that sees the production of histories as constitutive of questions around the representation 
                                                 
64
 M. Morris, Every Step of the Way, 322. 
65
 G. Pandey, Remembering Partition, 46. 
66
 G. Pandey, Remembering Partition, 45. Indeed, this is precisely the approach advocated by South 
African historian William Beinart. This approach is also discernable in Mahmood Mamdani‟s detailed 
study on the Rwandan genocide. I do not suggest that contextualisation is not necessary, rather I am 
inclined to agree with Dominick LaCapra when he posits that, “contextualisation is an altogether necessary 
but not sufficient condition for historical understanding, particularly in intellectual and cultural history, 
where dialogic and critical issues of reading and response are also pertinent.” See W. Beinart, 
„Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography‟ in Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3. Special Issue: Political Violence in Southern Africa, (Sep., 1992). See M. 
Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). See D. LaCapra, History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical 
Theory (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), footnote 1, 72. 
67
 R. Koselleck cited in G. Pandey, Remembering Partition, 50. 
 
 
 
 
 134 
of pasts and more specifically questions of the representation of violence and nation 
therein.  
 
This approach is evident in the recent histories of assassinations of prominent African 
political figures, specifically Luise White‟s The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo and 
David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo‟s The Risks of Knowledge. Cohen and 
Atieno Odhiambo deal with the death of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya in 
1990, John Robert Ouko.
68
 The authors trace the evidence that came to constitute the 
knowledge that surrounded investigations into his death as does White in her analysis 
into the death of Herbert Chitepo, an African nationalist from Zimbabwe (formerly 
known as Rhodesia) who was killed by a car bomb in Zambia in 1975.
69
 
 
This knowledge, for Cohen and Atieno Odhiambo, included testimonies of various 
individuals at the official Commission of Enquiry immediately following the death of 
Ouko as well as the repeated re-emergence of its evidence into the public sphere over 
more than a decade. For White it is the numerous confessions and accusations that have 
surfaced over the years. My reading of the word „knowledge‟ can be understood as both 
meaning and representation. In other words, meanings ascribed to both the death of Ouko 
and Chitepo as they circulated in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean nations by means of 
constant media reporting and the constant search for „the truth‟ of who killed Ouko and 
who killed Chitepo as well as the circumstances that led to their death and thus the 
representation thereof. Put another way, the production of a particular history that is 
constantly being revisited. 
 
What is interesting is White‟s assertion that “events have rough and complicated 
antecedents, and each has an afterlife, often in the form of more texts and more words 
that render the actual event obscure.”70 Indeed this is precisely what Michel-Rolph 
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Trouillot underscores in his analysis of the ways in which history is produced and what 
Pandey points to in relation to the writing out of violence, of making it non-narratable.
71
  
 
For White and Cohen and Atieno Odhiambo, the texts that have appeared after the event 
that they are examining have been almost their sole interest in that it is not so much the 
event themselves that those scholars are examining, but rather how that event has come to 
be (re)represented within each text they examine. In both White and Cohen and Atieno 
Adhiambo„s narratives, the event of the killing of Chitepo and Ouko becomes secondary. 
Indeed the scholars say as much. This is not to say that what White and Cohen and 
Atieno Adhiambo attempt to do is „bad history‟, for indeed the production of histories, 
the circulation of meanings of particular events, the discursive formations of knowledge 
that come to constitute such events, are crucial in understanding historical knowledge 
practices. 
 
Both White and Cohen and Atieno Adhiambo do not seek to discover who killed the two 
prominent political figures. Rather they seek to unravel the complexities and dialogues 
that exist as well as permeate the various discourses surrounding the deaths of Ouko and 
Chitepo. White in particular is interested in the ways in which the death of Chitepo has 
come to play such a prominent role as a founding myth of nation.
72
 In many respects both 
texts critique grand narratives of progress, nation, voice/recovery and the centrality of 
capitalism. A focus on representation, as developed by White and Cohen and Atieno 
Adhiambo, suggests that it leads straight into questions of nationalism and possibly 
nationalism‟s failure to render violence narratable.  
 
In this regard, Pandey‟s point of the centrality of the state in relation to history 
(progress?) and nationalism is intriguing.
73
 He argues that “„real‟ violence, of which the 
„riot‟ [or in this case, acts of necklace killings] might be described as the quintessential 
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form, lies outside the domain of the state, outside progress and history.”74 Pandey 
therefore points to the „ahistoricity‟ of violence of which the assumption is that state 
„violence‟ is understood as state „force‟ that is written into history as the “unfortunate but 
necessary cost of progress” and „real‟ violence as being outside that history. Violence is 
thus viewed as an accompaniment to history and not as history itself. Where the writing 
of history repeats this ahistoricity, it can be said to be implicated and I would add 
complicit in such political projects.  
 
My reading of this particular strategy of rendering „real‟ violence non-narratable or rather 
of marginalising such violence, points to a tension within political projects where such 
projects are directed by those that fought for/in the struggle towards liberation. Here it 
would be productive to examine what happens to this distinction between „real‟ violence 
and state „force‟ when state power is transferred (in the case of South Africa, a negotiated 
transfer) from the oppressors to that of the liberators. The apartheid state and its 
supporters, as highlighted in Chapter One, strategically manipulated the term violence so 
that it only applied to actions by the liberation movement; the violence of the state 
disappeared, only to reappear in official discourse as legitimate force. Whilst the 
apartheid state saw the practice of necklacing as „real‟ violence and its repression on „the 
masses‟ as state „force‟; the ANC (as government in waiting) and UDF arguably regarded 
the practice of necklacing primarily as „state force‟ and to a lesser extent, though 
ambivalently so, as „real‟ violence. The practice of necklacing as state „force‟ was the 
complicity of the apartheid state in such acts.  
 
In the aftermath of democracy, the violence that constituted, as opposed to accompanied, 
the liberation struggle in South Africa may be considered as state „force‟, albeit 
fragmented, which implies that necklacing, as part of a resistance discourse, is no longer 
not only „real‟ violence, but also part of the “unfortunate but necessary cost of progress”. 
This indeed is the way in which the ANC has framed its discourse on necklacing. 
Although perhaps not in these exact terms, the gist of their argument has been that 
necklacing as the expression of the anger of „the masses‟ in achieving the means to a 
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liberated South Africa, and thus, was the “unfortunate but necessary cost of progress”. 
„Progress‟ however should be read here as a pre-activated trope for what was to be 
compromise and negotiation in the early 1990‟s.  
 
If struggle in the form of violent resistance leading to liberation is articulated in 
disciplinary history by way of making violence non-narratable, following Pandey, the 
question then is, can (should?) the moment of violence be written back into history? In 
Every Step of the Way, necklacing is (re)constructed in a similar way to Pandey‟s 
argument of the ways in which Partition in India has been rendered, in that there is a 
“normalising [of] the struggle, evacuating it of its messiness and making it part of a 
narrative of assured advance towards specified (or specifiable) resolutions.”75 For 
Pandey, writing moments of struggle back into history requires providing alternative 
perspectives to those (for him the history of Partition) advanced by nationalist discourse. 
Whilst Pandey is concerned with asking how to write a history of an „event‟ involving 
genocidal violence (Partition) “following all the rules and procedures of disciplinary, 
„objective‟ history, and yet convey something of the impossibility of the enterprise”76, I 
am concerned with asking how necklacing, as a manifestation of the violence that 
constituted the liberation struggle in South Africa, fits into the contours of disciplinary 
history. In attempting to respond to this question, I turn to Dipesh Chakrabarty‟s example 
of what he terms “subaltern pasts” and their ability to point to the limits of the discourse 
of history. 
 
Necklacing as signifier of “subaltern pasts” 
„Minority histories‟, are those histories that according to Chakrabarty, stay „minor‟ in that 
their incorporation into historical narratives converts them into pasts of “lesser 
importance vis-à-vis dominant understandings of what constitutes fact and evidence (and 
hence vis-à-vis the underlying principle of rationality itself) in the practice of 
professional history.”77 Chakrabarty calls these “subaltern pasts” in that these are 
marginalised not because anyone consciously intends to marginalise them but because 
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“they represent moments or points at which the very archive that the historian of a 
(marginalised) group mines in order to bring the history of that group into a relationship 
with a larger narrative (of class, of the nation, etc) develops a degree of 
intractability…these are pasts that resist historicisation…”78 For Chakrabarty 
importantly, the term “subaltern pasts” does not belong exclusively to socially 
subordinated groups. He posits that elite and dominant groups “can also have subaltern 
pasts to the extent that they participate in subordinated life-worlds.”79 
 
I wish to propose considering necklacing as a signifier of “subaltern pasts” within a 
broader nationalist history of liberation struggle. A nationalist rendering of the liberation 
struggle, as espoused in Every Step of the Way, suggests that a history of a particular 
manifestation of that struggle, namely the violence of the practice of necklacing, is 
relegated to the margins of that struggle story. 
 
History as a discipline, according to Chakrabarty, requires two questions to be answered 
affirmatively for any account of the past to be “absorbed into, and thus made to enrich, 
the mainstream of historical discourse: Can the story be told/crafted? And does it allow 
for a rationally-defensible point of view or position from which to tell the story?”80  
Chakrabarty posits that the way in which the story is told or crafted challenges historians 
to be both creative and imaginative in their research and narrative strategies. Relating to 
the second requirement, he argues that: “the story has to be plausible within a definable 
understanding of what plausibility may consist in. The author‟s position may reflect an 
ideology, a moral choice, a political philosophy but the choices here are not limited. A 
madman‟s narrative is not history.”81 
 
The point that Chakrabarty wants to underscore is that “the investment in a certain kind 
of rationality and in a particular understanding of the „real‟ means that history‟s, the 
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discipline‟s, exclusions are ultimately epistemological.”82 Chakrabarty thus posits that 
what is important is both the story that is told but more so, it is the historian that writes 
the story and her/his (in)ability at making the story plausible or, in other words, rendering 
it rational.  
 
It is necessary to briefly sketch Chakrabarty‟s argument to underscore the stake involved 
for both history and nationalist discourse in asking the question of what it might mean to 
write necklacing into a history of liberation struggle. Chakrabarty‟s aim is to understand 
what „historicising‟ the past does and does not do. He examines the seminal work of 
Ranajit Guha, „The Prose of Counter-Insurgency‟,83 and argues that in Guha‟s attempt at 
making the insurgent peasant‟s consciousness the core of a resistance narrative, the above 
mentioned questions renders historicising the Santal peasants rebellion problematic but 
productively so.  
 
The problematic is in Guha wanting to write the consciousness of the peasant into 
mainstream history, of making the peasant the agent of the insurgency. Indeed, the object 
of Guha‟s research is that of consciousness itself. Yet Guha is confronted with the 
subaltern ascribing agency to their god, „Thakur‟. Chakrabarty argues that when the rebel 
said, “I rebelled because Thakur made an appearance and told me to rebel”, “the 
subaltern is not necessarily the subject of his or her history but in the history of Subaltern 
Studies or in any democratically minded history, she or he is.”84 Thus, Chakrabarty 
argues that in Guha wanting to take seriously the voice of the rebel, he “cannot take it 
seriously enough, for there is no principle in an „event‟ involving the divine or the super-
natural that can give us a narrative-strategy that is rationally-defensible in the modern 
understanding of what constitutes public life.”85  
 
Chakrabarty continues and posits that Guha‟s position relating to the Santal‟s own 
understanding of the event thus “becomes a combination of the anthropologist‟s 
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politeness – „I respect your beliefs but they are not mine‟ – and a Marxist (or modern) 
sense of frustration with the intrusion of the supernatural in public life.”86 Guha, in 
negotiating this tension thus writes “it is not possible to speak of insurgency in this case 
except as a religious consciousness…except that is, as a massive demonstration of self-
estrangement (to borrow Marx‟s term for the very essence of religiosity) which made the 
rebel look upon their project as predicated on a will other than their own…”87 
 
The productivity of this problematic, for Chakrabarty, is that it allows for a critical self-
reflection of the historians craft: when there is no recourse to a rational-defensible 
position from which to tell the story, the very limits of the discipline of history are called 
into question. If minority histories “are going to be about inserting hitherto neglected 
identities into the game of social justice, [they] must also be good, and not subversive 
histories, for history here speaks to forms of representative democracy and social 
justice…” Though Chakrabarty argues that minority histories can do more than this:     
The task of producing „minority‟ histories has, under the pressure of a deepening 
demand for democracy, become a double task. I may put it thus: „good‟ minority 
history is about expanding the scope of social justice and representative democracy, 
but the talk of the „limits of history‟, on the other hand, is about struggling, or even 
groping, for non-statist forms of democracy that we cannot yet either completely 
understand or envisage. This is so because in the mode of being attentive to the 
„minor-ity‟ of subaltern pasts, we stay with the heterogeneities without seeking to 
reduce them to any overarching principle that speaks for an already-given whole. 
There is no third voice which can assimilate into itself the two different voices of 
Guha and the Santal leader, we have to stay with both, and with the gap between 
them that signals irreducible plurality in our own experiences of historicity.
88
 
 
For Chakrabarty, heterogeneity allows treating the Santal to doses of both historicism and 
anthropology - the Santal subject is treated as a “signifier of other times and societies.” 
But in asking if the Santal‟s way of being in the world is a possibility for our own way of 
being in this world, the Santal is neither historicised nor anthropologised:  
To stay with the heterogeneity of the moment when the historian meets with the 
Santal, the peasant, is then to stay with the difference between these two gestures: 
one, that of historicizing the Santal in the interest of a history of social justice and 
democracy, and the other, that of refusing to historicise and of seeing the Santal 
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instead as a figure throwing light on a possibility for the present. When seen in the 
latter, the Santal puts us in touch with the heterogeneities, the plural ways of 
being, that make up our own present…that is the function of subaltern pasts. A 
necessary penumbra of shadow to the area of the past that the method of history 
successfully illuminates, they make visible at one and the same time what 
historicizing can do and what its limits are.
89
  
 
It is this penumbra, this uncertainty, which plagues the question of what it would mean to 
write necklacing into a history of liberation struggle. Indeed, more questions have arisen 
from that inaugural question. Whose history/story of the liberation struggle should 
necklacing be written into, that of „the masses‟, those to whom the practice have 
overwhelmingly been ascribed to, albeit ambivalently? One might therefore also ask 
whether it is at all possible to write a history of liberation struggle without a treatment of 
necklacing that attends to its prose of ambivalence.
90
  
 
Indeed, Premesh Lalu, writing about colonial violence and the killing of the Xhosa king 
Hintsa in 1836 argues: “[i]f violence is the signature of our modernity, then we might say 
that this very violence is that which we cannot seem to escape.”91 He continues by 
suggesting that: 
[t]he uncertain relation of history to the intrinsic violence of modernity also places 
it in an uncertain relation to the encounter with the violence of apartheid. Given 
the aporia, it has become necessary to return to the place of history in this 
modernist predicament, not as a source but as a symptom. If apartheid is 
symptomatic of modernism‟s violence, then we might say that its history has not 
really escaped the realms of complicity. The discourse of history, we might say, 
hosts modernity‟s supposedly inescapable paradox. That much is known to us.92  
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It may therefore be that the inescapable ambivalence of historicising necklacing is also 
the condition of possibility for its persistent remembering.  
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By way of a conclusion 
The refusal of necklacing to be forgotten 
   
Ma ebizwa amagama amaqhawe Ngab‟elami 
Ngolifica likhona! 
Koba njani 
Sesihlezi noTambo 
Sesimtshela 
NgamaBhun' egingqika! 
(When the roll call of heroes and heroines is read, will my name feature among 
these? What will the atmosphere be when we meet Tambo to report to him about 
how we, revolutionary combatants, destroyed the oppressors!)
1
 
 
 
In thinking and writing about necklacing, one is drawn into representations of its 
gruesome practice, its complexity, its seeming singularity, its contradictory impulses and 
its ambivalence. Thus, concluding in the space of ambivalence is always to expect points 
of irresolution. 
 
Broadly, this thesis has examined the difficulty of writing necklacing into the narrative of 
struggle history. This difficulty arises from the interplay of apartheid state and „official‟ 
non-state discourses in relation to the practice of necklacing. Scholarly writings 
attempting to render the practice explicable have not been able to escape the inextricable 
bounded-ness of that interplay. Indeed, scholars have stumbled between a resistance and 
witchcraft trope where the former presents a causal explanation in which resistance arises 
from oppression/repression but in so doing re-articulates the ambivalent discourse of 
condemnation/condonation. The latter, in attempting to navigate a route through tradition 
and modernity, runs up against the obstacle of tradition/barbarism that has been placed in 
their path by the state discourse. This re-articulation of the dominant discourses speaks to 
the ambivalence that haunts necklacing and propels into being a „politics of ownership‟. 
In remembering the struggle for liberation in South Africa, I have argued that the 
forgetting to remember necklacing in liberation history functions to surreptitiously re-
introduce the „official‟ non-state discourse of necklacing. 
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With this in mind I want to use a „Letter from the President‟ in the November 2007 issue 
of ANC Today as a means of re-stating some of the more salient issues that this thesis has 
sought to examine.
2
 In the letter, former ANC and South African president, Thabo 
Mbeki, provided a summary of the book Oliver Tambo Remembered, 
 
published as part of 
celebrating and honouring former ANC president Oliver Tambo.
 3
 In a key section of the 
summary, „The Necklacing Must Stop‟, Mbeki cited Kader Asmal‟s contribution to the 
book in relation to the „official‟ condemnation of the practice of necklacing by Oliver 
Tambo at the September 1987 conference on children in Harare (Zimbabwe):  
[A] call was made for all the South Africans to gather away from the 
conference…There was silence when OR [Oliver Tambo] spoke movingly about 
violence by the regime and then, about „necklacing‟. There was a hush – exiles 
did not know what would happen next – but then there was a dramatic full-
throated roar of approval when Tambo said, „This must stop‟. I don‟t think, he had 
discussed this matter with the NEC [National Executive Committee] of the ANC. 
His was a cry, drawing on the humanism of our struggle and the need to relate 
means to ends. He did not need anyone‟s permission to do this.4 
 
Mbeki thereafter recalled the question of necklacing:  
[At] the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka, we had discussed the urgent need to call 
on the masses of our people firmly to repudiate the practice of „necklacing‟. At 
the same time, our Headquarters was interested that the call of our movement in 
this regard should enjoy the support of the leadership of the mass democratic 
movement in our country. OR thought the presence of many among this 
leadership at the Harare International Conference on Children provided us with a 
good opportunity to communicate the message that the entirety of our movement 
had to intervene to stop the „necklacing‟. To ensure that this message reached the 
masses of our people, successful arrangements were also made to ensure that it 
reached some sections of our domestic media… 
   
Mbeki stated that he referred to the “episode to make the point that the ANC that Oliver 
Tambo built, of which millions were and are proud, was and is characterised by a value 
system symbolised by the life, the words and deeds of that great hero of our people, 
Oliver Tambo.” Mbeki then made reference to his famous “I am an African” speech 
delivered at the adoption of South Africa‟s Constitution on the 8 May 1996: 
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Among us prowl the products of our immoral and amoral past… The great masses 
who are our mother and father will not permit that the behaviour of the few results 
in the description of our country and people as barbaric.
5
 
 
He then referred to a speech given by Oliver Tambo on the 1 July 1989: “It is indeed our 
collective responsibility to rid our country of the cause of conflict, deprivation and 
disunity which has earned it the distaste of the rest of humanity…”6  Mbeki linked this to 
his own call to members of the ANC to adhere to the “revolutionary oath” as propagated 
by Oliver Tambo. The letter is concluded with the freedom song that prefaces the present 
chapter. 
 
The letter should be read as serving a dual purpose: to memorialise Oliver Tambo but 
also, in so doing, to remind the ANC‟s constituency and the South African „nation‟, one 
month before the ANC‟s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane (16-20 December 
2007), of the ideal citizen that Oliver Tambo represented. Besides the obvious nationalist 
overtones in this public letter to the „nation‟ (the ANC, through Oliver Tambo, in a sense, 
as constituting the „nation‟), Mbeki laments the passing of Oliver Tambo and valorises 
Tambo‟s contribution towards an all inclusive South African nation which includes an 
answer to a question of necklacing. For Tambo, the question was ultimately whether the 
practice of necklacing would relate to a politics of ends. His response, born out of 
humanism, was for the practice to be stopped. 
  
However, as I have argued in this thesis, there never was an absolute and 
uncompromising condemnation of necklacing. Oliver Tambo and other ANC and UDF 
leaders condemned the practice of necklacing but did not condemn those, „the masses‟, 
who partook in the practice. In Chapter Two, I have suggested that this wavering between 
condemning and condoning was in part due to the ANC‟s concern to maintain its support 
base as well as its inability to clearly define whom it regarded as legitimate targets in its 
call to a „People‟s War‟. I showed that there was a blurring between who could kill 
legitimately and who could be killed legitimately. This wavering was exacerbated by the 
apartheid state mainly setting the discursive terrain on the practice of necklacing. In other 
                                                 
5
 T. Mbeki, „Oliver Tambo Remembered‟. 
6
 T. Mbeki, „Oliver Tambo Remembered‟. 
 
 
 
 
 146 
words, because of the initial hesitancy in responding to the rise of necklace killings, the 
ANC and UDF were compelled to respond to the state discourse on the practice rather 
than set the discursive terrain themselves. 
 
Indeed, Mbeki‟s recollection of the „official‟ condemnation of the practice by Oliver 
Tambo is suggestive of the interplay of state and liberation discourses on necklacing that 
haunts current remembering of the practice. Mbeki states: 
Considering the importance of OR‟s statement on „necklacing‟, Helen Suzman 
sought to have this statement published. To her dismay, PW Botha refused. 
Cynically, Botha preferred that the „necklacing‟ should continue. This would give 
the apartheid regime the possibility, with charred human bodies as evidence, 
further to demonise especially the ANC and United Democratic Front (UDF), 
falsely attributing the unacceptable practice of „necklacing‟ to them.7  
 
The apartheid state had emphasised the publicising of statements made by ANC leaders 
that seemingly propagated the practice whilst ignoring those that „condemned‟ that 
practice as underscored in Chapters One and Two. The apartheid state discourse on the 
practice of necklacing characterised it as evidence of „black-on-black‟ violence with 
notions of barbarism and savagery. The apartheid state assigned „ownership‟ of the 
practice to the ANC and UDF and later at the TRC, this assigning would come to 
constitute a „politics of ownership‟. This „politics of ownership‟ permeates the legacy of 
necklacing in the liberation struggle as was shown in the previous chapter and is evident 
in the above cited quote. 
 
The TRC was a site where contested versions of the liberation struggle were waged. 
There the question of necklacing was not only whether the practice should have 
continued or not, it was also one that encompassed the complexity of whether it justified 
the ends of a liberated South Africa. The contestation centred around whether the practice 
of necklacing was carried out by „the masses‟ in the name of the ANC and the UDF, 
whether understanding those who engaged in this practice was tantamount to condoning 
its occurrences and whether the practice as a form of resistance was rational at all. 
 
                                                 
7
 T. Mbeki, „Oliver Tambo Remembered‟. My emphasis. 
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However, for Mbeki in 2007, the question of necklacing seemingly does not constitute 
the same formulation of “the need to relate means to ends” that had as its constituting 
subjectivity, „the masses‟, as it did for Tambo in 1987. Through Mbeki‟s recalling of the 
question of necklacing, the practice is seemingly rendered as being perpetrated not by 
„our people‟ or „the masses‟ but by a handful. This enables Mbeki to place necklacing 
beyond the legacy of the resistance and oppression/repression binary in which Tambo 
formulated it. It is through Mbeki re-engaging that question of necklacing and through 
recalling its „official‟ response, the practice had to stop, that he re-asserts the ANC‟s 
„value system‟ that seemingly condemns the behaviour of ANC members that would lead 
to the „nation‟ as being referred to as „barbaric‟. In this sense, Mbeki re-formulates the 
question of necklacing in relation to ANC members, and by implication the nation, acting 
out of expedience in postapartheid South Africa. 
 
Thus, it is the response to the question of necklacing that is recalled by Mbeki to 
underscore a „value system‟ that he wants to assert as the moral compass of the ANC as 
well as for a South African „nation‟. Mbeki‟s reassertion of the condemnation by Tambo, 
juxtaposed with a sharp rebuke to ANC cadre‟s who have lost those “noble values”, 
served as an opportunity to discipline ANC cadres in the build up to the Polokwane 
Conference. Mbeki thus strategically reaffirms and re-legitimates Oliver Tambo‟s 
„official‟ condemnation of the practice so as to legitimise a policy espoused by Mbeki in 
rooting out those ANC members acting out of expedience. 
 
Mbeki re-engaged a discourse of necklacing approximately two decades and two months 
to the day that Tambo „officially‟ condemned the practice. Implicitly, Mbeki‟s attempts 
to obscure the ambivalence of necklacing in the country‟s “immoral and amoral past” 
was aimed at demonstrating that it was not „the masses‟ but only “a few among our 
ranks” and that, “ th[e] struggle did not turn our people into blood-thirsty and mindless 
brutes with no respect for human life and human dignity.”8 This was a question of 
representation as much as it was one about the national subject. In this sense what 
Mbeki‟s letter obscures is not only the ambivalence of the formulation of Oliver Tambo‟s 
                                                 
8
 T. Mbeki, „Oliver Tambo Remembered‟ 
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condemnation as was shown in Chapter Two, but also to the question of necklacing and 
its ramifications for a history after apartheid. 
 
In the case of the practice of necklacing it was not just the mere application of violence. It 
was the excess and excessiveness of that violence and its assignation to categories of both 
barbarism and resistance that renders it ambivalent. I suggest that in Mbeki‟s „letter to the 
nation‟, recalling Oliver Tambo‟s „official‟ condemnation of the practice of necklacing, 
though not its ambivalence, constitutes the possibility of also assigning necklacing to 
more than one category: one representational and the other, ontological. In this regard, a 
number of moves are apparent in Mbeki‟s rendering: Mbeki asserts a humanism in Oliver 
Tambo‟s call for the practice of necklacing to stop thus seemingly asserting a re-
presentation of the black subject in Tambo‟s humanist framework. In other words, 
Mbeki‟s articulation (as representative of the new state) operates to overturn the 
rendering of the black subject as barbarous and savage by the apartheid state; by re-
articulating the „official‟ non-state discourse, he inserts in its place Tambo‟s humanist 
black subject. 
 
However, and this is the second move, Mbeki includes the following sentence from his “I 
am and African” speech: “The great masses who are our mother and father will not 
permit that the behaviour of the few results in the description of our country and people 
as barbaric.” This perhaps points to a departure from Tambo‟s humanist framework. For 
Tambo, it was the practice of necklacing that was barbaric and not “the behaviour of the 
few”. Indeed, Tambo was unwilling to condemn „the masses‟ because the practice of 
necklacing, understood as resistance, was rendered explicable only in an 
oppression/repression context. 
 
Thus the third move discernable is that Mbeki, eliding this strategic departure, links 
Tambo‟s humanist framework to a question of the constituency of the current ANC.  
In this sense, Mbeki seems to offer a warning to the ANC‟s constituency and indeed its 
leadership, of slipping into a somewhat familiar formulation of being between 
„condemning‟ and „condoning‟ those among the ANC‟s constituency who are, “the 
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product of our immoral and amoral past.” In other words, Mbeki is pointing to those, 
“criminals who, whilst wearing ANC t-shirts, have corruptly abused their positions in 
government to manipulate government tenders to enrich themselves and their 
collaborators.” In doing so, Mbeki re-formulates the question of necklacing. 
 
This re-formulation, however, does not occur in the interstice of resistance and 
oppression/repression as it had for Tambo. I suggest rather that it is in the ramifications 
of a legacy of struggle that fails to attend to the ambivalence that saturates necklacing. In 
the end then, Mbeki‟s re-formulation operates within the same circular logic of 
ambivalence of Tambo and that Chris Hani in his “comment on the necklace” had tried, 
and failed, to escape. This then too must qualify as a prose of ambivalence.  
 
At the Polokwane Conference, Mbeki was relieved of his duties as ANC president and 
later in September 2008, of the South African presidency. However, a question lurking 
behind the tactical re- formulation of the question of necklacing by Mbeki as I have 
attempted to sketch here, suggests necklacing as signifier neither of resistance nor of 
“subaltern pasts”, but one of political power that strategically oscillates between past and 
present in a re-articulation of an „official‟ non-state discourse on necklacing. Mbeki‟s 
„letter to the nation‟, in so far as the emphasis placed on the „official‟ condemnation of 
the practice of necklacing, can therefore be read as a continued attempt at coming to 
terms with a national liberation struggle history. The “difficult legacy” that this history 
presents is haunted by the spectre of necklacing, indeed it is haunted by the refusal of 
necklacing and its ever present ambivalence, at being forgotten. 
 
Is it impossible then to escape this impasse of remembering and writing violence, of 
marginalising violence so that violence itself comes to stand as nothing more than a 
referential for larger narratives of nation-making and statehood? For indeed, as 
Gyanendra Pandey argues: 
Liberation is not a cut-and-dried object, obtained once and for all in some 
seamless form. Progress and justice are not notions of crystal-clear content and 
unmistakable indices, which may easily be measured. Every liberation in history 
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has come at the cost of the establishment of new hierarchies and new kinds of 
bondage, not to mention the reinvention of old ones.
9
 
 
This thesis then scratches the surface of that “difficult legacy” which necklacing poses. 
History certainly needs to do much more work at tracing the impasse that necklacing 
presents in writing histories of South Africa‟s liberation struggle. Though to do so, it may 
have to begin with its own ambivalence.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 G. Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 19. 
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Appendix   
Chris Hani‟s “comment on the necklace” 
 
Why the necklace? You know for a long time South Africa, being a colonialist 
power of a special type, has depended on the continued repression of our people 
through active collaboration by puppets. We know that even in the classic 
colonial situation in countries like India, Kenya, the old Tanganyika and 
elsewhere, the colonialist have depended on the African askari. Similarly in our 
country, we know ourselves that the colonialists, the racists, regime if you like has 
always depended on the active collaboration of the oppressed, on the recruitment 
of the Black policeman, the Black special branch and the Black agent stay in the 
same township as we do, they have been the conduit through which information 
about our activities, about our plans have been passed to the enemy. This has 
made the process of organization and mobilization very difficult. So the necklace 
was a weapon devised by the oppressed themselves to remove this cancer from 
our society, the cancer of collaboration of the puppets. It is not a weapon of the 
ANC. It is a weapon of the masses themselves to cleanse the townships from the 
very disruptive and even lethal activities of the puppets and collaborators. We do 
understand our people when they use the necklace because it is an attempt to 
render our townships, to render our areas and country ungovernable, to make the 
enemy‟s access to information very difficult. But we are saying here our people 
must be careful, in the sense that the enemy would employ provocateurs to use the 
necklace, even against activists. We have our own revolutionary methods of 
dealing with collaborators, the methods of the ANC. But I refuse to condemn our 
people when they mete out their own traditional forms of justice to those who 
collaborate. I understand their anger. Why should they be as cool as icebergs, 
when they are being killed everyday? As far as I am concerned the question of the 
necklace and how it should be used belongs to all of us, to the ANC, to the 
democratic movement. We should sit down and discuss amongst ourselves how 
we should mete out justice. What is revolutionary justice?  One fact is that, where 
agents and collaborators are concerned, we should establish, where is it (sic) 
possible our own revolutionary courts where justice should be meted out. And in 
those courts we should involve some of our best cadres so that our forms of 
justice do not degenerate into kangaroo justice. We would like to maintain 
revolutionary forms of justice. But SA is not a normal society; the situation is 
very abnormal. People are angry because we are fighting fascism in that country. 
The ANC will never abandon its leading role. We are saying to our people, 
whatever method you devise, there should be democratic participation, there 
should be democratic discussion and whatever method we use, that method should 
conform to the norms of the revolutionary movement. As I say we understand 
why the necklace has been used. We know even the negative and positive aspects 
of the necklace. There is a lot of discussion now going on the question of the 
necklace. But it is not this silly conclusion that it is Black on Black violence. The 
necklace has been used against those who have been actively collaborating with 
the enemy. We say the movement should be vigilant to ensure that whatever 
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sentence is passed on anybody, it is a result of participation by the revolutionary 
elements of our struggle.
1
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Chris Hani, „25 years of armed struggle‟ in Sechaba (December 1986), 15-18.  
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